Tag Archives: public service

The reckless mass medication of Britain

Robert Henderson

The reckless and even the enforced medication of the population grows apace.  State bodies are pressing for widespread or universal medication. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE)  recommends the universal  use of statins by men over 50 and women over 60, ministers are considering  making compulsory  the addition of folic acid to flour  and  councils are being encouraged by Public Health England  to put fluoride in the water supply .

That is direct government action. But there are many drugs with potent side effects which are being given out wholesale without any government interference. Potentially the greatest risk comes from  antibiotics to which resistance is being built up all the time. The World Health Organisation warned this year that  overuse was potentially creating a crisis more serious than Aids . Dr Keiji Fukuda, WHO’s Assistant Director-General for Health Security, claimed : “A post-antibiotic era — in which common infections and minor injuries can kill — far from being an apocalyptic fantasy, is instead a very real possibility for the 21st century.”

Antidepressants are being prescribed in record numbers and the side effects, which often make people feel as though they are going around in a mental fog,  can make people feel the cure is worse than the disease. Moreover, they can be prescribed for people who either are not seriously depressed but suffering from a physical illness  or people whose severe depression is the consequence of a physical illness.

There is also the problem of addiction to such drugs with severe withdrawal symptoms experienced by some people, symptoms such as these suffered by a patient identified only as Henry“It was torture. I thought I was going to die, and I didn’t care. For two years, I was in severe physical pain and so weak I lay all day on the sofa. My cognition was severely affected, I was dizzy, with blurred vision, I couldn’t read a bedtime story to my son and couldn’t remember things that had happened just a few seconds previously.”

But even where there is no psychological problems or unpleasant but not immediately obvious damaging physical effects,  drugs can have dramatic consequences. For example, aspirin  is routinely prescribed to thin the blood, especially to those who have suffered heart attacks, but  recent research found that aspirin’s daily use  “ leads to 37 per cent increased risk of internal bleeding and 38 per cent increased risk of hemorrhagic stroke,”  while the  long term use of the contraceptive pill doubles the risk of glaucoma..

Probably the most controversial widely used medication in Britain  at present are statins. Side effects can be extreme.  Statins (which are used to reduce cholesterol)  have been the subject of much complaint by patients. There are studies which claim that statins have little or no side effects,  but the  catalogue of complaints against them is so huge that it is difficult to see how they could have come to such conclusions.

I have taken statins  for many since suffering   a heart attack,  I can I can vouch for the fact that they have powerfully obnoxious side effects. Luckily I did not  suffer psychotic episodes  such as those  which afflicted the unfortunate Dr Allan Woolley before his suicide,  which was attributed to the side effects of statins . However,  I  have experienced severe  disabling symptoms such as intense aching, especially in the hands, a permanent fatigue and a diminution of mental function, especially of memory and concentration (I had  to consciously concentrate on what I was doing rather than simply doing it without thinking, while my power of immediate recall, previously very good, became unreliable.

I only realised statins were responsible for such symptoms in 2007  – for years I attributed them to the  process of ageing and the after effects of the heart attack – after I read several articles by Dr James Le Fanu who both questioned the general value of  statins and described the side effects:  ” Statins are useless for 95 per cent of those taking them, while exposing all to the hazard of serious side-effects and  detailed the side effects….they seriously interfere with the functioning of the nerve cells, affecting mental function, and muscles.” (Sunday  Telegraph  17 3 2007).  He concluded that only those with a personal or family  history of heart trouble should take them.

But even that advice is debatable. Eating an apple-a-day is as effective as taking statins according to a recent piece of research, viz:

“Prescribing either an apple a day or a statin a day to everyone over 50 years old is likely to have a similar effect on population vascular mortality. Choosing apples rather than statins may avoid more than a thousand excess cases of myopathy and more than 12 000 excess diabetes diagnoses. The basic costs of apples are likely to be greater than those of statins; however, NHS prescription prices and convenience may drive people to purchase their apples from a store rather than through a pharmacy, thereby reducing direct NHS costs, or the NHS may be able to negotiate apple price freezes (although defrosted apples may not be so palatable).23”

There are also doubts about whether cholesterol levels have anything to do with heart attacks and strokes, so the concentration on bringing  down cholesterol levels may be pointless.

It might be thought with the ever increasing range of medications available that overall  life expectancy would be increasing and go on increasing . Not so.  In  recent years in the UK the trend towards greater life expectancy after the age of 65 has flat-lined for men and actually declined for women. “Life expectancy at age 65 in 2012 has been projected as 18.3 years for men and 20.6 years for women on average….In 2008 life expectancy post 65 was 19 years for men on average and 21.3 years for women on average. In 2010 it was 18.7 for men and 21.1 for women.”

This suggests that medication of the elderly is at best ineffective in extending lives on average and  may even be a  cause of the stagnation of increases in life expectancy amongst the old.

There is also a  moral question, namely,  how much medication should be given to a patient   regardless of the quality of life  they can experience?  The idea that living is desirable regardless of the nature of the life is difficult to sustain morally.  That is particularly true of the old. I have never encountered anyone over the age of 85 whose life I have known in some detail who has been averagely happy or physically comfortable.   Almost invariably by that age the body has developed some serious malady whether physical or mental.  That is not to say such elderly people generally  want to die.  Rather, it is simply that the life being led is normally miserable at worst and unfulfilling at best.  If they are loaded down with  medications, many or all of which will have obnoxious side effects,  this may extend their lives by a few  months or years,  but the patient  may well feel that there is a case for saying let nature take its course if those few extra months and years will be suffered rather than enjoyed because of the side effects of medication.

Why do patients submit to drug regimes regardless of the ill consequences? Patients generally trust their doctors and are inclined to accept advice in the vast majority of cases. But even if they do not want to carry on with a drug because of the side effects – and many commonly prescribed drugs have effects which make the enjoyment of life seriously difficult – they find it difficult to refuse a doctor’s advice. Often it is not a simple matter of refusing a single treatment, because many patients, and especially elderly ones, will have a range of ailments and  will fear that refusing to take one medication may ruin their relationship with their GP or a hospital consultant, with a consequent diminution in the quality and scope of their  future  medical care. Even if unfounded , such fears will drive patients to carry on with medication which is causing them serious discomfort.

Things could be improved if doctors were required to discuss the side effects of drugs with patients. The only warning I have ever been given voluntarily by a doctor – and I have spent a great deal of the past twenty years with chronic complaints – about side effects is drowsiness, yet most drugs which seriously interfere with the natural workings of the body will have a list of serious side effects.  For example, diuretics, a very commonly prescribed drug to increase fluid removal from the body has these side effects according to  the BUPA guidance :

Side-effects of diuretics include:

mild gastro-intestinal problems, such as feeling sick

a fall in blood pressure that is related to posture (postural hypotension), which causes you to feel faint or dizzy when you stand up

altered levels of salts in your body, such as low levels of potassium (hypokalaemia) and sodium (hyponatraemia)

Less common side-effects of diuretics include:

gout (a condition that causes pain and swelling in your joints)

impotence in men (the inability to achieve or sustain an erection during sex)

skin rashes

headaches

certain blood disorders, which can make you more likely to get infections

What can be done to reduce overmedication? First, if doctors explained the side effects to patients that in itself would probably reduce too ready prescription of medicines because the patient would be put off taking those with serious side effects simple by their recital by the doctor  and doctors would be much less likely to prescribe such drugs  unless they honestly believed a patient desperately needed them if they had to explain the side effects and overcome the resistance of patients who did not really need the medication.

Second, non-medical directions and incentives to doctors to prescribe certain medications widely, whether that be government authored or supported schemes such as folic acid in bread or drug companies peddling medicines to doctors, especially GPs, which materially benefit doctors  should be banned.

 

 

Parliamentary pay, expenses and conditions: a remedy for corruption

 

Robert Henderson

Parliamentary pay and expenses are never  far from the public eye these days. Neither the Commons voting on its own remuneration nor the setting up a supposedly independent pay review body has proven satisfactory from the point of view of the public. Nor did an earlier attempt at linking pay to that of a middle ranking civil servant avoid the difficulty of the initial setting of the peg by which MPs’ pay should be decided. .

As for expenses they have been a standing cause for Parliamentary shame ever since the Daily Telegraph exposed the gross abuses which were going on in 2009 when they purchased records of Parliamentary expenses which politicians  had done their very best to keep secret (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/5297606/MPs-expenses-Full-list-of-MPs-investigated-by-the-Telegraph.html).

MPs Pay

MPs’ pay  should be comfortable but no more than that,  let us say  three times the average national wage. That  would take it up to around £80,000 at present. I think most people would accept  that as  reasonable if MPs were banned from taking other paid  work and expenses abuse, both legal and illegal, was tightly controlled. It would give the backbench MP a salary akin to that of a doctor or a solicitor.  In addition, they have a seriously generous pension by present day standards, subsidised food and drink within the Palace of  Westminster and a substantial payment to tide them over should they lose their seat.  There might be a case for removing or lessening such perks, but for the moment I would let them stay. The subsidised food is justified by the ending of any expense claims  allowed for meals in London and the transition payment is reasonable if  MPs are allowed no  outside of politics  employment whilst an MP. The pension is more vulnerable to attack because there is a case for saying MPs should not have a more generous pension regime than is the norm for British society.

We can be sure that there would be no shortage of takers at £80,000 pa even with the other conditions I have proposed.  Indeed  the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (Ipsa), which has recently recommended an 11% rise,  admits that the current £66, 000 is quite sufficient to entice many to be parliamentary candidates (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/10516391/No-evidence-MPs-66000-salary-deters-people-from-standing-for-Parliament-pay-watchdog-admits.html).  The idea that if you pay peanuts you get monkeys should produce a hollow laugh from anyone who has paid attention to how MPs behave, whether  in terms of being dishonest or lazy or simply incompetent. Our present remuneration system produces all too often MPs who act as though they see being an MP as merely a ticket to ride the  gravy train and  an ego trip.  Few  show any real independence of thought or action for very rarely does an MP, even a backbencher, step radically out of line on a party policy, even where, so often these days, the policies are self-evidently not in the national interest, for example, the continuing mass immigration in the UK and the ever increasing suppression of dissent against the ever tighter grasp  of political correctness.  

