Monthly Archives: October 2010

Why Western elites are so keen on “free markets” and “free trade”

An ideology may have its attractions, but that does not explain why it becomes the  ideology of an elite. Innumerable ideologies, sacred and profane, have come and gone without achieving such a status.. Sometimes, as with the French and Russian Revolutions, a dramatic event catapults a group with a particular ideology into power, but in a country such as Britain with a very long tradition with representative government, the ideological capture of an elite has to be by more subtle means.  The answer lies in the self-interest of the elite which emerged after the Great Reform Act when the balance of power began to shift from the landed aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. That elite gradually evolved into a broader middle class movement which in turn is evolving into a supra-national class,  a class which is closely bound up with big business.

 “I  just  think  that  a lot of modern  corporate  capitalists  —  the managerial class basically — has no loyalty to any country anymore, or any particular values other than the bottom line.” (Pat Buchanan quoted by  Daniel  Brandt  in  his article “Class Warfare”  in  issue  13  of Namebase Newsline  -http//

 Buchanan  is grasping a demon which he only dimly apprehends.  What is happening  is vastly more significant than simply gaining economic advantage. We are presently witnessing  the creation of an international class of plutocrats  who care for  nothing but  their  own  class.   They  have  the  potential  to  form  a  true international aristocracy.  If that happens,  the imperfect  democratic control  the  masses have been able to exert over their elites  in  the past  century  will end.  The prime tool for the creation  of  such  an international aristocracy is “free trade”.

 There are  parts of Western elites which are  reluctant  to embrace  “free markets”  and  “free trade”,  but the  general  economic trend is clear:  the internationalist, globalist creed is the  dominant philosophy  when it comes to trade and increasingly the idea  of  laissez  faire in the domestic sphere is being accepted in practice if not always in overt political policy. 

Why  have  Western   elites moved from the  socially  oriented nationalism  which dominated most of the twentieth century to laissez faire driven internationalism?  The answer is simple: internationalising politics gives them greater political control.  Laissez faire with its add-ons of  mass migration and the emasculation of the nation state provides a means to subvert the power of the masses to restrain the abuses of elites through democratic control. 

From the point of elites socially oriented nationalism was an aberration. In  most circumstances throughout history the wishes of the mass  of  a population  have  been  of little or no account in any  formal   sense. The  masses  made  their  presence  felt  through  rioting  – the historian Lewis Namier  memorably described  the government of 18th century England as “aristocracy tempered by rioting” – and  social disturbance  or as catspaws  in the service of elite members who wished  to rebel.  An elite took note only  when they were frightened enough – the creation  of  a form of national public assistance by the Poor  Law  of 1601 is a classic example of such behaviour.

Eventually,  representative government  evolved to the point where  the masses began to have a direct say in the political process through  the vote.  The elite as a group did not welcome this but felt it could  not be  resisted.  It was not democracy to be sure but elective  oligarchy, which  was  buttressed  by elite constructed devices   to  exclude  new entrants  into  the  political process  such as  first  past  the  post voting, election deposits and a very strong party system.  Nonetheless, once  the franchise was broadened the masses  were able to  exercise  a large degree of democratic control  because politics was still national and a political party had to respond to the electors’ wishes. The elite resented this control over their behaviour as all elites do and  looked around for a way to diminish democratic influence. They found the means to do it through internationalism.

 In  a  sovereign  country elected politicians cannot readily  say  this or  that cannot be done if it is practical to do the thing.   That is a considerable  block on elite misbehaviour.  So elites decided thatthe way round this  unfortunate fact was to  commit  to treaties  which would  remove the opportunity for the electorate to  exercise  control.

A most  notable  example is the Treaty of Rome  and  the  subsequent treaties which have tied  its constituent members  into the EU. Vast swathes of policy are no longer within the control of the EU members because of these treaties. Add in the treaties tying Britain to  the UN and the WTO and  the commitment of every mainstream  British party to them, and  democratic control has essentially gone.

But  internationalism  is not simply a bureaucratic  elite  device  to weaken  democratic control,  it is a sociological event in itself.   An elite thinks of itself  as a separate group,  a group which may in some circumstances   extend  beyond national boundaries  and  jurisdictions. The medieval aristocracies of Western Europe thought themselves part of a  chivalric whole.    When Charles I of England was executed  in  1649 the   monarchs of Europe were horrified because  they thought it  would set an example for other royal killings.

 The ruling elites in the First World today  have a class interest which binds  them more closely to one another than to the people  they  rule. Indeed,  there   is  arguably a greater sense  of  international  elite solidarity  than ever before.   This is because  modern  communications allow  people, goods and ideas to move with an unmatched ease. Because of  this the international class can constantly revitalise  and  extend their group solidarity.

 The  advantage to the elites of this culturally  based   international solidarity  underwritten  by many personal elite  relationships  across national  boundaries,   is that it allows them to weaken  even  further their  dependence upon their immediate  (native)  populations,  because not only does a particular national elite have a ready made excuse  for not  doing something – “Our treaty obligations will not permit it”  –  but the  personal relationships and the growing sense of  class  solidarity increases  the  confidence  and hence the willingness  of  the  various national  elites  to  act ever more in the  international  elite  class interest.  Indeed,  the more they are together and the  more  they  act together, the more  natural it will seem.

 It is important to understand that  elites are not  engaged  as a group in a conscious conspiracy against the masses.  What happens is that the psychological and sociological  forces which press upon us all push the elite to adopt policies which always lead to their retention of  power.

It is not difficult to see how this happens.  All human beings  have a powerful ability to write a narrative in their heads which will persuade them that they  act not from self-serving  or disreputable  reasons  but  honourable and socially useful  ones.   The consequence of this is that while individual members  of an elite  will consciously  comprehend   the  likely effect of  their  ideology,   the majority will simply accept their ideology at face value. This helps to bolster  and stabilise the elite’s position because no  secular elite  ideology ever  overtly  states  that the masses will  be  disadvantaged  if  the ideology  is  followed,  and in the case  of  formal  democracies,  theideology  positively  claims to materially better society as  a  whole. This  will emotionally reassure most elite members,  who  will  bolster their acceptance of the ideology through inter-elite conversations – if most  or  all those in a group are positive about something,   that  is most powerful social reinforcer.

 It is important to understand how we got  into the present mess.  Despite the widespread  ignorance of and economic theory and history amongst the elite , it wasn’t primarily an intellectual failure amongst those with power but one of character. Some failed to act rationally because of their inability to resist the laissez faire ideology, others failed because they feared the consequences of speaking out against the elite ideology, some failed because they had a vested interest in maintaining a system which paid them well.

The most dangerous people in the world

Imagine a group of ideologically driven people spread throughout the world whose wish is to ruthlessly shape the world in their own image. Imagine that their ideology is such that it has  severely damaged the societies in which its proponents have gained  influence and power. Imagine that this group is immune to reason, adhering to their ideology regardless of how it corresponds to reality or  how much damage it does.  Imagine  that  the ideology is such that it requires its followers to transcend all natural group affections such as the tribe, clan or  nation. Imagine men and women to whom treason is so much second nature that they have no conception that what they do is treason.

What groups might meet those criteria? Catholics during the Reformation would fit  much but not all the bill,  Marxists would be a near perfect fit for  much of the twentieth century and radical Muslims would make a fair fist of the description now. But there is another such group in the world,   a group which has existed for more than two centuries and which is now far more powerful and universal in its reach than any other ideologically driven group  in history and consequently  more destructive. ,

As a revolutionary political creed, the group’s ideology  has evolved from a desire to engage in the reckless reformation of  a nation’s natural economy  linked with a vague idea of the universality of Man, to a political position which includes the  deliberate settlement of its  territory by millions of  foreigners and the removal of  the ability of  the native population to meaningfully to protest through non-violent means by the transfer  of the country‘s sovereignty to supra-national powers by devious means. This group is not called terrorist; its proponents  hold and implement their ideology unhindered by the law in the most advanced societies in the world and in many of those societies   it has become the elite’s creed.

The ideology is liberal internationalism. It originally rested on  the laissez faire economics of so-called free markets (so-called because they rely on state intervention to prevent monopolies forming)  and free international trade bound in with the Enlightenment idea of the Universality of Man.   To this original portfolio has been added  the idea of  unrestricted movement of peoples across national boundaries, with labour treated simply as a factor of production , and the  totalitarian system of thought we know as political correctness, a propaganda system designed to both underpin the liberal internationalist ideal and deal with the social frictions created by  the implementation of the ideal. (Political correctness meets the criteria for a totalitarian ideology as  it potentially  touches every aspect of life because  the concept of discrimination can be applied to any human situation and because it claims that the only acceptable view on any aspect of life which it touches is the politically correct one).

You think it is absurd to say this group is the greatest existing threat to world peace or our own society? Not if an objective assessment  is made  of   the damage – economic, political, social and cultural – which they have caused in their various guises over the past century and a half.

Take the British example. Islamic terrorism has to date produced a toll of just over 50 dead and 900 injured in Britain, all from one dramatic event in July 2005  The peripheral effects of  these terrorists have been a reduction in the legal safeguards for those accused of a criminal offence, a worrying increase in the surveillance powers of the British state and a  decrease in the freedom of speech through both fear of Muslim reprisal and  zealous action by the state in repressing criticism of Islam.

That is serious damage, which will doubtless become more serious as time passes, but when compared with the consequences of  liberal internationalism for Britain since the middle of the 19th Century its significance is utterly dwarfed, for that is a litany of  catastrophic periods of economic failure,  enhanced class hostility, the wilful creation of racial  and ethnic strife,  war and the destruction of  democratic control. Indeed, one of the malign consequences of liberal internationalism is the  modern Islamic extremist threat to the West,  for that  is the child of mass  Muslim immigration to the first world, the gross provocation offered by  aggressive wars against Muslim countries by liberal internationalist war-mongers and the willingness of politicians under the spell of political correctness to pander to extremist Muslims within their societies.

These are the most dangerous people in the world; men and women to whom treason is second nature; quislings in the service of liberal internationalism


English National Identity

 The idea that the English are not a nation or have no sense of themselves as a people would have seemed very strange indeed to any generation of Englishmen and women before the present day. Cecil Rhodes’ belief that “to be born English was to have drawn first prize in the lottery of life” would have fitted very well with the sentiments of the average Englishman at most times in the past seven hundred years.

The roots of English identity are ancient. England was a cultural entity before it became a political state. When the Northumbrian monk Bede wrote his Ecclesiastical History in the early eighth century it was the Ecclesiastical History of the English not of the Saxons, Angles and Jutes nor of the various kingdoms of England, By the ninth century the English called themselves Angelcyn (Angelkin) and lived in Engalond speaking Englisc. When the Norsemen came they were opposed by the beginnings of a people. Certainly the bare rudiments  of  English national feeling existed from the time of Alfred. The various authors of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which began in Alfred’s reign (871-99) and continued for two centuries, had no doubt that the English existed as a separate people. Here is the Chronicle in 886: “The same year, king Alfred occupied the city of London and all the English turned to him, except those who were in the captivity of the Danes”.  The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is, incidentally, the longest continuous  record  ever written in Europe which  says  something about the strength of the early English sense of nation.

Political aspirations for an English state come early too. The eighth century Mercian king. Offa, styled himself as king of the English and in one document at least as rex totious Anglorum patriae: king of all the homeland of the English. As the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle progresses, it  is ever more ready to write of England as a single Kingdom. In 1014, at a time of great trouble from the Danes (Cnut was to be king of England within two years), Wulfstan,  Archbishop of York, made in “The sermon of the Wolf to the English”  the first  recorded appeal to the English nation as a whole.  By the time of the Conquest, England was  indubitably a single kingdom covering most of the land we know as England.

The Norman invasion stunted the development of  English national consciousness  for the better part of  three centuries. However, even in those times there were public signs of  awareness of England as a separate entity, most notably in the alteration of Arthur and his knights from an ancient British into  an English myth, and throughout the later  Middle Ages the English delighted in manufacturing  world   chronicles which showed the English occupying a primary role in world history.

Foreign visitors to England persistently reported from the fourteenth century onwards that the English were addicted to thoughtfully telling foreigners how splendid  everything English was and how inferior everything foreign was. Venetian ambassadors seem to have been particularly favoured in this respect especially when they were at the mercy of Thames boatmen. 

   Shakespeare’s echoed this chauvinism:

My people are with sickness much enfeebled; my numbers lessen’d; and those few I have almost no   better than so many French; who, when they were in health, I tell thee,  herald, I thought upon one   pair of English legs did march three Frenchmen. (Henry V)

In the sixteenth century national consciousness took a quantum leap forward. Englishmen began to think of themselves as not merely worth more than your average Johnny foreigner, but as a chosen people, the uccessor race to the Jews. Cromwell believed most passionately that God was on his and England’s side.  By the twentieth century the idea still existed but the responsibilities of Empire had mutated it into a sense of duty.

Perhaps the most persistent and profound evidence for the English sense of themselves as a separate nation is the strong  antipathy towards foreigners which  they  have persistently shown since the employment of Frenchmen at Edward the Confessor’s court after his return from exile in Normandy.  The oft repeated liberal dirge  about  “this country’s  proud tradition of welcoming foreigners” is so utterly at variance with the historical reality that it is both risible and sinister. The truth is that the English are an  insular people who have ever been  suspicious  of foreigners, especially at various times the French, the  Spanish, the Dutch, Italians and Jews. The truth, like it or not, is that immigration has always taken place in the teeth of opposition from the mass of English men and women.

Daniel Defoe’s poem “A true born Englishman” (written in 1701) is frequently cited by the England haters as proof of the insubstantial nature of English national identity. This is most curious because what Defoe (real name Foe) was attacking  was not a lack of English national feeling but the reverse, a rampant chauvinism and hatred of foreigners which he portrayed as unwarranted because the English  were he claimed an exceptionally mongrel race. But a tale lies behind this poem.  Defoe was a hired pen who would write   anything for anybody provided the work paid – he spent  of his adult life stumbling from one financial disaster to another.  After William died, Defoe sold his services to the Tory Harley without any qualms.  The poem was a piece of Royalist propaganda to make William of Orange’s assumption of the throne seem to be merely the last in a long line of foreign conquests. If circumstances had been different DeFoe would have been as happy to pen a piece extolling the racial purity of the English if it had suited his purposes and   circumstances.

Those who now decry the very idea of Englishness do so on very flimsy grounds. They almost invariably cite trivial aspects of culture when proclaiming the supposed  stronger national identity of other peoples. The inadequacy of such definitions can be easily shown.  The most commonly cited defining characteristics of the Scotch, Welsh and Irish are such things as these. The Scotch are known for tartans, the kilt, the bagpipes, haggis, the thistle, whiskey, golf and Burns. The Welsh are associated with Eisteddfod’s, the Welsh language, choirs, chapels, leeks, rugby and sheep. The Irish bring to mind shamrocks, Guinness,  St Patrick, Catholicism  and folk music.  A similar list of symbols can be made for England without any difficulty: St George, fox hunting, Shakespeare, roast beef and cricket, All of which proves nothing about the respective strength of their national identities. What it does tell us is the nebulous nature of the reasons for despising Englishness which the England haters purvey.

Cultural unity

How far a people are culturally united may be judged by their internal antagonisms. Englishmen recognise one another as Englishmen regardless of class and regional variation. Thus a working class Englishman may genuinely hate an upper class Englishman simply because of his class, but he will never think of him as anything other than English. A Northerner  may curse “soft Southerners”  but  not  as foreigners. Home counties folk may laugh gently at northern manners, but it is done in the form of family chafing.  Such   a sense of natural community is unmatched in other nations of any size.

 The truly amazing political and cultural homogeneity of England is seen in the absence since the Norman Conquest of any serious regional separatist movement within the heart of English territory. There has been meaningful  resistance at the periphery – Cornwall, the Welsh marches and the far north, – but nothing since the sixteenth century.  Englishmen have fought but not to create separate nations.

The vicious poison in the British economy is the outlandish cost of housing

The price of housing, both to purchase and rent, is severely distorting British society. The absurd cost of property now – around £165,000 on average and considerably more in areas such as  Central London where a studio flat costs  upwards of £200,000 – makes it impossible for the large majority of people to get on the housing ladder which in turn inflates rents. The lack of housing scandal, for that it what it is, poisons the lives of ever increasing numbers of people in Britain.  The fault lies at the feet of reckless politicians who allowed the incontinent housing boom, failed  to build adequate  social housing for 30 years and  permitted  mass immigration.

Things used to be very different. In 1955, a time when there was  still a shortage of housing after the war,  the average price of a UK  property was £2,000 (1) , which adjusted for inflation is £39118 in today’s money  (2 ). The average weekly wage  was £10 17s 5d  (3),  worth £ 212  in 2010 (2).  This meant that someone on average earnings in 1955 could purchase the average priced property  for less than four times yearly earnings.

Today  the average wage is approximately £25,500 having dropped from £28,000 in the first six months of 2010 (4) , With the average price at £165,000, the average earner needs more than six and a half time annual earnings to purchase the average property.   In fact, the would-be purchaser today is even worse off because the taxation of  the average wage now is more severe than it was in 1955.

To the problem of obtaining a mortgage today  is added the need for much increased deposits  since the economic crisis became full blown in 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Bros. To get property suitable for raising a family in most parts of the UK would cost in the region of £200,000. Even on an income of £50,000 a couple would struggle to find the now commonly required 15-25% deposit for such a property.

As for the large majority earning around the average income or below , a property purchase is out of the question. In places such as London even those on £50k would be priced out of the market  because a studio flat can cost £250-300k. The sad truth is that most people who have not already got on the housing ladder are unlikely to ever get on it as things stand. Instead they will have to pay extortionate rents with precious little security of tenure.

Imagine how easy it would be to live in Britain now  if housing was in real terms as cheap now as it was in 1955.  Someone on less than half average earnings would be able to buy a starter home. The private rental sector would fall considerably  both  because much of the cost of renting comes from the capital value of the house and the demand for rented housing would be much reduced.

The cost of housing is striking at the heath of society in the most fundamental  way: it is preventing people from  starting a family viz.:

“The findings suggested 18 per cent of 18 to 44 year olds, equivalent to 2.4 million people, are actively putting off having children because of high housing costs. This rises to 24 per cent among 18-34 year olds. One in five 18-44 year olds have waited for as long as six years to start a family, while 37 per cent expect housing costs to continue to delay their plans for another four years, according to the survey by the charity Shelter.” Two million Britons delay having a family due to high housing costs – Myra Butterworth : Daily Telegraph 18 Jan 2010)

This is unsurprising,  for how can a young couple today who cannot afford to buy a property – the vast majority – be expected to have any sort of settled family life when they cannot   buy , social housing is scarce and private rented property has little security of tenure.

The coalition government has just made a bad situation worse. In the 2010 spending review it announced that new tenants for social housing would have to (1) pay 80% of the market rent – which would make it impossible for large parts of the population to live in places such as London – and (2) not have security of tenure for life. (There  is policy creep on these things and it is odds on that once the principle is established, part of all of the new regime  will be extended to existing tenants.)

It is important to understand that it isn’t only those who have purchased a property or who own it outright who are effected. If only a fifth of those struggling to pay their mortgages lose their homes that will be hundreds of thousands of people in need of rented accommodation on top of the hundreds of thousands who are already on council and Housing Association waiting lists.  Such an influx will not only increase competition for social housing,  it will push up private rents. The other major effect of reducing house prices will be fewer and fewer new build houses.

We are rapidly returning to the housing shortages of the post-war decade. Then a massive programme of council housing was followed by first  Labour and then the Tories. The same is needed now together with action to force developers to build on land they hold or the land to be subject to compulsory purchase at a price for the land without planning permission.   The following is also needed:

1. The end of the Right To Buy

2. The end of buy-to-let mortgages

3. The re-imposition of formal controls on mortgage lending to ensure there is not another housing bubble – see appendix.

4. A restriction of social housing to those born British citizens.   It is indefensible for foreigners to be given housing before those born and bred here have their needs satisfied.

Of those suggestions all  but the last are still within the remit of Westminster. If Britain was  outside of the EU she could if she chose  stop immigrants from taking social housing, but as was shown by the response to Gordon Brown’s “Social housing for local people” in his last months in number 10, under present circumstances  any preference for native Britons  would fall foul of both British and European law; British law because of the requirements  of our equality legislation  and the obligation on local councils to house vulnerable people in need, especially those with dependent  children, and European law because any person legitimately resident in the EU has the right to move to any part of the EU and receive equivalent treatment in terms of social provision to the citizens of the receiving state. It is also probable that the Human Rights Act would come into play, most probably with the clause relating to the right to enjoy a private life.  Britain would have to either leave the EU or force a change in EU law to stop EU residents from  outside the UK taking social housing.

The problem of immigrants taking social housing is significant. The Equality and Human Rights  Commission  produced a report in 1989 which showed immigrants in approximately  10 per cent of social housing (5).  Even with the coalition government’s proposals for new tenants,  t his  is likely to increase substantially   as those who flooded into the UK when the new entrant countries such as Poland joined will soon begin to qualify for social housing.

The cruel truth is that the prudent have been subsidising the imprudent since the beginning of  this crash. Those without mortgages, both those who own outright and those who rent, are paying through depressed wages, lower benefits, reduced public services and the long term debt caused by the excesses of the past 12 years. Those who are being subsidised are the people who took out massive mortgages, often by the straightforward fraud of exaggerating their incomes, and/or ran up vast debts by drawing on the equity in their homes. The heaviest losers are those who have never owned a house outright or had a mortgage. They have gained nothing during the property boom and have had every rising rents inflicted upon them as property prices inflated unconscionably.




(4) (


A sane policy on mortgage granting would require these simple controls:

1. No mortgage of more than 3 times earnings for an individual or 4 and half times earnings for a couple.

2. Minimum of 15% deposit.

That was roughly the position until Thatcher removed the controls on lending in the 1980s.

The end of self certificated incomes for mortgages is welcome but it needs to be done efficiently. It is no good looking at just pay slips for those under PAYE or accounts for the self employed because these are potentially under the control of the mortgage seeker through the forging of convincing payslips (easily done with modern computers and printers) or a collusion between the mortgage seeker and a crooked accountant.  Moreover, an honest accountant is dependent on what the self-employed give them by way of accounts.

For the vast majority (those under PAYE) the check  should be done using not only current payslips,  but the previous year’s P60 (this is HMRC’s statement of earnings and deductions for those under schedule E (effectively those under PAYE). In addition, bank statements and credit card statements should be sought to verify claims of indebtedness or the lack of it. The mortgage provider also has many opportunities via Internet searches in including most pertinently credit rating agencies and county court judgements. I would not mind betting these searches are not made in the vast majority of cases.  What is not needed is a minute audit of a person’s spending habits.

For the self employed the position is more complex because the best they can ostensibly do is provide accounts compiled by a qualified accountant.  Here they often find they have shot themselves in the foot because in  preparing accounts for tax purposes real incomes are almost invariably  understated if the person is earning above the tax threshold. Thus they evade tax but find the mortgage providers taking the tax income figure as the earnings even though it is much below the real income. However, provision of bank and credit statements could go some way to mitigating the problem by providing evidence of the real income. In addition, things such as credit rating checks and county court judgement searches would be most important because a self-employed person is more likely to end up with county court judgements against them. They are also much more likely to have been made bankrupt.

The people of England

One of the most frequently voiced myths of the England haters  is  that  the English are a peculiarly  mongrel  people.  The  truth  is  that  compared with most  other  peoples,  England  between  the Conquest and 1945 contained  a very  homogeneous  community.

A   little  thought  will  show  the  improbability  of   the “exceptional mongrel”  claim. The simple fact that Britain is an  island  suggests that there will be  greater  racial  and  cultural homogeneity  within her borders  than in continental  lands  which  share borders and which consequently are more vulnerable to immigration and invasion (there is not a  major  country  in  Europe which has not been invaded  in  the  past century).  England  by contrast   has not  been  successfully invaded by people from outside the British Isles since  1066,  while mass immigration was a rarity until our own day.

The general facts of immigration into England are these.  The English and England were of course created by the immigration of Germanic peoples. The British monk, Gildas, writing in the sixth century, attributed the bulk of the Saxon settlement to the  practice of British leaders employing Saxons to  protect  the Britons from Barbarian attacks after Rome withdrew around  410  A.D.  The English monk Bede (who was born in  A.D.  673)   attributed  the origins of the English to the Angles,  Saxons  and  Jutes who came to England in the century  following  the  withdrawal  of  the  Romans at the  request  of  British  war leaders.

Archaeological  evidence suggests that  substantial  Germanic  settlement   in England had a longer history and  dated  from  the  Roman  centuries,  perhaps from as early  as  the  third century.  What is certain is that in her formative  centuries  following  the  exit  of  Rome,   the  various  invaders  and  settlers  were drawn from peoples with much in  common.  They were  the  same  physical type,   there  was  a  considerable similarity of general culture, their languages  flowed from a  common linguistic well.

When the Norsemen came they too brought a Teutonic  mentality  and origin.  Even the Normans were Vikings at one remove who,if  frenchified,  were  not  physically  different  from  the  English  nor  one imagines utterly without  vestiges  of  the  Norse mentality. Moreover, the numbers of Normans who settled  in England immediately after the Conquest was small,  perhaps  as few as 5000.

After  the Conquest,  the only significant  immigration  into England for many centuries were the Jews.  They were expelled  from England in 1290.   There was then no large scale and  sudden immigration from outside the British Isles  until the flight of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (which granted limited toleration to the  Huguenots  within France) in 1684 by Louis X1V.

There was other immigration in the period 1066-1650,   but it was  small and highly selective.   Craftsmen of  talent  were encouraged particularly in the Tudor period. Italian families with  trading and banking expertise (such as it was in  those  days)   appeared  after the expulsion of  the  Jews.  Foreign merchants  were  permitted,  but for much of  the  period  on  sufferance  and  subject  to  restrictions  such  as   forced  residence within specially designated  foreign quarters.