Their pay should  be uprated up or down in  accordance with the rise or fall of the average wage.  That would provide both a simple and transparent system for the public to understand and give MPs a direct reminder once a year of how their stewardship of the country is going. It would also get rid of any squabbling over who makes the decision and remove, after the initial decision on the multiple of the average wage to be used, any further human decision making. Consequently, there would be an appearance of objectivity top any rise.

The job of an MP should be full time  for two reasons. The first is a matter of practicality:  the size of the average UK constituency is large (68, 000 – http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/elections-and-voting/constituencies/ ) and requires a good deal of time spent on it if people are to be represented properly . In addition,  much of the present business of Parliament goes through with precious little  scrutiny because MPs are so often absent – even the Commons committees routinely have MPs missing. 

The second reason is fundamental to the office of MP: if they have outside interests there is a strong likelihood they will be compromised, because their extra-Parliamentary work will very often impinge on Parliamentary business.  That is not just the obvious cases such as back benchers being sponsored by unions,  being in receipt of non-executive directorships or receiving   consultancy fees, but also that deriving from seemingly innocuous employment such as practising at the Bar or working as a doctor because these can readily give them vested interests.  For example, a barrister would have a vested interest in changes to legal Aid; a doctor in the alteration of the terms of general practice. MPs are supposed to declare any  interest but they can still vote.  In principle,  Ministers have to be not only honest in actuality, but show themselves to be like Caesar’s wife above suspicion. This they do  by divesting  themselves of  directorships and placing any shares they may have in blind trusts. If it is thought necessary for ministers to have such, it should be doubly  necessary for backbenchers because they would prima facie be much more in the way of  temptation when it comes to satisfying their own selfish interests rather than those of the country because they have far less pay than a Minister.   

The post-office legalised bribes that come in the form of sinecures on the boards of companies must also be stopped.  (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10516295/Whitehalls-revolving-door-speeds-up-ex-ministers-and-civil-servants-seeking-jobs-in-private-sector-doubles.html ).

MPs Expenses

It might be thought that after the revelation  by the Daily Telegraph in 2009 of the  grotesquely inappropriate  things for which MPs were allowed to claim,  caution if not morality would have greatly curbed the abuses.  Sadly, it appears there is still some bizarre  poking of Hon Members’ noses into the expenses trough, for example, the brawling Scottish MP Eric Joyce, who sits as an independent since losing the Labour whip, stung the taxpayer for  £229 for a pair of designer glasses. (http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/disgraced-mp-eric-joyce-stung-2896178).

The only expenses MPs should be allowed are for accommodation when they are in London and have constituencies a fair distance from the capital and the cost of travel between their constituencies. It is reasonable to expect them to meet their food costs whilst away from home, not least because of the subsidised  meals they can get within the Place of Westminster.

Housing can be met one of two ways,   build a furnished hostel to house MPs or simply put out contracts to London hoteliers for a bulk rate. Fully furnished accommodation with no need for  MPs to buy any household goods.

As for travel, the government should negotiate a bulk contract for MPs and their families with the rail companies. The spouses and children could be restricted to a set number of trips a year.  I doubt whether any MPs live far from a  railway station.  I would restrict them to railway travel if the taxpayer is paying. Those who  live  a genuinely long distance away, for example, in the far north of Scotland or Northern Ireland,  could be covered  by a bulk buy contract with one or more airlines.

If this seems somewhat Spartan rations,  remember that MPs who have constituencies too far from Westminster to make a daily commute practical  probably only spend Monday-Thursday nights in London. In addition, the Commons only sits for about 6 months of the year. Consequently, the argument that MPs need a flat or house in London to maintain family life is clearly untrue.

If such a regimen was introduced expenses fraud would vanish because an MP would have little  opportunity for it. Their  accommodation in London would be paid for by the government directly, there would be no household purchases needed because the accommodation would be furnished and travel expenses would be paid for by the government directly. MPs would have to claim nothing.

The other great abuse is the employment by MPs’ of their relatives or friends as staff.   As this is public money being spent it is reasonable that these positions are put out to open competition. But even if that was done, the  MP would still be likely to choose the relative or friend.  That is a good reason to ban MPs from employing anyone close to them. A second reason to ban their employment  is that a close relative or friend would be more likely on average to turn a blind eye to bad behaviour by an MP and MPs would be aware of this and moderate their criminal tendencies. The third reason is that some MPs at least have employed relatives and friends who have done precious little work. Someone unknown to the MP before employment is much more likely to do the work for which they are paid.

To help ensure that MPs are not illicitly enriching themselves, a full statement of assets including those held by close family members should be included in the Members Register of Interests. These should be checked against the actual material circumstances of each MP  when they first become and MP, once a Parliament and when the MP leaves Parliament.

There is also a crying need for a proper investigation into the way Parliamentary  expense administrators and the special HMRC unit dealing with MPs pay have failed to apply the HMRC’s  “Wholly, necessarily and exclusively incurred in the performance of the job”  expenses test. It was clear from the Telegraph data published in 2009 that well over half of MPs had claims which comprehensively failed the test, yet very few were brought to book over it.  Consequently, the Parliamentary administrators and the HMRC unit should be investigated for systematically failing to apply the test. 

The House of Lords

The Lords is a mess. It is neither political fish nor fowl nor good red flesh. Trying to reform it is really a lost cause because most of the hereditary peers  are gone (which removes the idea of independent members  beholden to no one) and the vast majority of the regular attendees are placemen of the major political parties. It would be better if the House was abolished and replaced by an entirely new chamber with none of the placemen in it so there is a genuine change of political personnel. (Personally, I would favour a House of 1,000 members selected by lot from those who were willing to serve with a single term of eight years. They would act as a kind of jury to oversee the legislation of the Commons but would not initiate the legislation.  The primacy of the Commons would not be challenged and political parties would not be able to control the house). 

However, there is no prospect of any radical change in the foreseeable future so what should be done under present circumstances?

Peers do not get pay, but  an attendance allowance and expenses, including London accommodation if they live far enough away. . They cheat  by selling influence , claiming illegitimate expenses and by abusing the attendance allowance rules. The last they do by signing on for the day then leaving the Lords shortly afterwards having pocketed £300 from the taxpayer (http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/video-tory-lord-hanningfield-exposed-2934895#ixzz2nj1KwOwp)  It is doubtful  whether this abuse of the attendance allowance is illegal because there are no clear duties for peers, but it is clearly an abuse and should be stopped. As for the selling of influence, that  should be made a criminal offence. Expenses should be  restricted to travel and overnight accommodation and could be included within whatever arrangements are made for MPs.  

How could things be improved on the attendance allowance front?  By paying a salary? That is not really a starter because most of the peers entitled to sit in the House – there are approaching  800 at present – do not wish to attend regularly. The so-called working peers – almost all placemen and women of the major parties – might be given a salary while the others continued with a more rigorously policed  attendance allowance scheme  but that would be a messy arrangement.   The best option would be payment based on objective criteria such as participation in debates and voting  rather than simply clocking in.  This could be linked to definite duties such as I discuss in the next section.  

Terms of service

Apart from abuses in drawing expenses,  some  MPs neglect their political duties, both  at Westminster or in their constituency.  For example, Gordon Brown is notorious for very rarely being in the Commons since his  resignation as Prime Minister – he has even started describing himself as an ex-politician  (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/gordon-brown/10415046/Gordon-Brown-Im-an-ex-politician.html). In addition  there is no general public scrutiny of the performance of  a constituency MP, the only real test of the latter being the opinion of their constituency party because the vast majority of constituents will never have cause to go to their MP seeking personal help. 

MPs can get away with such neglect because there is no legal requirement for an MP to do anything either at Westminster or in his constituency. There is a Code of Conduct for MPs but observation of the Code  is not a legal requirement.  Complaints under the Code  can be referred to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Commissioner’s report on any investigation  he or she may undertake may  be considered by the Committee on Standards (until the beginning of 2012 the Committee on Standards and Privileges http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/standards-and-privileges-committee/). In principle, the House of Commons can also take action as a House if it so chooses. 

Apart from the lack of legal teeth, here are two problems with this system: first, the penalties which are imposed are normally  minor, for example, a reprimand and instruction to apologise to the House; second, even the relatively  minor sanctions that the Committee for Standards can mete out are all too often not imposed.

MPs can be excluded from the House, sometimes for years, but these are rare punishments, especially where powerful and influential members are involved. Think of Peter Mandelson under Blair who was forced to resign a  ministerial position not once but twice: the first time over his false declaration when applying for a mortgage  and his acceptance of a very large loan accepted from a political colleague, the second after the Indian Hinduja brothers received British passports in questionable circumstances after Mandelson had taken a hand in the matter  (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/3130348/The-scandals-that-brought-Peter-Mandelson-down-twice-before.html). Nor would the police investigate Mandelson for his false declaration when applying for a mortgage, despite this being an established fact – I made a complaint to the Met asking them to do so but the police refused to even register the complaint (http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2011/07/07/laws-are-for-little-people-the-mandelson-mortgage-fraud-cover-up/).

The Code of Conduct is a document which shares something with  the 1936 Soviet Constitution. The latter was a wondrously cornucopia of democratic goodies; the Code of Conduct is splendidly ethical statement of how an MP should behave. Neither the Soviet Constitution nor the Code of Conduct had or has any connection with reality.  Consider these extracts from the Code of Conduct:

“Selflessness

Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.