The  reintroduction  of  the  Jews  to  England  during   the Commonwealth  (a  small  Jewish  community  was  in   England unofficially  before then) was substantial enough   to  cause  riots in London. However, their numbers were still relatively small, thousands rather than tens of thousands.  The  great  influx  of  Jews to England occurred in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries as they fled first the  Tsarist  pogroms and then Hitler.

For  reasons of political correctness much is made  today  of  the long history of coloured peoples in England. Pedantically this is true,  but the pertinent question with immigration is always  how many?   I dare say that at any time  during   the Crusades  one could have found the odd Moor in England,  most  probably in London. Blacks, most of them slaves or ex-slaves, were brought into England from the sixteenth century.   Their numbers  in  London  by 1600 were  great  enough   to  prompt  Elizabeth to  pass an Act banning further black immigration. This Act had mixed success. There is no evidence of  widespread  black  settlement in the years  afterwards, but by the eighteenth century there was a significant population.  The blacks  of Elizabethan times and later were generally  slaves who  lived  with their masters. Those who  did  not,  settled  overwhelmingly  in  three  places:   London,   Liverpool  and Bristol.   The upper estimates of their numbers in  the  late eighteenth century (when settlement was at its peak)  suggest   a black population of perhaps  10,000. Substantial numbers of  these were resettled in Sierra Leone in West Africa, a colony which   was  established  in  the  late  eighteenth   century  specifically  for the purpose of returning blacks to  Africa. The  overwhelming majority who remained in England  were  men and  took white wives out of necessity.

The  flow of blacks into England was much reduced after  Lord Mansfield’s  narrow  and cautious judgement in  1772  on  the  status  of  a  slave in  England.  Mansfield  concluded  that  slavery  was such an obnoxious state that only  positive  law enacted by Parliament could make it legal in England.  In the  absence of such law,  slaves were  effectively free once they stepped  onto English soil.  This had the effect  of  gravely reducing  the  number blacks coming into  England.  With  the end of the Slave Trade in 1807, black immigration was reduced          to a bare trickle.   The combination of intermarriage and the ending of regular black immigration  meant that by the middle of  the nineteenth century they had left few descendants  who identifiably  black.  The impact of coloured immigration on  English   society  was   negligible  in  terms  of   cultural  influence before 1945.  The immigration since the last war is unprecedented in its nature and numbers.

Within the British Isles  the main mass movements of  people prior to this century were from Scotland and  Ireland  after the Clearances and the Famine.


What makes a nation?

Man is designed by Nature to live in small groups (even today most of the world’s population live in small settlements despite millennia of urban settlement). Human beings are very large mammals which naturally seek a diet containing a good proportion of meat. Large mammals which rely on a substantial intake of meat are near the top of the food chain. They are necessarily few in number because the food they require is scarce. Hence, large agglomerations of humans are impossible without the greatly enhanced supplies of food produced by farming. The archaeological evidence supports this reasoning. Evidence of large human settlements is not found beyond, at best, 10,000 years ago (for example Jericho). The remains of large human settlements dated before 4000 BC are very rare.

Why have human beings formed larger groups than those in which they naturally lived for hundreds of millennia? The fact that Man is a social animal is, as our philosophical friends say, a necessary but not sufficient condition for such behaviour. It does not mean that men take easily to living in large groups, but it does provide the possibility of such social engagement. But because living in large groups is not natural to Man in the sense that his evolutionary history did not include such behaviour and because the complexity of life is greatly enhanced in large communities, he result is always imperfect. In a tribe of 500 it is easy to see how a sense of belonging and identity exists, because everyone will have a personal relationship of some sort with everyone else. In a group of 10,000 that is not possible in any meaningful sense. Nonetheless, in a group of 10,000 the individual can still be practically aware of the group, for example through public meetings. With a group of a million the relationship between the group members becomes intellectual rather than personal or practical. That is when the problems start.

Man  can  create  such an  intellectual  sense  of  belonging  because he is self-conscious.  However,  this   consciousness also  provides the means to create distinctions between groups  of people. Hence war, tribalism, nationalism  and racism.

To  create  very  large  agglomerations  of  people  who  see themselves as part of a whole requires a core of values which are  accepted by generality of the population.  These  values may be religious,  as in the case of the mediaeval church and  Islam.  Then the sense of belonging is supranational,  indeed supracultural. But such feelings have always bowed before the   demands of family,  tribe, feudal lordship and nation.  Hence  the  failure  of the mediaeval church’s claim  to  supremacy;  hence the mutual antipathy of many Muslim peoples  throughout       history.   National identity does not consist of  clone  like  similitude,  but  it does require  a sense of  belonging,  an          instinctive   recognition  of  those  included   within   the  parameters of a national group.

 Taking the evidence of history as a whole,  it is  reasonable to conclude that  there is an inherent tendency within  human  society to  attempt to create ever larger units of  political  authority.   However,  like all behavioural  traits   in  the  natural world, it is no more than a tendency and there is  an  opposed    tendency   for  large   political   groupings   to  disintegrate  if  sufficient cultural  homogeneity  does  not  exist.  It is noteworthy that empires have been markedly less durable  than  nations throughout  history.  Nations  survive defeat, enslavement and centuries of oppressions. Empires may mutate as the Russian  did from Tsarist to Soviet,  but  they  cannot  withstand successful conquest. Then they  always  die and stay dead.

The components of national identity

National  identity  is most commonly presented  in  terms  of  such  banalities as “national dress” (often  a mark  of  past  servitude),  food  and crafts or in the  more  demanding  but still  narrow  world  of  High  Art.    Both  are  inadequate   explanations because they touch only a small portion of human existence.   To  find  the  answer  to  a  people’s  national  identity  one  must  look to   their  general  culture  which includes  at  its most  sophisticated,  science,  technology,    politics,   education,   sport,  history,   morals,   humour,  language. 

 From  the  general  culture comes what might  be  called  the secondary  human personality,  which is developed by  and  is  continually   developing  the  components  of   culture.   By  secondary  personality  I mean  a nurtured   overlay  on  the   innate  personality.  The  range of  basic  human  traits   –   aggressiveness,   placidity,  timidity, extroversion  and  so  forth  –  are universal.   But those qualities are  the  mere  skeletons  of minds.  Above them stand the  modifications  of  experience.   From   experience    develops   the   secondary  personality.  The social context of that experience  and  the  reflection   of   that  experience  through   the   secondary  personality creates culture,  is culture.

All  of  this  is not to say that the  material  and  mundane accoutrements  of a man’s life are completely unimportant  to the foundation of national identity. There are certain things which  are such a part of the warp and weft of  life  over  a  long  period  that  they acquire true  symbolic  value.  For example,   The wilful  destruction  in England  of their  historic  measures  which  arose  naturally  from man’s  everyday  needs   and  a coinage more than a thousand years old,  has helped undermine  the self confidence of a people who retained such things  not  out of backwardness,  but from a sense of national worth  and  importance.

Politically incorrect film reviews – There is none so blind that can PeeCee.

The Blind Side

128 minutes

Main cast: Sandra Bullock, Quinton Aaron, Tim McGraw, Kathy |Bates, Jae Head, Lily Collins

Director John Lee Hancock

If you require a primer on the white liberal mentality in general and their perception of blacks in particular this is your film,

“The Blind Side” ploughs the same rescuing-the-black-underclass furrow as “Precious” . But where “Precious” depicts the central character in the context of her day-to-day ghetto life and allows her to have some distinctly rough and unappealing edges, her equivalent in “The Blind Side” is a paragon, albeit one so bloodless as to be next to transparent. , Both films are fairy stories:  “Precious“ is one by the  Brothers Grimm, “The Blind Side”  a  white liberal version of  “And  they all lived happily ever after“.

So off we go. Once upon a time there was a  rich white family consisting of Leigh Anne Tuohy (Sandra Bullock), Sean Tuohy (Tim McGraw), a son of about eight known as SJ (Jae Head) and a teenage daughter who decide to take in a homeless black adolescent named Michael Oyers (Quinton Aaron)  despite being (shock, horror!) Republicans, Christians and Southerners.

As befits a fairy story, Michael is a truly fabulous creature.  At the beginning of the film he is sixteen or seventeen. We are told that his mother is a hopeless crack addict who has borne  “ twelve children… or maybe more”  to  many of  whom she cannot  put a father  (when the mother fleetingly   appears she is the healthiest looking long  term crack user and  high-volume producer of offspring you ever did see.)

Michael’s childhood has supposedly been a mixture of physical, material and emotional insecurity in a classic  black ghetto – a violent, drug infested world – , glimpses of which were are shown as he occasionally  revisits the projects where he grew up.  At the beginning of the film we are told that his  education has been next to non-existent and  his IQ has tested as a lowly 80. .  However, Michael has two things going for him: he is very large and very athletic. This gets him  into a decent private school where he encounters the Tuohys, whose children attend the school,  and eventually to university and a professional American football career.

Despite his upbringing  Michael is conscientiously non-violent, won’t look at a drug, finds alcohol distasteful and, Heaven forefend,  shows no apparent sexual interest in girls, despite being a teenager  with presumably raging hormones.   Even more amazing he has perfect manners. After his first  night at the Tuohys,   he immaculately  folds the bedclothes he has been given before leaving the house.  A little later there is an unintentionally hilarious scene when the family celebrates Thanksgiving. While  the Tuohys  take their plates and sit around the television, Michael, bless his ghetto etiquette educated heart, takes his plate to eat from the dining table.  Leigh Anne sees this and the  Tuohys are  immediately shepherded  to the dining table to follow the superior manners of  their remarkable  guest.

The family are equally unbelievable in their reception of Michael.  Leigh Anne is a veritable modern Mrs Jellaby, the terminally disagreeable character in Dickens’ Bleak House  who is  deeply concerned with the benighted natives of Africa and  negligent  of her own children.  She does not go to Africa for her benighted native, she finds him on her doorstep, the boy being  invited into the house  in the most casual way when she encounters him walking along a road,  never having previously spoken to the boy . From that  wildly  implausible start, Michael becomes a permanent fixture in the home without any meaningful discussion amongst the family as to whether he should do so.  Not only does no  word of protest about this gross intrusion into their lives fall  from the lips of the husband or children,  the family  immediately re-orients their lives to make Michael the focus of their family and  fall over themselves to be nice to him – the son SJ does this in an extravagantly  precocious manner which would incline one to forgive Herod if the wretched child  had been included in the slaughter of the first-born.   Most wondrously, the  children  show no resentment or jealously  no matter how extravagantly their parents pander to Michael and, boy, do they pander.

Michael  is given his own newly furnished room, fed and clothed, provided with a private tutor (Kathy Bates) to help him get the grades he needs to take up a football scholarship, is taught to drive  and on his birthday receives as a present from the family a brand-new sports-utility vehicle.

When Michael celebrates his new car by taking the Tuohys’ son for a ride he crashes due to his wilful  inattention and injures SJ.  Leigh Anne far from being in a rage about the injury to her only son is all concern for Michael’s feelings and rushes to assure him it wasn’t his fault. The rest of the family don’t refer to the accident. The final cherry on the let’s-be-nice-to-Michael-at-any-cost-cake is the Tuoys offering to be Michael’s guardian, something which is met with universal  hyperbolic family joy.
This eerily unreal air of ecstatic jubilation at Michael’s very existence exuded by the Touhys seeps over into the parade of university reps who come to try to persuade Michael to  attend their university. 

The  white liberal guilt trip rises to a crescendo when Michael is interviewed by a public official about why he wants to go to a certain university. The official is a black woman who is concerned that ol’ whitey is up to his evil ways by trying to emotionally capture black boys with athletic talent  who they can then direct to their own satisfaction. . She suggests to Michael that the only reason the Tuohys have done all that they have done for him is because they wish to direct his athletic  prowess to their old university. Notwithstanding the preternatural generosity shown him, Michael immediately becomes outraged at this shocking thought and  turns on Leigh Anne before going missing. Cue for  Leigh Anne  agonising about whether she and her family  have been trying to make choices for him, She frantically seeks Michael out and, wait for it, apologises for  even suggesting that he might want to go to a university for which she had affection.

But the  liberal  desire to wallow in guilt is a form of masochism, and like all masochists they wish to control the pain. They are happy to humiliate themselves only on their terms,   This means Apart from a few snatches of ghetto life “The Blind Side” takes place in a remarkably white world  of white home, white school, white tutor, white football coach. If there is an abuse of Michael it is his almost complete removal from people of his own race.  What the Tuohys want is a Michael  made in their image. .

There are three important  sub-plots. The first concerns anyone Leigh Anne knows or meets who makes any suggestion which can be interpreted as racist, a word which in the strange world liberals have foisted upon us can mean virtually any expression of opinion which is other than wildly enthusiastic about the joy of diversity. Leigh Anne’s lunching club  female friends who have the temerity to suggest that she might be biting off more than she can chew or that this is just her latest worthy cause,  are first reprimanded then cast into the outer darkness after one of them is rash enough to suggest there might be just a hint of danger in having a large black male adolescent in their house when they have an attractive  teenage daughter. This, of course, panders to another primary white liberal trait, an intense desire to play the role of the morally superior being.;

The second involves Michael’s education.  As already mentioned,  his IQ is   a “tested 80“ , a surprising intrusion of realism into the film because  the average IQ of American blacks is 85 .  However, that is where the realism ends about Michael’s intellectual ability  because he then proceeds with the help of a special tutor to gain the necessary grades for university entrance.

 The film does not actually say so, but the clear implication is that those pesky old IQ tests which are always showing blacks with a substantially lower average IQ than whites or Far East Asians such as the Chinese are really just indicators of social circumstances. (Interestingly, “Precious”  uses the same device with the central character making a mess of an IQ test early in the film).  This is an unpersuasive argument because ,despite the vast amount of money and manpower put into schemes such as Head Start, there has never been a proven case of IQ being substantially and permanently raised by teaching.  There is also the glaring fact that if it were possible to raise IQ substantially and permanently by teaching  the rich would long ago have purchased the privilege for their children. They have not because no such teaching exists. 

The upshot is we are left with the startling idea that someone with an IQ of 80 can handle a degree course, startling because an IQ of 80 is the point at which most psychologists working in the field of intelligence testing think that an individual begins to struggle to live an independent life in a developed economy such as the USA.  Just to add to the wonder of it all, Michael, someone who supposedly has had no meaningful education until he is sixteen or thereabouts, is writing  fluently about his life not long after we first  meet him  and before he has a personal tutor.

The third  sub-plot is the absurd portrayal of  Leigh Anne as a dominant woman.  The white men she meets throughout the film are wet in the extreme, an amazing fact as the main white male characters are all southerners, folk not generally noted for their subservience to the gentler sex.  .  Leigh Anne  addresses them as if they were naughty schoolboys in the manner of  a dominatrix with  the type of  shouty all purpose  “Southern” accent that is the American equivalent of the English “Mummerset“, To this  abuse  these Southern males merely bow their heads meekly and gaze in wonder at the marvel of the woman.  The nonsense reaches its apogee when at the end of the film she is searching for the missing Michael and ventures into the ghetto from which Michael has supposedly come. Here she harangues  a distinctly nasty looking gang of “rude boys“ who cringe before her threats.  In the real world she would most probably have ended up dead or raped or both.

There are other problems with the film. The Tuohy family seem to live in a world of  not only almost perpetual circumstantial light, but of light which is dazzling. Nothing but nothing brings gloom and doom, not even SJ’s injury.   The characterisation is one-dimensional with Michael being  little more than a looming physical presence who acts as a  reflecting board for the white liberal mentality. 

The screenplay has been written by numbers with frequent exchanges of brute sentimentality.  The writers fondly imagine that they have been subtle in putting in the odd scene which clashes with the general air of undiluted worship of Michael, for example, on  the boy’s  first night in the Tuohys’ house  Leigh Anne makes a show of wondering if he is going to steal form them or wreck the place.  However, when such scenes arise, and they are very occasional, the non-pc thought is immediately squashed by a another scene which shows how ridiculous and racist is the very idea of Michael behaving badly .

 The screenplay’s cringe-making quality  is epitomised by the   exchange when Michael is asked whether he wants the Tuohys to become his guardians: “Would you like to become part of the family, Michael?”. Michael: “I thought I already was”. There are plenty of other saccharine gems like that so those diligent enough to see the film are advised not to eat anything before viewing.

That this ridiculous piece of  political correct agitprop should have not only been an Oscar contender,  but landed Sandra Bullock the Oscar for best actress (no pc whining about gender specific awards when it suits the feminists note) demonstrates the grip which political correctness has on the US elite. . Unlike “Precious” which was a powerful film, this is simply feeble failing on every important  criterion by which a film is judged: plot, screenplay,  characterisation, and  acting. If you must see it, go as a duty to see what the multicultural  enemy is up to  not for recreation. 

Why do white liberals behave in this grotesquely patronising fashion?  Simple, blacks are their clients not their friends. Liberals do not see blacks as equals or even as fully fledged human beings. They relate to  them in much the same way they might view an exotic animal which has become a fashionable pet.

 The problem with being a client of those with power and influence is that fashions change. In Britain forty years ago the role of liberal client  was played by the white working class, now the position is filled by a growing army of ethnic minorities.  The white working class lost their position by  disgracing  themselves in white liberal eyes through their failure to accept that they should  remain as pristine proletarians jealously guarding their working class culture without any aspiration to become middle class and  because of their growing hostility to the consequences of the white liberal policy of mass immigration, consequences which those who promoted the immigration ensured they avoided.  

What would an interesting film involving white liberals acting as Lady Bountiful  to the black underclass be like in these pc times? How about this, a white liberal  family  takes in an adolescent  black ghetto gang member  who is heavily into drugs and guns, is functionally illiterate, has no inclination to be educated and  is sexually incontinent. 

The white family then go on one of those  “journeys”  beloved of  progressives,  from liberal fantasists to  race realists as the erstwhile gang member introduces the children to drugs, gets the teenage daughter pregnant, robs the family, beats up the parents and reduces the family home to ashes in an act of arson before being gunned down after re-joining his  ghetto  gang , I am not saying that would represent everyday reality, but it would be a good deal more plausible than “The  Blind Side.”

Somehow I doubt whether that film will ever see the light of day.

Film recommendations

Young Victoria – I have very belatedly seen this, but better late than never for it is the best costume drama I have seen fin years. The casting is immaculate, from Emily Blunt and Rupert Friend as Victoria and Albert (Friend is the most impressive young British actor to appear for some time) to cameos by the likes of Jim Broadbent (a most amusing William IV, albeit sadly without his renowned quarterdeck language) ) and Julian Glover (Wellington with a most impressive prosthetic nose.). Mark Strong is first rate  as Sir John Conroy, the Svengali controlling Victoria’s mother.  I have seen Strong in two other  films in the year, Rock’N’Roller (where he played a London villain) and  Body of Lies (where he played a Jordanian prince who was head of Jordanian security). He is a most impressive and versatile actor, with a fine ear for accents. 
Sex and Drugs and Rock-and-Roll – Biopic of Ian Drury. This completes a trio of first rate biopics of rock stars in the past three years, the others being Control and Nowhere Boy.

Why have the bankers escaped punishment?

 The fragility of the belief in laissez faire economics can be seen by the readiness of almost all of the supposedly  big bad free marketeers  to rush for the support of the State when things go wrong. As the Government almost invariably steps in when it is a bank going bust, being a  banker  is a one way bet:  the bank makes money you get the vast remuneration: the bank fails the taxpayer steps in and you do not  suffer any punishment such as summary dismissal, the removal of limited liability if you are a director or  criminal proceedings, but are dismissed with a massive pay-off at worst and continue to be   employed on the same outrageous remuneration terms as  you were before the taxpayer had to bail out the banks.

 There is existing law which could be applied to culpable bank directors but never is.  Section 174 of the 2006 Companies Act details the duties of the directors as follows :

 (1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and


(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised by a

reasonably diligent person with—

(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be

expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director

in relation to the company, and

(b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.

 How can the directors of RBS, HBOS, Lloyds TSB and Northern Rock be said to have met these requirements? Lloyds TSB have even admitted that inadequate due diligence was done before the takeover of HBOS.

There is also the question of general competence. The alarming truth is that  the executive directors of banks almost certainly did not understand the complex financial packages being devised by their investment arms which led to the crisis.  On 10 February 2009 the recently removed executive directors of the RBS and the HBOS appeared before the Commons Treasury Select Committee: Sir Fred Goodwin  (ex-RBS chief executive) and Sir Tom McKillop (ex-RBS Chairman),e Andy Hornby  (ex-HBOS chief executive) and Lord Steveson of Conandsham  (ex-HBOS  Chairman).

During their examination by the committee, each of the four directors on show was asked to detail their formal banking qualifications. All four had to admit that they had none. I am generally an enemy of credentialitis, but in this case technical qualifications are necessary to ensure that the directors understand the very complex financial instruments being used and  the exotic accounting practices employed  by large corporations. If failure to understand such things does not amount to gross negligence what does?

The  Companies Act allows shareholders, subject to the agreement of a court,  to sue directors for  negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust. No attempt has been made to removed their limited liability to allow this to happen. Nor, as far as I can discover,  has any attempt has been made to get bank directors banned from holding directorships in the future.   Why have the institutional shareholders not started such legal action to remove limited liability from directors so they can be sued?  Why has no politician raised the possibility of banning ex-bank directors from being directors in the future? The only plausible reason is the  tacit class interest encompassing  politicians, bankers and large institutional investors, the  last being the  only  non-governmental  people generally  with the financial muscle to fund  actions to remove the limited liability of directors. There is a simple legal way to stop them enjoying the fruits of their ill-gotten gains:  remove their limited liability and ban them from holding directorships for life.

As for criminal charges, I wonder if something could not be done under the laws relating to fraud. There must come a point where  recklessness behaviour becomes fraud because the director knows they are taking chances which will most probably not come off.  For the future we need a law of reckless endangerment which would make any director who endangered a bank or allied institution through their criminally reckless behaviour to be punished by the criminal law.

 The culpable bankers should be punished both from common decency and to deter others in the future. Those who are saying “we must move on” are  arguing a nonsense. Let’s try that argument with a few other scenarios: X murdered Y but there is no point in recriminations: we must move forward; X stole £50 million from his employer but that was in the past: we must move on.  Doesn’t really work does it? The argument politicians and bankers both employ promiscuously that to concentrate on bankers’ pay is to distract from the real issue of what is to be done about the economy is simply special pleading: reforming  bankers’ pay is part of dealing with the economic mess because if they have the same incentives to misbehave in the future and no penalty is paid by those who have misbehaved in the past there will be no reason not to misbehave once more. . 

Far from being punished, bankers who have left the banks they have helped ruin have received   gigantic pay-offs to reward them for their incompetence. The  case best known to the public is that of Sir Fred Goodwin of RBS who originally was to receive an immediately payable pension of more than £700,000 per annum,(since reduced to a more modest £400,000 odd )  but he does not stand alone. To take a couple of other examples, according to the Telegraph  (27 Feb 2009) “Eric Daniels, the chief executive of Lloyds Bank, which has accepted tens of billions of pounds from the Government, could receive almost £10 million in pay, perks and bonuses this year”,  while Adam Applegarth, the chief executive of Northern Rock when it failed,  a bank so badly damaged  that it is now wholly owned by the British taxpayer, reportedly   trousered  £760.000 (Northern Rock boss to get £760,000 payoff Telegraph Tony Undercastle 31/03/2008).

 Nor is it only bankers who have been so lucky. viz:   “Clive Briault, the official in charge of supervising Northern Rock when it collapsed, received a payoff of almost £530,000 after parting ways with the Financial Services Authority, it emerged yesterday. The payoff took Mr Briault’s total remuneration for the year to almost £884,000. FSA chief executive Hectors Sants collected cash, bonuses and other benefits totalling £662,000, compared with the £652,577 received by his predecessor John Tiner, despite the FSA’s own critical report into regulatory failings that culminated in the Northern Rock fiasco. “ (£530,000 farewell for FSA official who watched over Northern Rock  Peter Taylor  Telegraph 01/07/2008).

 As for politicians. not a single person  responsible for the mess has taken any responsibility. The person most at fault is of course Gordon Brown, who in more then ten years as chancellor debauched the British economy through massively expanded public spending and his role as cheerleader-in-chief  for the excesses of the financial sector.

Since the development of this economic crisis the Government has been advocating what they  represent as a  Keynsian solution.  The problem is that they  are only giving us half of  Keynes,. There  are two parts to his theory: the prudence of government in reducing public debt in good economic times and the use of public money to boost aggregate consumption in bad economic times. In fact, even that does not do Keynes justice,  because he advocated public spending to boost demand only as a very last resort after time had shown that the self-righting corrective of the market had failed. Gordon Brown as Chancellor neglected the prudent part of Keynes with the consequence that we arrived at the credit crunch is unprepared to carry out the second part of Keynes.

As for the independent  economic “experts” who supported laissez faire , have they suffered from  their failure to predict what was happening? Not a bit of it. They still occupy their posts in the media, think tanks, private consultancies  and academia, drawing their pay and pontificating as if their misjudgement and misunderstanding of economics  had never happened.

There is no excuse for the failure to predict the financial collapse.  It was  of course impossible to predict the detail of the crash but it really wasn’t that difficult to see what was coming in general terms. Some of us, myself included, picked the disaster before it happened, in my case in July 2007 before  even Northern Rock had collapsed. My decision to make such a prediction came when the housing bubble which was driving the economic boom became so extreme that first time buyers  on average earnings could not afford to buy a property in most parts of  Britain, despite mortgages of five and six times earnings and up to 125% of the value of the property being on offer. As first time buyers support the entire housing market, that could only have one result: a severe fall in  house prices which in turn would topple the boom into bust.  It was not, as they say, rocket science.   