Integrity

Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might influence them in the performance of their official duties.

Objectivity

In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit.

Accountability

Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.

Openness

Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.

Honesty

Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest.

Leadership

Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example.” (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmcode/1885/188502.htm#a1)

How far  this is from reality is epitomised by the IPSA chairman claiming that the 11% pay rise for MPs is necessary otherwise they would return to large-scale abuse of expenses. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/10512763/Increase-MPs-pay-or-risk-another-expenses-scandal-Ipsa-chairman-says.html).

The Code of Conduct needs to be enforced rigorously, but that would still leave MPs free to  devote too little time to their political duties. Consequently, there needs to be a legal enforceable job description which requires MPs to do things such  hold regular constituency surgeries, respond to constituents mail within a certain numbers of days  and attend Westminster whenever Parliament is sitting unless they have a reasonable excuse for being absent such as attending to ministerial duties or undertaking official Parliamentary business away from Westminster.

What improvements in politicians’ behaviour would result?

The changes I propose, or something like them, would remove from Parliament those who are there to enrich themselves. The remuneration (including perks) would be sufficient to enable an MP to live decently but not extravagantly.  Because MPs would have all the previously legal ways of enriching themselves through such things as  absurdly lax expenses rules, employing relatives  or spending large amounts of  time on non-political work, only surreptitiously selling influence would be available to them.  However, with proper oversight  such as checking the actual material circumstances of  an MP even that would become decidedly risky. Make selling influence a criminal offence with a hefty prison sentence and it would be most unattractive prospect.

If MPs come to the business knowing they cannot be a law unto themselves but will be subject to the type of constraints which the general population are held by in their work, that in itself will tend to produce politicians who are interested in formulating and implementing policy and serving their constituents rather than serving their own interests.   What I propose  would not be a panacea but a good beginning in the sorely needed attempt to change the ethical weather in Parliament.  There is nothing more corrupting than seeing those with power being corrupt for it  taints the whole of society by example.

 

Replacing the BBC licence fee

Robert Henderson

I have always had objections to the licence fee. It is a poll tax enforced by an extensive and expensive bureaucracy armed with extensive powers to harass the public. The practical consequences of the fee are the poor subsidising the rich and thousands of the poor, mostly women, brought before the courts each year for non-payment of the licence fee. The last is far from being a small matter because recently it has been revealed that an incredible ten per cent of court cases in the UK (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/10256679/TV-licence-offences-account-for-one-in-ten-UK-court-cases.html).

But whether or not you think the licence fee is the best solution to funding public service broadcasting (PSB), your opinion  will become academic in the foreseeable future  because the technology is moving on rapidly. TVs as we know them will  be on the way out by the time the BBC charter comes up for renewal in 2016, as computers (and conceivably something completely new) become the means to view what we now call television. (A tax on personal computers is currently being mooted. Take it from a retired Inland Revenue Officer, this  is administratively bonkers).

The alternatives to the licence fee fill defenders of PSB with horror, and in most instances, justifiably so. Voluntary subscriptions could never provide the necessary finance and advertising would corrupt programming because of the need to draw audiences.

But there is one means of funding which could preserve the status quo – direct funding by the taxpayer. I have never understood the objection in principle to this. If direct funding could be cut off or reduced at any time by a Government, so can the licence fee. In principle, Parliament could pass a Bill tomorrow overturning the BBC’s current charter. More realistically, a future Government could simply decide to destroy or at least severely emasculate the BBC through legislative action.

Can anyone honestly say that the World Service (WS), which is (and always has been) directly funded by the taxpayer, has been the creature of any government? Has any government seriously reduced WS funding because it did not do what the government wanted? I think most people would give a pretty firm no to both questions. The BBC domestic service is in fact already receiving substantial direct payments from the taxpayer in the shape of  payments of around œ400 pa to compensate the BBC for the licence fee exemptions made for the over-75s. Has that made any noticeable difference in the relationship between the BBC and the Government?

Direct funding could be guaranteed on the same basis as the licence fee, a ten-year charter with a guarantee that direct funding would last for the period of the charter. Ideally, the funding would be linked to some objective criteria such as a proportion of the total UK broadcasting spend and adjusted annually according to whatever the total UK spend was for the past year. This would both guard against politicians interfering during the period of the charter and  provide less opportunity for the private side of the industry to complain about unfair competition because the proportion of the overall UK spend would remain static. That would remove the private sector fear that the BBC’s seemingly remorseless expansion will have limits. The BBC could strengthen their position further in that respect if they eschewed any active commercial activity beyond selling programmes which they have made in-house or funded directly from an independent production company.

Direct funding would also improve the relationship between the BBC and the public. All experience shows that direct payment by the individual is what causes friction. Hence, the Council Tax causes more friction than paying income tax, VAT etc from which central government pays the majority of local council spending. Hide the expenditure in general taxation and complaints usually die. Even the most  belligerent member of the “Why should I pay the licence fee when I don’t watch the BBC” brigade would find it difficult to rally under a “Why should I pay my taxes to directly fund the BBC” banner.

In the end PSB is reliant on what politicians do. But  there are several good reasons why they would not willingly damage the BBC. To begin with politicians are human beings (just)  and many have an affection for the Corporation. A substantial hard-core are committed to PSB in principle. Others see it as a prestigious British institution which deserves to be preserved for that reason. There are also the base political reasons. The first is obvious: dismantling or seriously damaging an organisation as large and influential as the BBC would be a risky business for any government, which would risk being caught in pincer movement of journalistic wrath and public resentment at the loss of a unique service (the BBC is one of those institutions which will not be truly appreciated until it ism not there).

The second base reason is wonderfully self-serving and simple. The continued existence of the BBC is convenient for politicians, because it provides them with political coverage and opportunities which no private broadcaster can offer. This advantage may grow as privately financed  broadcasting becomes increasingly fragmented in the future. Politicians need large audiences. Broadcasts with small and diminishing audiences is not what they want. If the BBC  continues to exist in something like its present size and importance, a large audience can be guaranteed.

In an ideal world, the public would have such elevated tastes that PSB would not be necessary because only the best programmes would be broadcast as the market acted to select them. However, the world being far from perfect, PSB funded by the taxpayer offers the best hope for broadcasting which is not driven solely or largely by the meretricious hand of demand.



Royal Mail privatisation – an act of ideology not of necessity or prudence

Robert Henderson

The announcement of the privatisation of the Royal Mail  by  the Business Secretary Vince Cable (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-mail/10172284/Royal-Mail-lined-up-for-3bn-float.html)  is the marriage of the Thatcherite  privatising Zombie which has infected the whole of the mainstream British politics linked to the mania for “competition” exhibited by the EU (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/postal_services/overview_en.html).  The two ideologies – that of market economics and the goal, pursued with pathological determination,  of an ever expanding equalisation of trading conditions throughout the EU dovetailed perfectly.

The public sees Royal Mail as a public service. This is unsurprising because it has been in public hands since the 17th century and the provision of a universal delivery service to every part of the country for a standard charge existed from the time  Rowland Hill invented the postage stamp and the penny postage in the mid 19th century until the EU  interfered and ended the monopoly on letter post and small parcels in 2010.

There are clearly much broader questions of social  utility  than the cost or otherwise to  the taxpayer.  But even on the narrow and vulgar question of cost to the taxpayer there is no solid case for privatisation. Provided the letter post and packages up to a size which encompasses  the large majority of packets sent is  kept as a state monopoly,  the service could be relied upon to remain in the black whilst keeping postal charges low.  Even with the considerable weakening of Royal Mail’s monopoly over recent years it is still delivering healthy profits, viz: “ The state-owned delivery company said pre-tax profits jumped to £324m from £201m last year and a loss of £165m in 2011. Underlying operating profits soared 165pc to £403m from £152m in 2012” ( http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-mail/10070998/Royal-Mail-delivers-profits-fit-for-flotation.html).

It is true that letter numbers have  declined  considerably in recent  years, by 25% between 2006 and the end of 2012. Nonetheless, the volume is still considerable  with 16 billion letters being sent to 28 million addresses  in 2012 (http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2012/03/27/ofcom-announces-measures-to-safeguard-the-uks-universal-postal-service/). Even with the ever growing use of digital communications, it is difficult to see letters dwindling to an insignificant number in the near future. Moreover, a good deal of the recent letter decline can be attributed to the ever growing cost of postage,  with second class mail for small letters now being 55p (large letters 69p) and first class  mail  60p (large 90p) (http://www.royalmailgroup.com/first-and-second-class-stamp-letter-prices-unchanged). In 1840 when the penny post was introduced a letter of any size could be sent for one old  penny. At 2012 prices that would be 87 old pence today (7/3) , or 36 new pence.  (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/inflation/calculator/).  In real terms the  modern cost of a first class large letter is nearly three times as much as its 1840 predecessor. Bearing in mind the benefit of modern sorting technology  and transport and a great reduction in the number of deliveries per day,  it is rather surprising that the cost of post has risen hugely in real terms in modern times rather than dropping.

Parcel post costs have also risen sharply for those sizes of parcel  most likely  to be used: “2kg [parcel] was previously £5.30, but this will now rise to £8 if it is bigger than 45cm by 35cm by 8cm.” (2013  –  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9965562/Cost-of-posting-parcels-to-rise.html and http://internetretailing.net/2013/04/online-retailer-speaks-out-as-royal-mail-changes-parcel-pricing/#sthash.4EFUCLqr.dpuf) )

These price rises have been permitted by the regulator Ofcom simply to prepare the Royal Mail for privatisation. If Royal Mail remained in public hands, with the old letter post and small parcel monopolies restored, the cost of postage could be reduced considerably because profit would not be a prime driver of the cost . In fact, with the current profits being made, even if the present situation was maintained substantial postage price reductions could be made.  The current large profits are only needed to make Royal Mail  attractive to prospective buyers of the business.