The cost of the current banking failure

The extent of the obligations which the taxpayer has taken on is impossible to  calculate with any precision for two reasons. First,  it is not known how much of the money pushed into British banks  (RBS, HBOS, Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley)  will be recouped when and if they are sold.  Second, the extent  to which  the  loans guaranteed by the taxpayer (both for the banks which are now part owned by the taxpayer and those which are still technically impendent like HBSC and Barclays)  are subject to default is not known.  That the  “experts” are groping in the dark can be seen from the fact that the Governor of the Bank of England has refused to even estimate how much money will have to be put into the banks. (Mervyn King: ‘Impossible to say’ how much capital needed to shore up banking system By James Kirkup, Telegraph 26 Feb 2009)

There is also the possibility  that if  the Lloyds Group  is successfully sued by institutional shareholders on the grounds that  they were misled by the management before the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB or because of Lloyds TSB e failure to do due diligence  before completing the deal,  then the taxpayer might have to foot at further colossal bill, especially if the company is still part-state owned when a suit is successful.

The partly state owned banks are in theory to be sold reasonably quickly, probably  within the next five years, but  that assumes they will be in a state which will attract buyers and the world economy will have recovered enough in that time to create circumstances in which plausible buyers  will come forward.  There is a further fly in the ointment. The EU competition commissioner has already insisted that subsidiary parts of  RBS and Lloyds are sold off, with the added proviso that they must not be sold to buyers who would then have too large a market share in Britain. If that ruling is extended to the sale of the main bank assets it would create very grave difficulties because no British bank would be able to make such a purchase and the number of foreign banks able to do so would be very limited. That could result in the banks being broken up clumsily just for the sake of reducing size rather than for good commercial reasons or sold for a song.

In addition to the problem of finding buyers,  there is a very real possibility that  nothing like the full extent of  sub-prime debt has  been admitted to by the banks, whatever their ownership status, and only a fool would bank on both Britain and the world’s economy recovering fully within five years. The fact that RBS  had to be bailed out  again with mind-boggling sums so soon after the first gigantic cash injection is strong indicator of  the massive hidden bad debt still lurking within banks.

The hard figures for taxpayer’s cash being spent to prop up the banks are mind boggling. To date  RBS has received £45.5 billion – with another £8 billion earmarked if it is needed. Of that approximately £27 billion has already disappeared through the toxic debt trapdoor (as at November 2009). .  Through a series of complicated loans and repayments,   Lloyds Banking Group has received £14.7 billion net. Northern Rock received £27 billion in September 2007, although this has been reduced as the less toxic mortgages have been   redeemed  (Daily Telegraph High Risk gambling in record bank bailout 4 11 2009).

As for estimates of future obligations, even the government anticipate a  long term cost to the taxpayer of the bailout to be £20-50 billion,  but it could rise to  over £1 trillion if all the government insurance and other guarantees are called in – the amount underwritten in the governments Asset Protection Scheme  currently stands at £282 billion (ibib). In  July 2009 the IMF estimated the cost of  British taxpayer support for the banks to that date as £1,227 billion (IMF puts UK banking bail-outs at £1,227bn Telegraph 31 Jul 2009 Edmund Conway).

Then there is the  national debt. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) projects a  national debt of £792 billion by the end of the 2009/10 financial year  with another possible £1.5 trillion being added before the crisis is over. (Independent 5 11 2009 1.5 trillion  could be added to national debt). This would leave Britain with a national debt of  £2.3 trillion, substantially more than current GDP which is around £1.5 trillion. Before Northern Rock was nationalised, the National Debt was officially less than £600 billion. ( It should also be borne in mind that the National Debt is substantially larger than the current official figure because Brown’s Enron-style accounting has kept the true cost of PPP and PFI off the books, most of the ongoing debt not being included in the National Debt.)

In addition to the direct costs of this banking fiasco, there are the vast sums of money, loss of expertise and human misery caused  by a severe recession to be set against the politicians and bankers’ account.  There is now, as there has always been,  a signal failure amongst the laissez faire believers to acknowledge the true  economic costs of their  religion in terms of lost wages, lost tax, higher benefit payments and increased  anti-social behaviour when people are put out of work. A prime example of such  behaviour  was that of Margaret Thatcher when she  exulted in the destruction of  Britain’s heavy engineering and extractive industries without seemingly having any concern about the structural unemployment she was causing or its human and economic costs. .

There obviously have to be limits to  public service employment,  but it is clearly better, for both moral and economic reasons,  having people employed in useful – and I stress the useful – public service than unemployed, provided their wages can be met without radically destabilising the economy.  At least that provides people with purposeful lives and the public with something for their taxes.  Moreover where enterprises such as coal mining and the railways  and the  energy utilities are in public hands strategically important economic capacity is being maintained. Nor is it simply a case of defending public service provision for important private industries can be defended through protectionist measures. This mixture of public and private protection of employment opportunities could be further bolstered by a refusal to permit further mass immigration.

Why all the banks should be nationalised

 Until Lehmann Bros went down  (Sept 2008) it was still just about possible (although it took a good deal of credulity) to honestly believe that Northern Rock was simply a one-off  economic disaster, but once Lehmann had started the ball rolling last year it was soon  unmissably obvious that the entire banking system in the developed world was infected with the same criminal recklessness with every one being insolvent because all required government action to keep them afloat whether it be direct investment or government backed schemes such as Britain’s Asset Protection Scheme.  That being so, the  most rational  course would have been to force the banks into administration on the usual legal grounds of their demonstrable  insolvency and then go for immediate and complete nationalisation with no automatic compensation to shareholders because the banks were  insolvent.  The state would then have had legal responsibility only for bank deposits  and  a distribution to shareholders and other creditors would only be made if realised assets exceeded the liabilities, a distribution which would never occur because the liabilities were so vast there would have been nothing to distribute. However, for reasons of  British public confidence and international politics something would have had to be paid to the shareholders and other creditors.  

 This action would have immediately solved, as far as it can be solved,  the problem of a lack  of investor and depositor confidence because the entire weight of the British taxpayer will be behind the banks, which in an advanced economy is the best security there is. It  would also,  in all probability,  have cost a great deal less than what the crisis has already cost and what it is likely to cost in the future.   At worst it would have placed no greater burden on the taxpayer because we are already underwriting every financial institution while giving the additional benefits of allowing government to  rapidly (1) ) direct lending to where it is most needed immediately, namely, business. (2)  institute procedures to prevent reckless banking and (3) ascertain the true extent of the bad debts insofar as that could  be done. I say as far as possible because  debts can easily change their status from sound to bad as an economy worsens. In addition,  many of the financial devices used to market and circulate the sub-prime debt are so complex it is possible that no one really understands them. Indeed, they may have been  deliberately made impossibly complex to ensure that they could not be understood. Nonetheless,  an estimate could be made which  would at least give an order of magnitude of the toxic loans.  For example, it  could tell us that the debts were in the trillions rather than the hundreds of billions of pounds. 

 There is an obvious danger which would have to be guarded against. A banking system under state control would be prey to politicians manipulating bank operations  for their own political advantage, for example,  by extending credit freely supporters or, more broadly, instructing banks to apply looser lending rules  in constituencies which they hold  than in constituencies held by their political opponents. The worst case scenario is that they would  plunder the banks for their own personal pecuniary advantage. The check against such abuses is  unambiguous legal restrictions on what can and cannot be done by banks with thumping legal penalties for those who ignore the law and regular surveillance of the financial position of politicians and bankers.  

 Apart from dealing with the present crisis there are three good general reasons why banks should be nationalised. First, banking cannot simply be treated as another industry.  Money is the petrol which drives the economic engine. Take it away and a society is reduced to barter. An advanced society rests on a viable currency and a stable and reliable supply of credit.  It is simply too fundamentally important a matter to leave in private hands,  something which is tacitly admitted by British governments for  the taxpayer has long underwritten the vast majority of bank deposits. Once other restrictions were removed in the 1980s and 1990s this  allowed the traditionally staid British retail banks to borrow recklessly because the lenders know the taxpayer stands behind them.

 Second, the banks and their ilk  are the prime drivers of the growth in the money supply through their massive expansion of credit (when a loan is made the money supply increases by the amount of the loan, because the lender still owns the money and the borrower has the use of it.) The lack of proper controls over lending has effectively privatised control of money, with the financial institutions being allowed to contaminate the currency by creating money of widely varying quality. An analogy would be with a currency based on gold  with the government minting to a consistent standard,  while allowing private companies to mint coins to whatever standard they chose. Nationalisation puts the  control of the money supply back into public hands.

 Third, all modern banking is fractional reserve banking, that is, the bank holds liquid reserves which are only a small percentage of its debt. Thus it has considerable similarities to pyramid schemes (or Ponzi schemes if you must) because both rely on the sociological trait that in normal times only a small percentage of investors/depositors will want to withdraw their money at any one time. When times become extraordinary and there is a run on a bank, the bank rapidly becomes insolvent because it has little liquidity, . the reserves held being only a tiny proportion of the total liabilities of the bank in advanced economies. This is unlikely to radically change while banks are in private hands. Hence, private banks in places such as Britain  would  always be very vulnerable to runs on them if the state did not guarantee  most or all of the deposits. With British  banks in public hands the problem vanishes, insofar as it will ever vanish, because the depositors know it is guaranteed by the taxpayer.

 Bank nationalisation does not mean general state control of the economy. It is quite possible to retain capitalism for most other economic activity. It is only ideologues such as Marxists who think otherwise as they attempt to fit reality into their ideology rather than adjusting their ideology to reality. If something is practically possible – and this is – then human beings can decided that is how they wish to live. Supposed ideological necessity is no necessity at all if the ideology does not capture the mind.

 Nor would the nationalisation of the banks mean that the state would be the only source of credit. Companies could still raise money through rights issues and the sale of bonds. Private equity companies could continue provided they took only money actually owned by an investor, that is, the investor had not borrowed to make the investment.  Retail companies could fund their own credit schemes. Loans and investment on a personal basis could still be made.

Britain is  getting the worst of all worlds at the moment and will continue to do so if the banks remain in private hands.   They are propped up with country-ruining sums of money yet very little control is being exercised over them. The weasel-worded  policy of  “quantitative  easing” – the virtual-world   equivalent of printing money – which has so-far (November 2009) put £175 billion into the economy has not persuaded the banks to release the purse strings on lending to either private individuals or business. That is true even of  the banks  which are part or wholly owned by the  taxpayer:  RBS, Lloyds, Northern Rock and  Bradford and Bingley, Instead the banks are re-building their balance sheets at the taxpayers’ expense and, most shamefully, massive remuneration is being paid to the people who got us into this mess.  When the self-serving cries of  “We must pay the market rate to get and keep the best people”,   it should be remembered that not only are these the class of people who created the mess,  making money through  banking  is considerably easier now than it was before the recession began. because so much banking capacity has been lost.

In one sense the banks  cannot  be blamed for what they are doing because they are on one hand being instructed by government to re-build their balance sheets to provide greater security for their future trading and on the other to lend more to businesses and loosen  the reins on mortgage lending. They cannot do both, especially as much of the credit supplied in Britain prior to the recession was foreign originated, a source which has now dried up, and politicians of all sorts are yelling about the irresponsibility of  125% mortgages and mortgage multipliers of  six and seven times income. The result is businesses failing for want of their previously normal credit and the housing market limping along as first time buyers are effectively squeezed out of the market by 25% deposits and  3-4 times salary mortgage multipliers and many who need to re-mortgage finding to their horror that they cannot do it on affordable terms. However, that is not an argument to allow banks  to continue in private hands but an argument to nationalise, because it is quite clear that they will not behave in any interest other than their own while they remain nominally independent or are taxpayer owned enterprises waiting to be returned to private hands and still being run as quasi-private companies with,  in the case of RBS and Lloyds Group, the absurdity of having shares traded on the stock exchange while the taxpayer feeds  what are essentially insolvent businesses with seemingly endless and mind-shaking sums of money. 

The extent to which British  banks were serving their own purposes without regard to any other consideration  before the financial roof fell in can  be seen from their  massive reliance on foreign business, viz:: “Whitehall sources said that they had discovered that some major UK lenders – including RBS, HSBC and Barclays – have had only 20 per cent of their balance sheets made up of “traditional” loans to UK households and firms. Meanwhile, up to 80 per cent is tied up in loans toforeign nationals and companies, bond issues and other investments. “  ( Patrick Hennessy, 80 per cent of bank lending ‘went overseas’ 17 Jan 2009 Daily Telegraph )

 It would have been best if the banks had been nationalised right at the beginning of the present crises. However, the delay has taught the public one very important lesson, namely, that private enterprise is amoral and will always follow its own rather than the national interest.

 How much would nationalising the banks cost?  The honest answer should be no more than it takes to soak up their debts because the reality is that British banks were all insolvent when the rot set in after the demise of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Those banks which did not directly take taxpayers money, most notably Barclays and HSBC,  survived only because  of Government action such as  the Asset Protection Scheme which allowed them to lay off the risk on vast amounts of sub-prime debt  and the avalanche of money created through the printing of money by virtual means, otherwise known with quaint dishonesty as Quantitative Easing. As the debts of the banks vastly exceeded  the assets the normal consequence  of insolvency would be for shareholders to receive nothing because their shares would be worthless and  there would be no money to distribute to them after paying what was realised to the creditors.

 Many readers at this point will be saying, hold on, our economy is heavily dependent on financial services in general and the  City of London  in particular,  and much of  the money  government spends comes from the taxes drawn from the financial services. Won’t nationalising the banks kill the goose which lays the golden egg?

 The size of the financial services sector is large but it accounts for only a small part of  British GDP. Estimates of its size vary but most  are  in the range of  7-10 percent of GDP. IFSL Research puts the contribution of financial services for 2007 (the height of the boom) as low as £7.6 billion  put employment in the financial services in 2008 at 1.03 million and their positive contribution to the balance of payments  in 2007 at £36.9 billion,

That leaves a great deal of other British  economic activity and employment. Even with every financial institution in the country nationalised most of that banking activity would remain. In addition,  the profits to be made by cautious state banking would substitute for substantial parts of the current tax revenue which is spent by government. Moreover,  as economic commentators and politicians are beginning to acknowledge,  Britain’s heavy reliance on financial services has caused  the British economy to suffer  more than any other advanced nation in this recession  because the catastrophic losses sustained by the banks were proportionately larger because the banking sector was larger (Britain is the only major economy not to have come out of recession by November 2009). Arguably, reducing the proportion of  Britain’s economy which is dependent  on financial services would be a good thing in itself, although nationalised banks restricted to cautious banking should not get into the same sort of difficulty  again. 

As for the tax revenue derived from financial services, this is far from being a dominant funder of British government spending.  For example, the reported tax take from the City in the  financial year 2008/9 is £32.5bn (Open Europe 28 7 2009 Government reveals City firms contributed £32.5bn in tax revenue in a year) This is  interesting for two reasons: firstly, the £32.5 represents only around 5% of  the total UK budget spend for 2008/9 (excluding the bank bail-outs).  Hence, the idea that the City is massive  driver of tax revenue is objectively wrong. 

Secondly,  the tax paid by  the City is tiny compared with the amount that the taxpayer has pumped into the banks so far – hundreds of billions and perhaps as much as a trillion. Therefore, the total amount in taxes contributed by the City since 1997 is almost certainly much less than the taxpayer has had to pump in to date. Moreover, the pain is far from over because the banks and their ilk are almost certain to have further massive bad debts to announce which will result in more taxpayer support.

If we can only guess at what the ultimate cost will be to the British taxpayer, it is clear that that the sums involved are so vast they will  swallow up many years of the tax generated by the City. For example, if  the £2.3 trillion national debt figure is reached, that would mean the profligacy of the banks and their ilk in Britain would have saddled the taxpayer with  around £1.7 trillion pounds (the national debt before the Northern Rock crash was less than £600 billion.). Taking the £32.5 billion tax figure for the City in the past financial year, it  would require approximately  52 years of  tax revenue from the City at that level to meet the £1.7 trillion the taxpayer may have to service and/or pay down  if the predictions turn out to be anywhere near correct.

Even the City’s  contribution during the boom years is overstated, viz.:  “…we are apt to attribute the sudden spurt in Britain’s prosperity in the mid- to late-1980s to a deregulated and reinvigorated City, it owed far more to the massive windfall from the North Sea. Take a look at the numbers. In 1979, when Margaret Thatcher came to power, the amount Britain owed, as a nation, was £88.6 billion. In the subsequent six years, taxes from the North Sea (which had been pretty much non-existent previously) generated an incredible £52.4 billion. “(Edmund Conway Telegraph 4 11 2009).

There is also the question of the amount of tax bankers actually pay compared with what they would pay if they were under strict PAYE, the fate of the vast majority of British employees.   The Daily Telegraph reported (James Quinn  16 Oct 2009) that the tax due on a Goldman Sachs bonus pot of £13.5 billion  for 2009/10 would £2.5 billion.  Let’s do a bit of arithmetic. Suppose all of the Goldman Sach’s bonus pot of £13.5 bn is taxed at 40%. That would be £5.4 billion. Of course they will all have personal allowances and be taxed at the standard rate of tax up to the point where 40% rate comes into play. However,  balanced against those reductions are the NI contributions, both employee and employer, and the new 50% tax band above £150,000. That duty  would almost certainly substantially outweigh reductions caused by  the lower rate tax band duty and the personal allowances.  However, for the sake of simplicity,  let us assume that the higher rate tax band and the NI c contributions  merely balance out the lower rate tax and personal allowances. Instead of the £5.4 billion due at the 40%  tax rate the Treasury is only slated to receive less than half that amount (46.20% to be exact).. The balance is tax avoided at best and evaded at worst.  If it is only £2.5 billion the average real rate of tax on their entire earnings will be around 18% based on the entire sum being taxed at 40%., although  it could be even lower in reality depending  on  the balance  between  tax allowances and the lower rate tax band and national insurance and the higher rate tax band, possibly as low as 15%.  That would be a  substantially lower rate of tax than a worker on average pay under PAYE. Nationalise the banks and that type of  avoidance  would become a thing of the past if politicians have the courage and lack of self-interest to control banking  remuneration. 

The City of London has not been a boon to Britain, but an albatross waiting to be hung around all our necks.

Men, morality and international order

‘There is a maxim very current in the world, which few  politicians are willing to avow, but which has been authorized by the practice of all ages, that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons.’ (David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature Book 111 section X1)

 As Hume wryly noted such a view of public morality is rarely acknowledged by politicians, but until our present time it is doubtful whether its general practical application has been seriously challenged. Particular matters such as the abolition of the Slave Trade or the Factory Acts might result from private (individual) moral feeling dictating public behaviour, but most men have never expected governments to invariably act in a manner calculated to disadvantage no one. Above all, the general expectation has been for each nation to look to its own interests. Now for the first time we have in the West, particularly in Britain and America, a political class and an intelligentsia actively promoting, or at the least publicly accepting, private morality as the sole or primary determinant of public behaviour at all levels, including that of international affairs.

 At the level of the homogeneous nation, this incontinent promotion of private morality in public matters is perhaps no more than a serious inconvenience, for there is widespread acceptance of moral rules and both a sense and an actuality of common interest. Indeed, in such  circumstances private morality frequently coincides with public morality for there is much agreement as to what is just and reasonable, and where it does not coincide, the discrepancy can normally be covered with a decent hypocrisy. But translated to the heterogeneous society or relations between states where there is widely divergent moral ideas  and no permanent common interest, where disparate groups amorally vie for advantage, it becomes positively dangerous for then private morality is not merely often but normally inappropriate. Other things being equal, the scope for private morality in public matters might be said to be  proportional to the degree of homogeneity in a society or that shared between societies.

This irresponsible and inappropriate expansion of the scope of private morality is compounded by the general portrayal of Mankind as a single entity which is composed of beings who are expected to share the same morality and feel the same responsibility and sympathy for men whose society they do not know as for those who share their lives and general cultural experience.

Frequently conjoined with this misunderstanding of moral appropriateness and range is another twentieth century phenomenon without historical precedent, influential groups within the intelligentsia and political classes who evince an active general dislike or even hatred of their societies, and make a fetish of denigrating their own and related cultures. Politically these range from latterday liberals full of smug, irresponsible, self-indulgent guilt to  the Left revolutionaries who adopt the stance, ostensibly at  least, for “tactical” reasons. Let us call them the Denigrators. They have existed for several generations at least:

 The Left intelligentsia, indeed, have so long worshipped foreign gods that they seem to have become almost incapable of seeing any good in the characteristic English institutions and traditions. That the moral values on which most of them pride  themselves are largely the products of the institutions they are out to destroy, these socialists cannot, of course, admit. And this attitude is unfortunately not confined to avowed socialists. (F.A. Hayek The Road to Serfdom – 1944 chapter X1V)

 Such people require an impossibly high standard of behaviour from their own societies whilst describing them as morally inferior to others which patently, by Western criteria, possess lesser moral standards both in theory and practice. In fact, the case is worse than that. Essentially the Denigrators require no moral behaviour from those of whom they approve. Indeed, for the Left revolutionary morality is simply an instrument of propaganda for it is “bourgeois morality” and consequently of no account. And the whole business is given a delicious irony because, whilst supporting the idea of universal “human Rights” and generally using the language of moral disapproval to flay the West, the Denigrators intellectually espouse moral relativism.

In fact, for all their expressed horror of cultural imperialism, the Denigrators unconsciously or covertly seek to impose a universal morality, although in so doing they believe, or say they believe, that they are merely seeking to change material circumstances, that indigenous  cultures will remain unaltered. They are correct in thinking that morality adapts to material circumstances but wrong in assuming that it will take a particular form, or that the aspects of a culture which appeal to them are independent of and will survive a change of material circumstances. Their mistake derives from a failure to recognise that morality is the pivot around which a culture moves and develops.

The most dangerous upshot of the Denigrators’ behaviour – for it strikes at any society’s very existence by attacking its incoherence – is that everywhere we hear from Western political elites, from conviction, fear or sordid expediency, that the entirely natural desire of men to live in homogeneous societies is the ultimate wickedness. Indeed, so arrogant have the true believers in this doctrine become that they have gone beyond promoting the idea that racial discrimination is bad to asserting that multiracial societies are a positive good in themselves.

This ideology of multiculturalism is a conflation of individualism, natural rights and materialism. It is, unsurprisingly, intellectually confused. The individual is presented, by implication if not overtly, on the one hand as an atomistic being who can be haphazardly moulded to any  cultural shape (moral and cultural relativism), and on the other as an automaton, whose moral status, through the possession of “Human Rights”, is objectively absolute, and whose moral behaviour is preordained by the possession of innate and uniform moral inclinations, which require no more than advantageous material circumstances to be manifested. This materialism has the advantage for leftist moral relativists of allowing them to circumvent, to their own satisfaction at least, the ticklish problem of practices which other cultures regard as moral but which these moral relativists see as immoral, or as they might prefer to put it after the humbugging manner of anthropologists describing illiterate societies as pre-literate, pre-moral. Alter the material conditions and moral behaviour will improve is the implicit message. That altering the material conditions fails to produce the desired results does not, of course, worry the Denigrators who merely cry that not enough has been done. While the Western political classes and intelligentsia brandish ever more aggressively the doctrine of beneficent multiculturalism, in every corner of the earth a contradictory story is told: incessant conflict between races and cultures. Ancient hatreds in the Balkans; Africa a running racial sore; the disparate entities of the old Soviet Union incontinently elbowing one another for political space; the Indian subcontinent where racial conflict is so common it is scarcely to be remarked upon; China, with a hundred million of despised minority peoples, just waiting to explode; South and Central America a largely miserable melange of peoples, poverty and graft, ungovernable American cities; rising anger on the continent and, if we are honest, parts of Britain and elements within her population which are effectively beyond the control of British authority. And the present reiterates the past. Indeed, so prevalent is the dislike, hatred and fear generated by the  competitive meeting of peoples that it might justly be described as the most fundamental of social behaviours.

It might be thought that the Denigrators wish to remove from all societies the ability, by restricting alien entry, to protect their cultural coherence. Many, but not all, Denigrators would ostensibly support this position: some would openly advocate for non-whites what in all but name is apartheid – the treatment of Aborigines in central

 Australia for instance. But what the Denigrators intend is of no great moment, for in practice only the West is endangered because mass immigration since 1945 has been one way traffic. Already most Western countries with historically white populations have been heavily settled by blacks and Asians. There is no post-war case, nor the likelihood of any occurring in the foreseeable future, of a country with an historically non-white population being similarly settled by whites. The white man’s position is further weakened by the massive differences in breeding rates. He has more or less stabilised his breeding: other  races are rapidly multiplying. Hence we are left with an absolute imbalance of population movement and settlement between white and non-white societies, an imbalance which becomes positively sinister when the political consequences are considered.

If the process continues it will, probably within fifty years, lead to similar black and Asian settlement in the countries of Eastern Europe. Then no country on Earth will be absolutely controlled by whites. On the other hand, all the lands historically settled by blacks and Asians which presently remain unsettled by whites will be absolutely controlled by blacks and Asians. At best, whites will be severely circumscribed in their dealings with those peoples: at worst, they will completely forfeit control of their own destiny for it will become impossible to operate any form of immigration control if immigrant communities become powerful enough to have a large share in the government of the historically white nations. The logical outcome of mass immigration is conquest by other means.