But even If the worst came to the worst and Royal Mail regularly made a loss, and the taxpayer had to  directly subsidize the cost, this would still be a benefit to the general public because it would ensure that an important public service was maintained at a price the public could afford.

The really good news for those who want  Royal Mail to stay as a public service is the immense growth in parcel post because of the already hugely expanded and ever expanding increase in Internet buying. In May 2013 this accounted for 9.7% of all retail spending excluding automotive fuel (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/rsi/retail-sales/may-2013/stb-rsi-may-2013.html#tab-Internet-Sales). There is every reason to believe it will continue to grow substantially as people get more and more comfortable with buying online and the opportunities to buy in shops diminishes as more and more close The Centre for Retail Research estimates that stores will decline  from 281,930 today to 220,000 in 2018, a decline of 22% (http://www.retailresearch.org/retail2018.php).  This growth in parcel post will more than cancel out the reduction in revenue from  letters.

Practically allied to Royal Mail is the Post Office . Until  April 2012 Royal Mail and the Post Office were  effectively part of the same organisation, albeit as agencies of varying status. (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/84/8405.htm).  Now the Post Office is to be, legally, an entirely separate state-owned organisation.

A Commons committee in 2012  recognised  its public service function: “The Post Office remains an essential service which is extensively used. A third of the UK population—just under 20 million people—and half of all small businesses visit one of over 11,500 post offices every week.] The Post Office is one of the country’s largest cash handlers, processing around £70 billion of cash and £636 million of coinage every year. “
(ibid)

The official view of the Post Office networks future is rosy: “[In 2012] Paula Vennells, Chief Executive of Post Office Ltd, supported the proposals and set out her ambition for the Post Office:

If I have a vision, it is to have 30,000 post office outlets, not 11,500. It is to have standalone electronic drop boxes for mail packets. It is to have ATMs in railway stations. It is to have identity kits in town halls and libraries, all branded ‘Post Office’. But until we transform the current network and make it more sustainable, that becomes just an ambition.” (ibid)

This seems wildly improbable in the context of a privatised Royal MailAlthough  a ten year deal to maintain the existing Post Office network was agreed by the government in 2012,   it is probable that the network will be severely reduced in the not too distant future . It has already suffered a considerable contraction –  there are 11,500 Post Offices now compared with 20,000 in 1990. Many of the remaining offices,  and especially the  sub-post offices,  are struggling   because government services such as TV licence renewal have been removed from the Post Office remit and  there is a  general move towards online government services (in which the user increasingly has no choice but to use the online service) will worsen  the lot of Post Offices, especially the sub-post offices. (http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-1678139/Post-offices-death-by-a-thousand-cuts.html).   Politically it will be much easier to reduce a stand alone state-run Post Office network  in size or even do away with all together than one attached in some way to the Royal Mail, especially if the privatised Royal Mail and its other private competitors decide not to use  Post Offices  as parcel pickup points and the government can keep pointing the Post Office network as “a burden on the taxpayer”.   The network It does require a public subsidy but this is minute in the context of national expenditure – it was  £150 million in 2010/11 ((http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/84/8405.htm)

There is little experience of privatised postal services  because there are few anywhere  in the world and those that have been privatised – Sweden, Finland and New Zealand – have only done so within the last 20 years.   However, a 2007 European Commission report on the liberalisation of postal services within the EU  found a common theme, namely, a reduction in post offices and increased postal charges (http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/wsi_pj_piq_post_europe.pdf).  That is exactly what is to be expected when private operators are allowed  into a state service.

Does anyone  honestly doubt that privatisation will make matters worse? After all, every major British privatisation of public  services,  apart from telecommunications  where there can be real competition,  has resulted in higher charges for at best unimproved and at worst inferior services.  Why should this privatisation be any different?

Here is a media doubter Vikki Woods writing for the free market Daily Telegraph  : “ Vince Cable said in the Commons that the time had come for the Government to step back from Royal Mail and allow its management to focus on growing the business. The sell-off “is practical, it is logical, it is a commercial decision… It is consistent with developments elsewhere in Europe where privatised operators produce profit margins far higher than the Royal Mail but have continued to provide high-quality and expanding services.” Oh, yes? He says “expansion” but I hear “shrinkage”. The universal service obligation was only five days across Europe back in 2011, and now various national mail companies are sucking their teeth and suggesting three days a week would be good. “(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/countryside/10176212/Our-postman-delivers-a-sack-of-bad-news.html).

I suspect that many will have the same fears.

The Royal Mail is already much diminished from what it was. There is only one delivery a day; the cost of postage has risen massively  and much of the Post Office counter service which includes a good deal of postal work – recorded and registered letters, airmail, special delivery and so on –  has gone because of the massive reduction in Post Offices.   How long before the universal letter post obligation is reduced from six days to three days or two days? How long before a single universal charge for the whole country is abolished and hard to service areas such as the countryside are charged much more than the cities?  How long before door-to-door letter post  deliveries are replaced by deliveries to central collection points ?

Privatisation is a fraud on the public for its is selling that which belongs to everyone.  Where privatisation of state assets involves selling them  to the general public  it is a confidence trick on a par with the conman who “sells”  Nelson’s Column to  tourist.   Britons  who purchase shares in a privatised company are buying what they already own.  Think about that fact and don’t be a sucker.

The public is being doubly stung with this privatisation.  Not only will they almost certainly have, based on the experience of privatised postal services abroad, a more expensive and less comprehensive service within the foreseeable future, the funding of accrued Royal Mail pensions up to 31 March 2012 will remain as a charge on the taxpayer (http://www.royalmailpensionplan.co.uk/) rather than the new privatised company.  In short, the taxpayer is left with the debts while the buyers of  Royal Mail walk away unencumbered with the historical pension obligations.

This is something which does not need to happen. It would be perfectly possible to retain a state-owned universal postal service which would not make a loss, would make sufficient money to keep modernising  and would be much cheaper to use. All that would  be required is the political will to say no to the EU and revert to the old letter and smaller parcel monopoly.  This  privatisation is simply an ideological decision and has nothing to do with the  viability of a state-run postal service in this country.

This could well be a highly unpopular privatisation because the public  overwhelmingly view  Royal Mail as a service and have become jaundiced by previous large privatisations such as the energy and water industries, all of which have  resulted in raised prices and no great improvement in the service they provide. It could  well cost the Tory and Lib Dem parties dear at the next election.   (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/royal-mail/10050074/Poisonous-privatisation-of-Royal-Mail-will-cost-the-Conservatives-votes-in-2015-Bow-Group-warns-Tory-MPs.html). If it does, they will have only themselves to blame.

How much public money is being stolen and wasted because of the privatisation of public services?

Robert Henderson

In June this year I attended a talk given by Michael Heseltine. It was embarrassingly limp re-hashed Heseltinian fare from the 1980s,with Heseltine airily advocating localism in place of centralised government with precious little idea of how  to engineer his envisaged  utopia of local politicians free from the Westminster party embrace mixing with banks,  Chambers of Commerce and other trade bodies to bring about a Nirvana of self-help and self-determination. (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2013/06/18/michael-heseltine-rebalancing-the-british-economy/).  Thankfully,  the Coalition thought so little of Heseltine’s proposals in his Government commissioned report No Stone Unturned that only the derisory sum of £2 billion (Heseletine had asked for £49 billion) was allocated to his recommendations for devolved power and expenditure  to promote growth (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/spending-review/10144584/Spending-Review-2bn-to-boost-regional-growth.html). It would have been less insulting if the Coalition had allocated nothing.

When the opportunity came for questions I raised  the matter of  increasing corruption in the spending of public money.  This is a consequence of taxpayers’ money going to private contractors at an ever more alarming rate as the mania for putting out public services to private companies and not-for-profit organisations such as charities  continues  unabated,  despite the ample evidence that contracting-out is generally very poor value for the taxpayer.  My argument was simple: the greater the number of public contracts being put out to tender by commercial businesses and not-for-profit organisations, the greater the opportunities for corruption by either public employees and contractors colluding or contractors fixing things amongst themselves.  Human nature being what it is, greater opportunities for fraud inevitably means greater instances of  fraud.

Heseltine reacted with considerable vehemence to my suggestion that serious corruption might exist in public service saying that he “took great exception” to the idea.  His denial rang hollow because sadly there is a constant flow  of publicly reported frauds by those receiving public money.   Here are a few recent examples of  alleged frauds:

1. Pharmacists and drug companies colluding to overcharge the NHS for drugs http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10133557/Pharmaceutical-scandal-The-NHS-the-drug-firms-and-the-price-racket.html.    The amounts in this case are potentially very large: “The Daily Telegraph’s investigation has found that companies are privately offering discounts of up to 70 per cent on drug tariff items to high-street chemists, with the pharmacist keeping the difference. For example, the NHS would agree to pay £100 for a drug that would be supplied to a chemist for only £30.” (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/10135897/Pharmaceutical-scandal-firms-boast-of-profits-on-drugs-that-cost-pennies.html).

2. Former government education adviser Tim Royle  arrested on suspicion of fraud when he was a headmaster ( http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/10130632/Former-government-education-adviser-arrested-on-suspicion-of-fraud.html).

Sometimes  misbehaviour  is judged to have fallen short of the criminal, but it still costs the taxpayer money.  A good example is that of  one-time award-winning  head teacher Jo Shuter  who  left herself open to suspicion and criticism by  inappropriate spending  and the employment of  relatives. She resigned but not before   being given a final warning  for “financial and human resource mismanagement”  (http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/london-life/jo-shuter-there-was-a-blurring-of-my-personal-and-professional-worlds-it-was-incredibly-stupid-8664781.html)

I can give two examples of questionable public contracts involving a great deal of money  which I personally tried unsuccessfully to bring to public notice. Both involved Camden Council, the London borough in which I live. The first occurred in 2003 when the Council announced that they were to replace 14,000 kitchens and bathrooms in their council housing stock.  In response to a question I put to him at a public meeting  Neil Litherland, the then director  of Housing in Camden , quoted me £6,000 for each room (£12,000 for a kitchen and bathroom combined).  The bathroom and kitchen units Camden  proposed to fit were pretty basic. The total cost at that price was £168 million (at 2003 prices).  This struck me as outlandishly expensive, so   I went to a local high street fitted furniture retailer to get a  quote.