The experience of the West since 1945 has been unique. Never before have so many people lived for so long without war or harsh authoritarian government. Add to this the everincreasing and unparalleled prosperity of the common man, the immense advance in medical capability and social welfare andthe spurious appearance of stability the cosy dichotomy of  Communism and the West gave to the world, and all the ingredients for a fool’s paradise are at hand. In such circumstances the Denigrators have been able to largely ignore the discrepancy between their ideas and reality for the mass of men will subdue temporarily their fears and  hatreds when their personal lives seem utterly secure. Now that time is passing.

The reality is that even an untainted liberalism – a liberalism without the hatred of one’s own society, a liberalism concerned with individual freedom rather than universal “natural rights”, can only be endured in international affairs in exceptional times, and even then with difficulty for it goes against the most fundamental dictum of existence: self-preservation and the pursuit of individual and group advantage.

A fundamental change in political mentality is essential if the nations of the West are to survive as recognisable cultural and political entities. And for that a new public morality must be created, or more correctly, an old one resurrected with some new appurtenances. Most importantly, to be enduring any new public morality must be compatible  with human nature and social organisation and flexible enough to deal with widely varying circumstances. To achieve that the West must cast aside the ideas, in practice as well as theory, that there is either a universal morality or necessary natural uniformity in Man. This is really not such a big intellectual step because it is no more than an extension of the difference between actual public and private morality in the western tradition.

Anyone who exercises authority, whether formal or informal, quickly discovers why private morality in the Western tradition is too constraining when dealing with men in the mass, namely that all men, opinions and desires cannot be equitably accommodated. In any circumstance where competing interests cannot be treated equally, those wielding authority are necessarily driven to make choices using principles of utility, ideological reference or capricious personal desire, none of which will stand examination as moral determinants within the Western private tradition because the central props of that morality – that all individuals are of equal worth and to be treated as ends in themselves – fall. Thus all societies share a certain public moral similarity, namely that all persons are not practically considered to be of the same worth. The only distinction between societies is the extent to which individuals are disadvantaged. The principle operates with greater force in international affairs.

That men are so prone to conflict should surprise no one. Peace not war is the unnatural state, for life generally is subject to external and internal constraints which are potential causes of conflict. The former are such things as other species and the physical stability of an environment.

The latter derive from the physical structure and social organisation of a species and cover matters such as breeding rates, length of gestation and infancy, longevity, instinct, sensual need, emotion, intellect and whether an animal is social or territorial. The particular internal qualities of Man to mark are his unique degree of self-consciousness and  the fact that he is a social animal. These are necessarily contradictory attributes because self-consciousness means ego and ego means individualism. Hence, Man is constantly confronted by an intrinsic incompatibility between his own needs and desires and those of the various groups to which he belongs.

The instinct for self-preservation will drive any organism to compete with members of its own species or any other species which is attempting to fill the same ecological niche. In a social animal such as Man the decisive struggle takes place  at the level of the group not the individual.

Man’s self-consciousness causes a diversity of behaviour vastly greater than that of any other organism. This occurs because Man is able to anticipate and plan with a skill no other creature can approach. From these abilities comes immense success in developing survival strategies, which in turn enables Man to adapt to a variety of environments exceeding that of any other higher animal. Moreover, he has a form of environment which is almost certainly different in quality from that of other animals, namely the intellectual. It is also potentially infinitely varied. This intellectual environment is perhaps the greatest source of behavioural variety.

Crucially, Man is aware of cultural norms. This awareness, together with the other attributes of self-consciousness, gives Man a potentially greater propensity for aggression than any other creature. He will defend or attack not merely in response to immediate threat, but because of anticipated fears and advantages and a dislike of cultural  differences. However, this propensity is balanced in some degree by self-conscious fear, the calculation of benefit from avoiding conflict and the development of emotions such as pity.

Because men are differentiated profoundly by behaviour, the widely accepted definition of a species – a population of actually or potentially interbreeding organisms sharing a common gene pool – is unsatisfactory. (It should be noted that the definition is man-made and thus subjective in some degree). When behavioural differences are perceived as belonging to a particular group by that group, as  differentiating members of the group from other men, they perform the same role as organic differences for they divide Man into cultural species.

But although behaviour is the primary distinguishing mark of Man, physical differences are important because they form part of cultural norms. To say baldly that a man’s colour does not matter is as absurd as claiming that the physical attractiveness of a man or woman does not affect the response of others. Indeed, skin colour is vastly more important than physical attractiveness where a culture’s value system  includes the requirement, spoken or unspoken, for a certain physical type, for then those of a different racial form are effectively precluded from full integration because one of the criteria for belonging has not been met. That is not to say, of course, that many of the habits of mind and body of such an alien culture may not be adopted by someone of a different race. What is withheld is the instinctive acceptance of the alien and his descendants as members of the society.

 Further, it is possible, perhaps even probable, that the reluctance to accept certain physical types is genetically determined, at least in part. Animals generally recognise their own species and particular social group by physical signs such as appearance and smell. It would be unlikely if nothing of this automatic response occurred in Man.

 Racialism exists, I suggest, for four basic reasons: desire for territorial expansion, fear of conquest, greed and aesthetic judgement. Other things being equal, men make the same class of judgement about other people as they do of such things as paintings, plays and novels. They feel comfortable with human beings who fit the mental and physical aesthetic frame; a distaste for those who do not. Only when men have the right aesthetic feeling can they accept other human beings in the mass.

 The favoured left/liberal interpretation of racial antipathy, that it is something which arises solely or primarily from the material conditions of the indigenous poor, is demonstrably untrue. Racialism exists and has existed in all manner of societies and material circumstances. To take but one example. Poverty may have been an immediate cause of Hitler’s electoral success, but it does not explain his popularity throughout the Thirties when German material circumstances changed greatly for the better. There is also the inconvenient fact that economies are dynamic and, consequently, societies are constantly being buffeted by recessions which lead to the very conditions – unemployment, lack of hope etc. – which the left claims are primarily responsible for racism. Hence, even if the left/liberal interpretation was correct it would be practically irrelevant.

 From all the experience of the past and present, it is unreasonable to argue that men can be freed of racial prejudice either by material circumstances or instruction. You can temporarily repress it, make hypocrites of men, but never remove it. Sooner or later the stopper preventing active expression comes off, it may take ten years or fivehundred, but it comes off. At best, mixed societies exist in a state of uncertain neutrality, a voluntary ghettoisation, which is inherently unstable. Nowhere in the whole of history have men ever willingly tolerated large numbers of strangers in their midst for long. Racial prejudice is seemingly as much an ineradicable part of human nature as  the tendency to seek one’s own interest. Indeed, it probably represents the individual’s primal self interest.

 It is true that all intercourse between cultures results in cultural adaptation. Where there is extensive settlement by one population in another’s land, cultural mixing may cause genuinely new unified cultures to evolve. But we know that it is a long and generally bloody business for, as the past two hundred years has shown, the instantaneous creation of nation states from heterogeneous peoples by legalistic means is impossible. States supposedly so created are practically empires. Only centuries of cultural mixing or the active subordination of minority groups creates a true nation. Moreover, we have plentiful evidence that minorities are, more often than not, immensely tenacious and their sense of being a separate people will survive virtually indefinitely, even under the most adverse circumstances. The normal effect of mass geographical ethnic mixing is to create hostile ghettos not true nations, let alone mutually respectful groups within a single multicultural society.

It is also true that there are similarities between the moral systems of different cultures – prohibitions against physically harming others, adultery and theft being probably the most common – but even where there is overlapping of moral subject, the scope and application of a particular moral rule varies greatly. Hence, in one population we may  have a moral rule which forbids the private individual to kill anyone within the confines of the territory occupied by that population: in another the absolute prohibition against killing anyone as a private individual may fall because the vendetta is recognised as morally acceptable.

Most tellingly, Man patently has never practically accepted  that morality is universally applicable. Indeed, most societies have, even in theory, extended moral rules in their entirety only to those within the bounded cultural group. In practice, the principle of exclusivity is much greater, operating at the level of class, kinship and friendship. How easily men may be driven to discount the  humanity of foreigners can be seen in warfare, which might best be described as an act of collective psychopathy. Man is simply not fitted by nature to be impartial. Hence there is a natural tendency to exclude which, carried to its utter conclusion, leads to genocide (a state of mind which can be admirably observed in the book of Joshua).

 How far particular morality is learned behaviour can be seen in the amorality of children. Indeed their behaviour may be a facsimile of the origins of moral behaviour, for it has startling similarities with that of primitive peoples; the sudden switching from amiability to violence, the uncritical cruelty, the need to conform, the creation of pariahs. It is not that children naturally obey no social rules, on the contrary they are extremely rule bound, merely that their rules bear little resemblance to Western moral codes.

 That particular moral behaviour can be learned does not mean it may be imposed at will. It can only be learned within a society, for moral rules which the majority do not obey are of no utility. There is also the immensely complicated business of developing a conscience which is the work of an entire childhood. Further, no moral rules which go against  the individual’s fundamental self-interest are likely to be obeyed with any regularity.

The mistake witting or unwitting universal moralists make is to assume that a natural moral sense equals an objective morality. In fact, morality is simply a response to the exigencies of living as a self-conscious social animal. Consequently, there is no necessary contradiction between the statement that morality is relative and that particular moralities are natural. There is no absolute moral behaviour  because each society evolves its own rules, and we should no more be surprised that this is the case than that chimpanzees in separate areas develop different behaviours for Man shares his basic existential circumstances with all other organisms.

 If morality is a relativistic organic growth, is it no more than a set of behavioural rules which are observed by sufficient numbers within a society to constitute a norm and which if transgressed activates either customary or formal legal disapproval? Looked at dispassionately, I think the answer must be yes. Morality is like treason, the victors make the definition.

 Once morality is seen for what it is, a natural tendency rather than an innate set of strict behavioural rules, that moralities are organic growths which possess both a psychological and a sociological dimension, the central problem of moral relativism – that where there is no absolute moral standard, there is no apparent reason to obey  any moral commandment – dissolves. All men will not follow the same moral laws, but all men will exhibit a tendency to observe some form of behavioural code because anarchy is not a feasible permanent behavioural state for Man or, indeed, any social animal. Conditions close to anarchy may exist temporarily, but they will never last for very long because  the damage to the group would be so great as to endanger its survival.

 Although moral rules are particular to a society, the utility of morality is universal. Judged by its intended consequences, the evolutionary function of morals is to reduce Man’s propensity to harm those within his accepted group. As such, it performs a task widespread in the natural world – threat displays are perhaps the most common. But this does not mean that natural selection will necessarily result in a morality which equalises the material conditions, status or moral treatment all men. Even less does it mean that all societies will evolve towards an individualistic morality as some of the more optimistic liberal political commentators seem to imagine. Japan is a prime example of an efficient state which in many ways is extremely authoritarian. All any morality needs to be is sufficiently efficient within its circumstances, or to put it another way, not so utterly disastrous that it leads to the extinction of the group.

 Whether men can even in principle evolve a universal morality is a moot point. If basic personality is genetically determined (I hypothesise), then natural selection will operate to select those personalities most suited to the moral behaviour of a society 1. This will continuously enhance the utility of traits. For example, if a society is authoritarian, then those who carry the gene or genes which  favour submissiveness will be at an advantage. Alternatively, in a society which allows a large degree of personal freedom those with a genetic inheritance favouring independence of mind should prosper. Such genetic selection could partially explain differences in moral behaviour for the dominant traits in any society would be constantly reinforced. It would also preclude the easy assumption of different moral standards by a society if these were imposed by another society or even voluntarily imported by a people’s ruling caste.

 But even if the innate, sociological and circumstantial difficulties of imposing on or inducing all societies to assume a single moral code could be overcome, would it be moral, by Western criteria, to undertake the act? There is a strong temptation to say yes rather in the fashion of ‘Socialism would be the most humane system if only it could be made to work.’ But the implications are intensely authoritarian for it is a great and sinister arrogance to say that men will all live in one broadly similar fashion, and that is what such a morality would mean for morals are the primary determinant of behaviour. You cannot replace moral norms without fundamentally altering a culture. Edward Gibbon’s argument against a world state, that it gives no place to which a dissenter may escape, is a powerful moral argument against a universal morality. Indeed, the idea of a universal morality probably implies a world state, for morality in large part is ultimately enforced by law and law can only equitably be dispensed by a uniform authority. Further, we know that societies are dynamic entities. Hence, even if the universal moral state was achieved, it would inevitably break down if a supranational authority did not have the ultimate power to maintain order. The difficulties such a universal authority would occasion can be seen in microcosm in the EC.

 But if Man the biological species is unlikely to become synonymous with Man the cultural species, this does not mean that inter-communal conflict will not educe. Strictly, because morality is an organic growth particular to a society, moral rules can only logically be judged by their effects within their particular society. However, in the actual world where societies and their attendant moralities meet, an extension of particular (internal) moral rules is necessary if societies which dispute territory are not to attempt genocide as a matter of course.