At the retailer  I  selected units of the same quality as those proposed by the Council and  was quoted £1,500 for each room, including the installation of the kitchen and bathroom units.   That was for a single retail sale. A contract for 14,000 properties should  result in a very substantial discount below a retail sale, but even at the retail price quoted the contract would have been a quarter of the Camden quoted figure.

When I made my complaint to Camden,  I doubled the £1,500 quoted by the retailer because Camden were doing other renovation work such as re-wiring and laying new vinyl on the floors in the kitchens and bathrooms as well as fitting the new kitchen units and bathroom suites.  The extra  £1,500 per room for this  renovation work was almost certainly far too much,  but even  at £3,000 per room  Camden  would have been halved their actual bill saving £84 million.

A  disinterested person reading that account might think the local politicians and the MP for area would have been biting my hand off to take up the case and stop the grossly overpriced contract going through. I could not find a single politician to take up the matter. Nor could I get even the local papers to investigate the matter.

The second case involved what is now known as the Francis Crick Institute. (http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/links-to-all-ukcrmi-blog-posts/).  This is a gigantic medical  research laboratory currently being constructed on land behind the British Library. The site is  a road’s width from the Eurostar terminus.  There are excellent grounds for opposing the building of such a laboratory because it will be dealing with level 4 (the highest biohazard level) toxins.  This poses a risk of dangerous materials being released  (through a terrorist attack or carelessness)  into an area which is both heavily residential and arguably the busiest transport hub in London.  However, that is not the important thing in the context of corruption.

In an attempt to stop the building of the laboratory I used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to gain details of the sale of the land on which the laboratory is being built. The land belonged to the taxpayer and was under the stewardship of the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). The site   was put out to competitive tender and a good deal of interest was shown (27 bids, including the likes of Barratt Homes and   Oracle Group  – http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/2011/02/11/the-full-list-of-bidders/).  The decision was solely in the hands of the Secretary of State for the DCMS who was exercising a quasi-judicial role in the matter.  Despite this, documents I obtained using the FOIA unambiguously show Gordon Brown when PM illegally interfering with the bidding process  from before the closing date for bids and carrying on interfering until the sale was complete (http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/2011/02/21/gordon-browns-involvement-in-the-sale-of-the-land-to-ukcrmi/).   Here is an example extract from a Treasury document  dated 1 August 2007:

The PM is also most recently stated that he is very keen to make sure that Government departments are properly coordinated on this project [the laboratory] and that if there is a consensus that this is indeed an exciting project then we do what we can to make it happen. This is extremely helpful from a DIUS and MRC perspective, but, formally a NIMR relocation project in London has yet to receive Lyons approval from Treasury (for either the first planned NTH site or the possible BL site).

This was before the initial bidding process was closed.  The process was a sham, the other bidders having bid with no prospect of success. Brown should not have interfered at all,  even to say whether he thought X or Y was or was not  a promising project, but here he is  issuing a direct instruction to favour the laboratory consortium by getting all the government departments with some future or immediate interest in the laboratory to put their weight behind it. (When a Prime Minister says he is “very keen” on something that is an order to move heaven and earth to achieve it).

As with the Camden contract for kitchens and bathrooms I was unable to get any politician, local or national, to take up the matter. Every Camden councillor and the local Labour MP Frank Dobson  had the information but refused to act. Camden granted planning permission in principle, but this had to be agreed by Boris Johnson in his role of Mayor of London because the Institute building  is over the height which can  be sanctioned by a London council. Johnson  granted permission despite having the details of the corrupted bidding process (http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/2011/01/14/notification-of-planning-irregularities-to-boris-johnson/) and refused to comment on Brown’s illegal involvement in the decision.  Equally telling in this case was the failure of the national media to take up the story despite Gordon  Brown’s involvement.  The nearest I came to getting the story up and running in the media was a single  short piece in the London Evening Standard (http://www.standard.co.uk/news/no-10-interfered-to-push-through-600m-plan-for-virus-superlab-6557759.html).

The nature of public  fraud

Much, probably the large majority,  of the fraud consists of inflating contracts. This can be done with or without the collusion of public servants and politicians. Collusion between  contractors, public servants and politicians  speaks for itself.  Fraud without public servants or politicians being involved is more complicated. It requires a conspiracy by a number of contractors to fix a bidding process.  The larger the contract  or the more specialised the  work to be done, the more likely a bidding process can be fixed, because often there are only a handful of bidders  capable of taking the contract on. This leads to corrupt agreements between the companies to share out public contracts between themselves at inflated prices. This is done by the bidders  putting in bids to a supposedly competitive bidding process structured so that the company who is to take the contract puts in the lowest priced bid. However, this lowest bid is much higher than it  should be if it was pitched simply at a level to  guarantee a level of quality and provide a reasonable profit for the successful bidder.

The practice is probably very widespread. The Office of Fair Trading concluded an investigation in 2009 which showed widespread fixing of prices: “The OFT has imposed fines totalling £129.2 million on 103 construction firms in England which it has found had colluded with competitors on building contracts.” (see   http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Evaluating-OFTs-work/oft1240.pdf and http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/general/table-of-infringements.pdf).

Where public servants and/or politicians agree to accept an overpriced contract they may be  bribed either directly or indirectly. A favourite indirect method  is not to pay the politician or public servant at  the time of the fraud but later with lucrative sinecures after they have left office .

The current rules regarding ministers and public servants taking posts in private industry are so lax as to be next to meaningless – they can take up posts after a year or two, regardless of how closely the private sector job is linked to their previous post.  A recent eye-catching example was that of Dave Hartnett who has just taken up a post with the accountants Deloittes. . The Telegraph Daily telegraph  recently reported “Until last year, Mr Hartnett headed operations at HM Revenue and Customs. His new role will involve him working one day a week at Deloitte, which acts as auditor for companies – including Starbucks – which have been accused of using legal loopholes to avoid paying tax.” (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10083254/Former-Revenue-boss-lands-tax-advice-job-at-Deloitte.html). I am not  suggesting there is corruption  in this case,  but is it really acceptable to have such a senior and important public servant turning from  gamekeeper  to poacher so rapidly?  Like Caesar’s wife, politicians and public servants should be above suspicion.

Waste through incompetence and lack of alternatives

Some of the fraud will be accomplished because the public servant or politicians involved in making contract decisions are simply not up to the job of judging what is a reasonable price for the work being put out to contract.  This is a common enough state of affairs because public servants often find themselves asked to negotiate contracts  even though they  have no experience of  doing so because work which has always been done by direct public labour is suddenly subcontracted to the private sector.   To cover their ignorance the public servant  will often judge bids not on their objective merits, but on who is the cheapest within the criteria set for a contract.  Whether the bid is a reasonable price  for the work done is ignored. This has a knock on effect, not least because  of the widespread lack of honest competition in bidding.  Those accepting bids will justify their acceptance by referring to other contracts for similar work.  Because of this inflated prices become the norm. The politicians who have to make the final decisions on the contracts are as ignorant as the  public servants who negotiate the contracts and simply take what is put before them in the vast majority of cases.

But even where politicians or public servants do realise a price is too high, they can be in a very difficult position which makes them  accept the price quoted.  The problem is that if they refuse all the bidders for a contract on the grounds of cost , then how is the work to be done?  They cannot go elsewhere often enough because there is no public organisation which could do the job rather than a private company or not-for-profit  institution. This is a particular danger with really large or specialised contracts which can only be undertaken by a few companies.  An inflated price may have to be paid by the taxpayer because there is no longer a  public sector alternative.

How much money is being lost?

Total UK Government expenditure for 2014 is £715.3 billion (http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/total_spending_2014UKbn). However, that does not include all of the Public Private Initiative (PFI)  liabilities because  Governments want to keep the full  PFI/PPP indebtedness off  the official national debt.  A report by the Office for Budget Responsibility in August 2011 notes that many PFI deals are not recognised in the National Accounts.:

“ As well as lacking transparency, this has fuelled a perception that PFI has been used as a way to hold down official estimates of public sector indebtedness for a given amount of overall capital spending, rather than to achieve value for money.[27]

The report details the scale of the problem noting that “at March 2010, PSND [Public Sector Net Debt] included about £5.1 billion (0.4 percent of GDP) in respect of PFI deals that were recorded as on balance sheet in the National Accounts.” However the OBR considered that “the total capital liability of on and off balance sheet PFI contracts was closer to £40 billion (2.9 per cent of GDP).”[28] They estimate therefore that if PFI contracts were all recognised as debt in the National Accounts this would increase the level of debt by around 2.5% of GDP.[29]” (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/114605.htm)

In 2012 The Guardian using ONS figures put total PFI liabilities at £301,343,154,097 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/jul/05/pfi-contracts-list).

It is clear that  a substantial figure should be added to  the headline £715.3 billion to account for the full PFI liability for 2014.

In the nature of things it is impossible to say exactly how much of taxpayers’ money will have been spent on overpriced contracts. However, the examples which are public knowledge suggest that it must be very considerable, because so much of what used to be done in-house by the British state, at both national and local level, is now put out to contract.

Take the NHS as an example.  If you spend time as an in-patient in the present day NHS you are likely to find that the cleaning, laundry, catering and provision of multimedia installations are  contracted out. The NHS will also spend immense amounts on equipment which will be supplied by a private contractor. Staff will often be recruited by a private agency for a hospital.  If they need temporary doctors and nurses they will pay a private agency.   The hospital may well have a Starbucks or a Costa Coffee instead of an in-house café for visitors. There is fair chance  that  hospital car park will  be run by a private company. Most expensively, if the hospital is recently built it will almost certainly be the  subject  of a PFI contract which stretches way into the future (twenty years or more). This,  and apart from costing the hospital a good deal of money  to pay for the building,   will almost certainly entail a costly management contract to run and maintain the building. This means in practice no one will be in definite overall charge,  because if something goes wrong with the building the contractor has to be left to undertake the maintenance as they see fit

The NHS is one of the most comprehensive examples of contracting out. But most government departments and much of local government displays the same tendency.  Schools and universities are within the contracting out net.  Defence procurement is  depends  very largely on  private contractors, foreign and British.  Police forces around the country  have either privatised much of their administration or are thinking of doing so.  Even the translation service used by the courts has been put out to a private contractor (with disastrous consequences).  Local government services such as waste  collection and disposal and street cleaning are frequently in the hands of contractors. The most disturbing and absurd example I have come across is the privatising of the quasi-judicial  District Auditor post which oversees local government and deals with complaints about their financial probity(“ Following the outsourcing of the Commission’s in-house Audit Practice, all auditor appointments are of private firms “ http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/audit-regime/appointing-auditors/).

If only ten per cent  official Government expenditure is creamed off by fraud, that would mean £71 billion  of taxpayers’ money will be lost this financial year.  That is more than half the current government deficit.  But the figure  could well be much more because of the omitted PFI costs and the incentive of contractors to be as greedy as they can get away with.  Putting on twenty or thirty per cent to charges for supplying goods and services to central and local government might seem reasonable if you are the supplier and have good reason to believe  prices are likely to be accepted even if they are high. If the Telegraph reports of the grossly inflated prices charged  through collusion by pharmacists and drug companies are to be believed, the sky is the limit in the right circumstances for ramping up prices.

 Why do politicians do nothing?

It is little wonder that politicians in Britain are so willing to tolerate corruption because so many of them are happy to have their snouts in the public trough themselves in illegitimate ways. The information published by the Daily Telegraph on MPs expenses in 2009 was sufficient to show that the majority of MPs were engaging in expense claims which should never have been counted as legitimate expenses by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in normal circumstances . This was because they did not meet the HMRC test of being  expenses “ wholly, exclusively and necessarily “ incurred in the performance of a job.   Very few MPs faced criminal charges even though quite a few repaid money they had claimed. Nor does the public know how many of the MPs faced fresh assessments  by HMRC or the penalties if any HMRC imposed.

Two criminal offences are committed by those who evade tax by illegitimately describing expenditure they have incurred as tax deductible expenses. That  counts as a false declaration. They are effectively claiming money by false pretences. A second criminal offence arises if the bogus expense claim is made without an employer knowing that it is bogus (effectively theft from the employer) or a business which  is paying a sub-contractor expenses as part of the contractual arrangement  and the business does not know the claim is bogus (effectively theft from the employing business).

Depressingly, MPs appear to have learned little if anything from the Telegraph’s 2009 exposure of their shameful behaviour  because they are still thrashing their expenses (15 May 2013  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/mps-expenses/10059243/Have-MPs-learnt-a-thing-since-2009-Their-greed-suggests-not.html).

There is also the widespread  practice of politicians being employed on lucrative contracts by organisations whose interests they have either surreptitiously  promoted as a backbencher or , in the case of ministers,  had an area of responsibility which coincided with that of the organisation giving them the job  (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1387791/Corruption-risk-ex-ministers-walking-straight-private-sector-jobs.html)

Finally there is  the scandal of still active politicians openly acting as paid lobbyists,   including providing ready access to Parliament  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/apr/10/lobbying-professionals-parliamentary-passes).

How things used to be

Until fairly recently the British Civil Service was remarkably free from corruption (local government is a different matter), a fact made all the more surprising because of the truly colossal amount of money Government  disposes of each year . There were two reasons for this. The first was the hard-won tradition of public service which in which the Civil Service is an apolitical institution and as such serves no political ideology or party but provides politicians of all stamps with disinterested advice and executes their policies. This tradition has been underpinned by the lifelong working careers which public servants, especially senior ones, have commonly had. Of course, that was merely the ideal and, as with any human institution, the reality fell some way short of the ideal. Nonetheless, such sentiments and conventions have in the past affected the behaviour of public servants for the better, especially in the area of honesty. Sadly, the public service ethos has been largely lost because of the constant upheaval in terms of employment, the loss of  career security  and thirty years of politicians and much of the mainstream media reciting the false mantra that private is good, public is bad.

The second reason for a lack of corruption was  the direct provision of most the services provided by central government. This meant that the number of large central government contracts offered to private business  was  small in relation to the money spent on the direct provision of public service in all its aspects. In such circumstances serious fraud becomes difficult going on impossible for most civil servants because they do not have access to large amounts of taxpayers’ money. (Where they do have access, for example in the Inland Revenue, in most instances there are strict accounting procedures which make the embezzlement of large amounts of cash extremely difficult). Moreover, where there are few government  contracts, most civil servants are not in a position where someone  would find it fruitful to bribe them because they have nothing to sell.  Unsurprisingly, where serious corruption amongst public servants employed by central government has occurred in the past, it has been overwhelmingly in those areas where large government contracts exist, most notably in Defence Procurement and building contracts. It is a reasonable assumption that the more public contracts offered to private companies, the greater the corruption will be simply because the opportunity for corruption increases.

It would be impossible to reinstate the public service ethos quickly, but taking work back into the  public  service fold  would have an effect on fraud and waste through incompetence.  It would  definitely reduce fraud and should allow costs to be controlled because it would be the public sector setting the prices for the work.

Here is a question for the supporters of privatisation in it various forms to puzzle over. Ever since Thatcher began the privatisation of public services governments have insisted that this was saving the public money.  Yet  government expenditure since 1980 has risen substantially  in real  terms.  In 1980 total public spending was £104 billion (http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/total_spending_1980UKbn). Using the Bank of England inflation calculator, £104 billion at 2012 values would be only £377 billion. (http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/inflation/calculator/flash/default.aspx).

The cruel truth is that the £715 billion of  government expenditure  in the present financial year is almost double what it would be if the UK had maintained public expenditure at 1980 levels in terms of the real value of the Pound.  If the true PFI/PPP figure for 2014 was included it might be double. The huge increase since 1980  is very interesting because in 1980 the UK  not only had a serious unemployment problem,  but owned vast swathes of British industry, everything from British Leyland and coal mining to the public utilities and , believe it or not younger readers, a national bus network which meant that to live in the country did not mean you had to run a car.  1980s  UK also had armed forces which were considerably larger  than they are now and the putting out to private contractors of public sector work in  national government and council services was rare except in areas such as road building and defence procurement.  For example, local councils only routinely  employed direct labour on items such as road maintenance and cleaning.    In addition much of  private business then was, we were constantly told,  supposedly hideously uncompetitive . Yet despite  these alleged  crippling disadvantages, the British government in 1980  was able to maintain a level of public services  better and more comprehensive than that we have today whilst spending, in real terms,  little more than half of what government spends today.

Why has British government spending rocketed?  It is reasonable to put forward as the primary culprit the mania for privatising everything  because of the near doubling of government expenditure since 1980, the high cost of privatised services  and the many individual examples of public contracts, especially the PFI contracts, which seem outlandishly expensive.

 

These things have not been understood by the privatisers:

1. The public service ethos did exist and was most valuable in maintaining standards, continuity and honesty within public provision.

2. Multiplying the opportunities for fraud results inevitably results in more fraud.

3.  That public services cannot be run on commercial lines  because public provision is normally universal provision.  Unlike a private company losing business, a public service provider such as the NHS cannot turn round and say we will not treat these patients because we need to cut costs.

4. For public services to run properly need to be focused not on the bottom line but the provision of the service.

5. Once a public service has been contracted out to a private provider,  the private provider has the government over a barrel because there is no alternative to a private provider once the public service option has been done away with.

6. That public employment gave those so employed secure lives and indirectly increased the sense of  security in those employed by outside of  public service  because  having a substantial proportion in secure jobs in itself made society more stable and certain.

7. That public money is a recycling of money and however it is recycled it has a value because its spending supports local economies.

8.   That public expenditure has increased steadily during the privatising of public service activities.

Robert Henderson 30 6 2013

Cleansing the (Parliamentary) Augean stables

Robert Henderson

The seemingly  never-ending saga of British politicians behaving immorally (and sometimes criminally) in their financial dealings whilst serving in the Commons or Lords  has taken a new turn with Tory MP Patrick Mercer’s resignation after being exposed by a joint sting by the BBC and the Daily Telegraph ( http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/10092607/Exposed-deal-that-sank-cash-for-questions-MP-Mercer.html).

Mercer  believed he was being signed up by lobbyists to promote the interests of Fiji with a view to getting that country  readmitted  to the Commonwealth from which it had been suspended after  several military coups dismantled any pretence at democracy and the military (staffed by native Fijians) had acted against the Indian minority population of Fiji.

The agreement between Mercer and the bogus lobbyists included payments to Mercer (he received two payments of £2,000 which he did not enter on the Register of Members’ interests),  Mercer creating an All Party Parliament Group (APPG) for Fiji , Mercer arranging for a Commons pass for the lobbyists and Mercer making embarrassing remarks about how easy it would be  to recruit  members because many would see it as a chance to get a free trip to Fiji.  Mercer certainly had no difficulty  in recruiting both MPs and members of the Lords to the APPG, recruiting amongst others the all-purpose Labour MP Keith Vaz and the Labour peer Lord Mackenzie, a retired senior policeman, who works for a company Awards Intelligence which  claims to be able to “help dynamic organisations and individuals to find, enter and win business awards and personal honours such as an OBE, MBE, knighthood or apply to the House of Lords” (http://www.awardsintelligence.co.uk/about-ai.asp).  You couldn’t make it up.