 As morality serves a necessary function – that of reducing conflict within a society – it can be extended to relations between societies without necessarily doing violence to Man’s basic desires because he is self-conscious and can perceive advantages to be gained from practising restraint. But it is not a necessary development, nor even where it takes place, can agreements between peoples ever be considered permanent  because such relations are dynamic. It is also debatable whether co-operating with other peoples is necessarily the best evolutionary strategy for a particular people. Certainly in the case of other organisms the answer is no, for if the primary evolutionary imperative is to reproduce (in Man’s case both physically and culturally) then successful acts of genocide, whether physical or cultural, are advantageous. However, because Man possesses self-consciousness with its

concomitant of anticipated fear it is probable that most men in secure circumstances will, if given a choice, resist acts of war out of prudence if nothing else. The potential for violent conflict may be further reduced by the action of habit whereby men unaccustomed to physical violence develop an aesthetic distaste for violence which is exhibited as pity or physical squeamishness. But because most men live in turbulent societies where power is concentrated in one or a few hands and which possess no tradition of valuing the individual regardless of his social status, it is improbable that inter-societal peace will greatly increase in the near future.

 As morality is necessarily reciprocal, if a stable relationship between societies is to exist responsibility for other peoples must be proportional to the extent to which a commonly observed set of moral rules and common interests exists. At the most basic level – where one society does not recognise people outside the society as fully human – there is no responsibility at all. Within the Western moral tradition that responsibility has been generally, at its weakest, that one people should not gratuitously harm another – although this begs the massive question of what is gratuitous: at its strongest, that members of one society, when within the borders of another society, are accorded the  same protection of the law as members of that other society. In our time the Denigrators have tried to create, not without success, two new international moral obligations, which practically fall only on the West, namely that the comparatively rich and politically stable countries should (1) provide material aid, in cash or kind, to the comparatively poor of the world and (2) accept immigrants, on a scale never before seen, from the poorer, politically unsettled parts of the world.

 These putative obligations go against all Man’s individual instincts and societal interests. Those receiving aid are the donors’ potential competitors. Aid helps to increase the recipients’ populations, which in turn increases the pressure on the donors to receive more immigrants. There may be good prudential reasons for aid – although where the aid is permanent I see none which outweigh the disadvantages – but it is difficult to discern any moral obligation for the principle of reciprocity is absent. Certainly, there is far less reason for a rich people to give to a poor people than there is for a rich man to give to a poor fellow countryman, for the sharing of values and interests is much reduced or even practically non-existent. 

But what of colonial exploitation the Denigrators cry? What of the arms trade? Do these not place a unique obligation on the West? Even within the Western tradition this is morally insupportable for, even if true, it places the sins of the fathers onto the sons and treats all members of a society as being responsible for that which is done by any member of the society. Moreover, all societies, even at the level of the tribe, share one thing, a dubious moral claim to existence. Ultimately, the only title people have to any land is the ability to settle, control and defend it, either separately or by alliance. There is not a people on earth which can lay claim to a morally clean past in relation to other peoples. If the West must make reparations for colonialism why not Turkey or China? The Denigrators supposedly moral call is in fact no more than a political stratagem. One people’s moral responsibility towards another stops at that which is commonly beneficial.

 The other main argument used by the Denigrators – that the West must placate the poorer peoples of the world because they will one day turn on the West either by force or denial of raw materials – is, of course, not moral but prudential. It is a mistaken argument, being a form of appeasement, which is never more than a temporarily effective expedient –  ‘once you have paid the Danegeld you never get rid of the Dane’. Further, looked at in purely practical terms, the idea that the West needs to appease the poorer parts of the world is nonsense.

If the poorer peoples are successful in raising their material standard of living to anything approaching that of the West, it will only be by industrialising. If that occurs, they will deny the West raw materials either by retaining them for their own industries or causing prices to rise steeply. If they remain poor and under industrialised, they will have every incentive to continue supplying the West at reasonable prices. Similarly, by remaining poor they will pose less military threat. Hence it is not in the West’s practical interests to see the poorer peoples become richer. In effect, the Denigrators are asking for a voluntary, unexacted tribute to be paid to the poorer peoples of the world which will bear most heavily directly and in its consequences, on the poor of the West.

If international obligations are necessarily limited by Man’s tendency to favour his own culture, the most fruitful path for men to consciously take would seem to be the promotion of nationalism based on the maintenance of territorial integrity rather than the aggressive acquisition of other lands and peoples. This is not utterly improbable because there is a tendency towards representative government and, as Kant pointed out, shared power tends to reduce the propensity for war.

Ugly as exclusive group behaviour can be, it is as an inherent part of being human, of being a self conscious social animal. And it is only ugly and destructive when it is aggressive and expansionist. Robbed of those qualities, it is a hard won and valuable state for within its territory conflict is reduced. That is not to say national identity need consist of clone like behavioural similitude. What it does require is a sense of belonging, an instinctive recognition of those included within the parameters of a group. Thus the upper class Englishman is indubitably recognised as English by the meanest member of the English working class, even though that person may have a genuine hatred of the upper classes.

  But it must be acknowledged that stable nationhood with a readily defensible territory is rare. Notwithstanding the UN with its 200 odd “nations”, the most common state of Man is still that of traditional societies where the first loyalty is to the family or a patron, then to the tribe, then to the clan. Indeed, the concept of nationhood, particularly as a political entity, is probably incomprehensible to most living men. Those peoples which have attained stable nationhood should be prized greatly, for they are oasis of stability which could so easily be swallowed up by the tempestuous desert of disparate peoples which swirls about and, increasingly, within their environs. The poorer peoples of the world can only act as the barbarians at the gates of Rome; they may destroy but not inherit.

At present there is a vogue in some influential quarters for intervention in local affairs by international forces led ostensibly by the UN, but in reality by the United States. This did not originate with the Denigrators but rather from the general moral confusion of the political classes. Such action is both dangerous for the intervening powers and misconceived in purpose. All the historical evidence is that such intervention tends to exacerbate matters for to be effective the intervening powers have to behave oppressively towards local majorities. The net result is not to preserve the lives and liberties of minorities but to create new animosities and intensify hatred of the minorities, who are blamed for the foreign intervention. The process of nation building, like moral development, can only come from within. It is organic. Peoples, like water, must be allowed to find their own level.

Moreover, even if it was practically possible to resolve racial and cultural conflict by force, it would simply not be possible to take action in more than a fraction of cases for modern war is impossibly expensive. No Western electorate  would tolerate the cost in lives or material for very long.

The UN is inimical to honest talking and effective action and, by providing a moral and legal fig leaf for the United States, it is a dangerous cloak for quasi-imperial action which is certain to involve much physical and material suffering. The West would be well advised to withdraw and form another body, membership of which would only be granted to those countries which exist both as a well established and defensible geographical entity and a stable political state. This organization should protect the security of the constituent members and encourage the peaceful movement of peoples and redrawing of boundaries in non-members’ territory. New members could be admitted when appropriate.

 Those who resist the forced movement of peoples should reflect on one thing: they are, by implication, willing to see peoples affected by ethnic divisions suffer indefinitely. Nor can the defence of utility be invoked for a racial running sore which festers for centuries certainly result in more bloodshed than a quick movement of peoples. And that does not take into account the emotional stress which constant antagonism generates. Ethnic cleansing, terrible as the process is for those immediately affected, offers at least the chance of some permanently settled future. How much better might the situation in Yugoslavia be if the West, instead of resolutely refusing to consider movement of populations, had accepted that it represented the best chance of peace. They might then have persuaded the various peoples to achieve the deed, in part at least, by agreement rather than force. As it is, for all the international huffing and puffing, the Serbs have practically achieved their aim.

Western nations should maintain their military capacity at a high level, guard their borders closely and not intervene in any conflict unless their fundamental interests are threatened. And this is not purely to their own advantage, for anything which threatens the stability and security of the advanced world threatens that of all men. To take but one example, imagine what would happen to the primitive world’s economies if the advanced world’s markets were greatly reduced in size or deliberately closed to the primitive world’s imports.

But if Western nations are to survive as recognisable cultural entities and avoid, within their territories, pogroms of both old and newly formed minorities or even outright racial wars, their political classes must honestly address the question of mass immigration and its consequences. This matter is particularly pressing both because of the scale of immigration and the fact that contemporary migrants to the West are generally much further removed from the culture of the countries in which they settle than has previously been the case – there is a great  deal of difference between receiving into England Bengalis and Huguenots for example – and resist assimilation more vigorously.

Above all, the West must recognise that the idea which is the bedrock of their morality, the primacy of the individual, is not valued by most societies and that its social corollary – a practical concern for individual liberty – is an even rarer cultural artefact. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that only in English society, and those  societies deriving from it, is the notion of individual liberty built into the social fabric. The English have been free not primarily because of legal rights, but because it is their evolved social nature. They accept liberty because it seems natural to them. Hayek, coming to England as a foreigner between the Wars noted the special quality of English life (he, of course, used liberalism in its uncorrupted individualistic sense):

 …it is one of the most disheartening spectacles of our time to see to what extent some of the most precious things which England has given to the world are now held in contempt in England herself. The English hardly know to what degree they differ from most other people in that they all, irrespective of party, hold, to a greater or less extent, the ideas which in their most pronounced form are known as liberalism…[Road To Serfdom 1944 chapter X1V]

Racial and cultural mixing undoubtedly corrupts the liberties and subverts the social stability of those peoples happy to have attained, through many a long century, both a large degree of personal freedom and a true sense of nation. Freedom of speech is abrogated, the promotion of indigenous culture lessened, employers are forced to dissemble, the interlopers obtain a privileged position before the law, both through statute and the indigenous authority’s unwillingness  to act and, most damagingly, parts of the land come effectively under immigrant control.

The example of the United States is particularly instructive.  Perhaps more than any other country it has the form of a libertarian society but increasingly not the content. Primarily it has the form because it grew from the English experience in the one hundred and seventy odd years before the War of Independence. It is losing the content because racial and cultural heterogeneity has gone beyond the point at which any single group can impose a general set of values on the society. And this despite being the richest, and in many respects, the most socially mobile society on earth.

No society need gratuitously assert its moral or cultural superiority, but it must actively defend that which it values against the attacks of hostile individuals or peoples. In the case of the West this means the refutation of the mindless cultural self-abuse practised by the Denigrators and the crude, but sinister, falsifications of history currently peddled by the Denigrators and their non-white pupils and the  implementation of effective immigration measures and  assimilation programmes.

At the least the pernicious doctrine of multiculturalism must be overthrown and all future immigration limited to those with scarce skills who are willing and able to wholeheartedly adopt the culture into which they move. The right of political asylum should be abrogated immediately, for we have reached the stage where the question is not how to identify genuine political refugees but whether the institution is appropriate in contemporary circumstances. (In any case, the distinction between political and economic refugees is hypocritical when the choice is, put at its starkest, between dying by the torturer’s hand and starvation).

Will such measures protect the cultural integrity of western states or prevent violent racial clashes within their  borders? Probably not, for history is against them and there is the unpalatable fact that many of those already settled in the West cannot or will not assimilate. There is also the practical immigration control problem represented by large minority communities. Where these exist it becomes extremely difficult to prevent further illegal immigration – in an age of mass tourism virtually impossible.

The most probable eventual outcome of the heterogeneity of populations in America and Europe is the massacre or expulsion of the minorities. In the case of North America, because of the numbers and the long term settlement of minorities, this will probably result in an eventual  partition of the continent, de facto if not de jure. Europe is in a different position. Most immigrants are of the first or second generation. In their case a mass repatriation is not inconceivable, for their countries of origin or paternity would find it difficult to refuse settlement, not least because of the fear of what relatives in the country of origin would do if their relatives were refused entry.

 Taking into account Man’s nature and social circumstances, what is a sane basis for membership of any society? It is, I suggest, the imbibing of a culture. Where a man is born is irrelevant. What distinguishes him is his instinctive allegiance to a culture and the assumption in childhood of the Manners and values of that culture. The successful  ingestion of manners and values produces the social colouring necessary for any coherent society and allows a man’s peers to accept him without question as one of themselves. That unquestioning acceptance is the only objective test of belonging. The most unhappy and unnatural beings are the Mr Melmottes 1 of the world who ‘…speak half a dozen languages but none like a native.’ These are men without country or psychological place.

 The problem was crystallised by Wellington. To those who simple mindedly insisted on calling him an Irishman, Old Nosey replied “if a Man is born in a stable it does not make him an horse”. To this I would add that if a man is born in an house but later chooses to live in a stable he does not become a horse.

If the West is subverted from within by mass immigration or overthrown by external action it will not be immoral any more than European colonisation was immoral. It will simply be the age old interplay between peoples or, to put it another way, cultural species. The point for the West to grasp like grim death is that neither possibility is inevitable.

The general spirit of some words of the younger Pitt (made during the Napoleonic wars) are apposite for all peoples at all times:

We must recollect … what is we have at stake, what it is we have to contend for. It is for our property, it is for our liberty, it is for our ependence, nay, for our existence as a nation; it is for our character, it is for our very name as Englishmen, it is for everything dear and valuable to Man on this side of the grave.

 1 ‘The way we live now’ – Anthony Trollope

1 Only a complete nurturist could deny this idea some validity

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