MacKenzie , his fellow Labour peer Lord Cunningham (Jack Cunningham  of Blair’s Cabinet)  and the  Ulster Unionist Lord Laird have all been caught on video by one of the BBC, Daily Telegraph or Sunday Times journalist seemingly offering influence for money – Cunningham asked  of  £144,000 a year ( http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2334558/Lord-Laird-resigns-whip-Labour-peers-suspended-claims-broke-parliamentary-rules.html).  Mercer has resigned the Tory whip and will not stand at the next election. However, that means he will draw £130,000 plus expenses from the taxpayer.  Mackenzie and  Cunningham have been suspended by Labour  while Laird has resigned his party’s whip.  All three can still sit in the Lords and draw their £300 a day tax free expenses allowance.  It is conceivable that Mercer and the three peers could face criminal investigations but none has begun.

No surprise

None of this shameful behaviour should come as a surprise. In 2010 David Cameron said lobbying would be the next  scandal to hit Parliament. Moreover, the behaviour of many MPs and peers over their expenses had already primed the public to distrust the honesty of modern British politicians.  The question now is what can be done to mend matters?  I suggest this:

1. A ban on any form of material inducement to  an MP, whether r direct or indirect, during or after they have been active in politics.  This would end what  amounts to legalised bribery, namely, the granting of sinecures on company boards or other corporate bodies or the employment of MPs as consultants  as a reward for illicit favours done for the corporation involved whilst in political office, whether that be as a back or front bencher.

2. All Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs ) can be set up by any MP able to get 19 members to sign up. They  often provide cover for what are really jollies at a third party’s expense, especially the ones which offer overseas trips.  The groups  fall into two categories : those dealing with a country (hence the many trips abroad) and those dealing with specific subjects – examples are Beer, Pub and Philately ( http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/register.pdf). They have no official standing.

The supposedly “fact-finding”  trips take MPs  away from their parliamentary and/or  constituency  duties, In addition,  they must create a feeling of obligation in  MPs to show they have done something useful on a trip by producing suggestions based on what is done in another society, suggestions which are often wholly inappropriate for Britain or address a problem which does not exist.  MPs should have a holiday allowance of, say eight weeks,  and  any “fact finding trips”  should be undertaken during those eight weeks at the MP’s expense.  The government could continue to send  MPs or peers  on official overseas visits at the taxpayers’ expense.

3.  The granting of passes to Parliament for anyone other than those employed directly by an MP or peer should be forbidden.  Apart from the question of corruption, it renders absurd the security arrangements of Parliament.

4. There should be a bar on MPs  having second jobs even if they are being employed  in work such practising at the Bar or as a GP which does not obviously require them to promote the paymaster/employer’s interest  . There are two reasons for this: (1) the practice  inevitably leads to situations where MPs are compromised because of the competing  demands of their party policy, their own self-interest  or the wishes of an employer/paymaster  and (2) it reduces the amount of time and effort MPs can put into their Parliamentary and constituency work.

The argument that the jobs MPs take keep them in touch with the real world is a nonsense because most are  drawn from a very small range of work such as the law or take jobs as non-executive directors or consultants. The idea that this qualifies them to bring the  everyday experience of the ordinary citizen to their political work or provides a wide range of practical experience and expertise  is risible.   In any case the restriction on who could stand detailed above would ensure that everyone elected would have a decent experience of the world of normal work.

Breaches of these rules  should be made crimes carrying automatic prison sentences  for MPs, peers or any third party offering them material inducements. .

A change in mentality

Most fundamentally, there needs to be a sea-change in how would-be politicians view politics.  At present  an MPs can behave as that dreadful toady of aristocrats Edmund Burke advised MPs  to behave in the 18th century in a speech to the elector of Bristol (http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html).  For Burke  an  MP was not bound by what his constituents thought but owed them “his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience” something which  he told the electors of Bristol “ he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”

That self-serving view gives carte blanche to an MP to more or less behave as he chooses provided he does not commit a criminal act. It is profoundly undemocratic and was doubtless designed by Burke to curry favour with the rich and powerful.

Political office  should not be seen as a career choice, something which it has become  for far too many politicians, but a public service.  To this end no one should be allowed to stand for the House of Commons before the age of thirty-five and only then if the individual concerned has worked for at least ten years in a job absolutely unconnected to politics. This would remove from the Commons MPs who have gone straight from university to work for a political party and who arrive in the Commons with no experience of the real world of work.

Should be paid more?  It is essential that people do not view life as an MP as a means to enrich themselves or otherwise that will be all too often be the primary purpose driving MPs. The current pay of a backbench MP is £66,000. They also get generous pensions and  subsidised bars and restaurants plus various expenses which even if they are not meant to it is possible to make a fair profit on  even under the new expenses regime. That should be a sufficient reward with  the UK full time average wage being s less than £30,000. The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority produced its first report on MPs pay and expenses in January 2013 (http://tinyurl.com/MPSISPA) and serious consideration is being given to ideas such as making MPs pay a multiple of the average UK wage. I would favour such an approach because it provide a direct link between wages and  the performance of MPs as a collective body  and automatically change as the average wage changed.

Legal obligations on MPs to do the work  for which they are paid are sorely needed. Parliament only sits for around half the year (House of Commons 129 days in 2012 http://tinyurl.com/HoCDayssat2012 ) and many MPs arrive late on Monday and leave early on Friday.   There is no legal obligation on MPs to attend the Commons or attend to duties in their constituencies and an MP who treats the position cynically can draw their pay whilst doing absolutely nothing until they either strand down or are defeated at the ballot box.  There  needs to be a formal  job description for MPs  detailing what work they are required to do in their constituencies and Parliament and a  means to take disciplinary action if the job remains inadequately done, for example, giving electors in a constituency the right to recall an MP.

More generally, there is a Code of Conduct  which if it was enforced would end most of the abuses. Here  is the most relevant part of it:

 III.  Duties of Members

4.  By virtue of the oath, or affirmation, of allegiance taken by all Members when they are elected to the House, Members have a duty to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, her heirs and successors, according to law.

5.  Members have a duty to uphold the law, including the general law against discrimination.

6.  Members have a general duty to act in the interests of the nation as a whole; and a special duty to their constituents.

7.  Members should act on all occasions in accordance with the public trust placed in them. They should always behave with probity and integrity, including in their use of public resources.

IV.  General Principles of Conduct

8.  In carrying out their parliamentary and public duties, Members will be expected to observe the following general principles of conduct identified by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its First Report as applying to holders of public office.[1] These principles will be taken into account when considering the investigation and determination of any allegations of breaches of the rules of conduct in Part V of the Code.

“Selflessness

Holders of public office should take decisions solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.

Integrity

Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might influence them in the performance of their official duties.

Objectivity

In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit.

Accountability

Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.

Openness

Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.

Honesty

Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest.

Leadership

Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example.”

V.  Rules of Conduct

9.  Members are expected to observe the following rules and associated Resolutions of the House.

10.  Members shall base their conduct on a consideration of the public interest, avoid conflict between personal interest and the public interest and resolve any conflict between the two, at once, and in favour of the public interest.

11.  No Member shall act as a paid advocate in any proceeding of the House.[2]

12.  The acceptance by a Member of a bribe to influence his or her conduct as a Member, including any fee, compensation or reward in connection with the promotion of, or opposition to, any Bill, Motion, or other matter submitted, or intended to be submitted to the House, or to any Committee of the House, is contrary to the law of Parliament.[3]

13.  Members shall fulfil conscientiously the requirements of the House in respect of the registration of interests in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. They shall always be open and frank in drawing attention to any relevant interest in any proceeding of the House or its Committees, and in any communications with Ministers, Members, public officials or public office holders.[4]

14.  Information which Members receive in confidence in the course of their parliamentary duties should be used only in connection with those duties. Such information must never be used for the purpose of financial gain.

15.  Members are personally responsible and accountable for ensuring that their use of any expenses, allowances, facilities and services provided from the public purse is in accordance with the rules laid down on these matters. Members shall ensure that their use of public resources is always in support of their parliamentary duties. It should not confer any undue personal or financial benefit on themselves or anyone else, or confer undue advantage on a political organisation.

16.  Members shall never undertake any action which would cause significant damage to the reputation and integrity of the House of Commons as a whole, or of its Members generally.

17.  The Commissioner may not investigate a specific matter under paragraph 16 which relates only to the conduct of a Member in their private and personal lives. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmcode/1885/188501.htm

Although complaints are investigated by a non-politician,  the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, the Code is rarely enforced with any severity by either the  Committee on Standards and Privileges or the House itself and even where it is enforced severely there are no criminal penalties.  It is all too incestuous. Where appropriate, for example where members or peers have  received money or other material considerations from a third party,  criminal penalties should be attached to the Code and those cases  should be investigated by the police not politicians.  The power of recall by electors could also come into play. It is also  worth noting that the Commons  can expel its own members and the Lords suspend theirs  (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10098194/How-Parliament-can-kick-out-crooked-MPs-and-peers-whenever-it-likes.html )

The balance of power in the Commons

The lack of opportunity to line their pockets should  attract a less self-serving kind of MP,  but there also needs to be a carrot as well as a stick. The carrot  should be a shift in the balance of  power between Parliament of the government. If backbenchers had far more chance to influence matters by introducing legislation and voting as their conscience dictates, there would be  more chance of people who were interested in implementing policy rather than getting rich or simply exercising their egos.

The government payroll vote begs to  be greatly  reduced. At present around 150 MPs on the government side are deemed to be part of the government. Even a Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS) counts as part of the payroll vote. This greatly undermines the importance and influence of backbenchers especially where a government has a large majority. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/feb/10/creeping-patronage-house-commons-mps-whips).  A Cabinet of 20 with 20 junior ministers is probably sufficient.

Two other things to strengthen Parliament are required. First, party whipping should be stopped. This would not mean governments losing control because most of the time backbenchers will naturally vote the party line.    Second, Parliamentary time should  be substantially  increased by having Parliament sitting for, say, nine months of the year rather than the present six months.  Apart from allowing much more time to scrutinise government legislation, this would allow time for backbenchers to place statutes on the books through their own efforts.

What will change?

David Cameron has promised a register of lobbyists and Nick Clegg has been huffing and puffing about  throwing crooks out of the Lords, but unless the matter is taken out of the hands of politicians by making the more offences breaches of the Code of  Conduct criminal offences dealt with by the police, it is unlikely that anything radical will happen.  That is the tragedy of modern British politics: self-serving not public service  has become the order of the day.

The “wrong” sort of indoctrination (for the left)

Robert Henderson

An unnamed (because they did not want the children identified) Rotherham couple experienced in fostering  have had three of their charges peremptorily  removed by Rotherham social services (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ukip/9700001/Foster-parents-stigmatised-and-slandered-for-being-members-of-Ukip.html). The reason? The couple are members of  the United Kingdom Independence Party  (UKIP) which opposes  further wholesale immigration including that from the EU and multiculturalism.  These policies were  deemed racist by Rotherham social services:

‘They [the fosterers] were told that the local safeguarding children team had received an anonymous tip-off that they were members of Ukip.

The wife recalled: “I was dumbfounded. Then my question to both of them was, ‘What has Ukip got to do with having the children removed?’

“Then one of them said, ‘Well, Ukip have got racist policies’. The implication was that we were racist. [The social worker] said Ukip does not like European people and wants them all out of the country to be returned to their own countries.’

The fact of UKIP membership was enough to damn the foster parents as unsuitable to raise three East European origin children because according to  Joyce Thacker, the council’s Director of Children and Young People’s Services, the UKIP couple could not meet the children’s  “cultural and ethnic needs”.  Despite the fact that the UKIP couple had been exemplary foster parents  for a number of years. After being removed from the UKIP foster parents the children were split even though they are siblings (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9704964/Ukip-fostering-row-children-were-split-up-when-removed.html). The claim  of meeting the children’s “cultural and ethnic needs”  is made even more absurd by the fact that the UKIP couple were foster parents trusted to take in children in an emergency,  a fostering status which often resulted in the  foster periods being short.

Since the story about the Rotherham foster parents broke a UKIP candidate has come forward to say that she was not allowed to be a volunteer with the children’s charity Barnardos because of her UKIP connections:

A row over two UKIP members having their foster children removed took a new twist last night when another woman claimed she had been barred from looking after children because she was a party candidate.

Nigel Farage, UKIP leader, condemned ‘another appalling case of discrimination’ after former district nurse Anne Murgatroyd said she had been prevented from volunteering as a mentor for young adults by leading children’s charity Barnardo’s….

Responding to a Mail on Sunday reporter, she wrote: ‘I’d almost gone through their process and been accepted when I told them I’d be standing for UKIP in locals . . . They checked with managers, discussed it, couldn’t accept me due to issue of multi-culturalism.

‘Their rationale was that because UKIP opposes multi-culturalism it would not be appropriate for me to mentor young people coming out of the care system. My argument was that, yes, I do oppose forced marriage and female genital mutilation and family killings but that does not make me unsuitable to befriend young people.’ (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2238037/UKIP-leader-fury-member-banned-Barnardos-caring-children.html#ixzz2DDOYxVs1).

These two cases suggest that within the social work world, whether state funded or charitable, UKIP have been placed on some sort of black list. This is positively sinister because once agents of the state, whether directly employed or subcontracted labour in organisations such as charities, are allowed to make political judgements in their work anything potentially goes,  including the imposition of blanket bans on those belonging to parties deemed not to be within the ideological Pale of the public servant or organisation.

What Rotherham Social Services and Barnardos are both saying  in effect is that only those signing up to an uncritical political correctness can be considered for participation in childcare socialwork.  However, that is not entirely correct because,   as we shall see,   UKIP’s policies on immigration and multiculturalism are not radically different from those of  the Conservative  Party; neither are they  a million miles from those of Labour.  To the best of my knowledge there is no example of a member of the Conservative or Labour Parties  being denied participation because of their attitudes towards immigration and multiculturalism.  The implication of this is that UKIP is seen as a fringe party with limited power which  can be excluded with few consequences , while the power, influence and money at the disposal of the major  parties makes them too hot to challenge – it is also worth remembering that the funding for social services and much of the funding for major charities comes from the taxpayer so those in socialwork have a vested interest in keeping mum about the parties which do or potentially will allocate the taxpayers’ money.

The double standards are further seen in the complaint of the politically correct that UKIP members would indoctrinate the children with UKIP beliefs. But these people are more than happy to tolerate the indoctrination of children with their own views. There are no calls to  prevent the politically correct, purveyors of multiculturalism, Marxists and  Internationalists from adopting and fostering.  The politically correct deem these to be the “right” kind of indoctrination.

What UKIP, the Conservatives, Labour and the BNP say about immigration and multiculturalism

This is UKIP’s immigration policy including its position on multiculturalism:

• End mass, uncontrolled immigration. UKIP calls for an immediate five-year freeze on immigration for permanent settlement. We aspire to ensure that any future immigration does not exceed 50,000 people p.a.

• Regain control of UK borders. This can only be done by leaving the European Union. Entry for work will be on a time-limited work permit only. Entry for non-work related purposes (e.g. holiday or study) will be on a temporary visa. Overstaying will be a criminal offence

• Ensure all EU citizens who came to Britain after 1 January 2004 are treated in the same way as citizens from other countries (unless entitled to ‘Permanent Leave to Remain’). Non- UK citizens travelling to or from the UK will have their entry and exit recorded. To enforce this, the number of UK Borders Agency staff engaged in controlling immigration will be tripled to 30,000

• Ensure that after the five-year freeze, any future immigration for permanent settlement will be on a strictly controlled, points-based system similar to Australia, Canada and New Zealand

• Return people found to be living illegally in the UK to their country of origin. There can be no question of an amnesty for illegal immigrants. Such amnesties merely encourage further illegal immigration

• Require those living in the UK under ‘Permanent Leave to Remain’ to abide by a legally binding ‘Undertaking of Residence’ ensuring they respect our laws or face deportation. Such citizens will not be eligible for benefits. People applying for British citizenship will have to have completed a period of not less then five years as a resident on ‘Permanent Leave to Remain’. New citizens should pass a citizenship test and sign a ‘Declaration of British Citizenship’ promising to uphold Britain’s democratic and tolerant way of life

• Enforce the existing terms of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees until Britain replaces it with an Asylum Act. To avoid disappearances, asylum seekers will be held in secure and

humane centres until applications are processed, with limited right to appeal. Those seeking asylum must do so in the first ‘designated safe country’ they enter. Existing asylum seekers who have had their application refused will be required to leave the country, along with any dependants. We oppose any amnesties for failed asylum seekers or illegal immigrants.

• Require all travellers to the UK to obtain a visa from a British Embassy or High Commission, except where visa waivers have been agreed with other countries. All non-work permit visa entrants to the UK will be required to take out adequate health insurance (except where reciprocal arrangements exist). Those without insurance will be refused entry. Certain visas, such as student visas, will require face-to-face interviews, and UKIP will crack down on bogus educational establishments

• Repeal the 1998 Human Rights Act and withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In future British courts will not be allowed to appeal to any international treaty or convention that overrides or sets aside the provisions of any statue passed by the UK Parliament

• Reintroduce The ‘Primary Purpose Rule’  (abolished by the Labour Government),  whereby those marrying or seeking to marry a British citizen will have to convince the admitting officer that marriage, not residence, is their primary purpose in seeking to enter the UK

• End the active promotion of the doctrine of multiculturalism by local and national government and all publicly funded bodies

• Ensure British benefits are only available to UK citizens or those who have lived here for at least five years. Currently, British benefits can be claimed by EU citizens in their arrival year (http://www.ukip.org/content/ukip-policies/1499-immigration-ukip-policy).

Most of those policies are either formal Conservative policy or have considerable traction within the Parliamentary party.  In the case of multiculturalism David Cameron since becoming Prime Minister has repudiated it for its fracturing effect on society(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 State multiculturalism has failed).  Here is the official  Conservative Party policy on immigration:

 IMMIGRATION

We are restoring order to our immigration system to bring annual net migration down to the tens of thousands – rather than the hundreds of thousands we saw under Labour – by the end of this Parliament. We have capped economic migration, reformed the student visa system, and we’re changing the family visa rules. We have made reforms at our borders, to ensure they are safe and secure.

The bigger picture

• Our annual limit on non-EU economic migration will not only help reduce immigration to sustainable levels but will protect those businesses and institutions that are vital to our economy. The new system was designed in consultation with business. Employers should look first to people who are out of work and who are already in this country.

• A properly controlled and regulated student visa system is a crucial component of our policy to reduce and control net migration. That is why we have radically reformed student visas to weed out abuse and tackle bogus colleges. And our reforms are starting to take effect: in the year to June 2012, there was a thirty per cent decrease in the number of student visas issued compared to the year to June 2011.

• We welcome those who wish to make a life in the UK with their family, work hard and make a contribution but a family life must not be established here at the taxpayer’s expense. To play a full part in British life, family migrants must be able to integrate – that means they must speak our language and pay their way. This is fair to applicants, but also fair to the public.

• The Government’s priority is the security of the UK border. The right checks need to be carried out to control immigration, protect against terrorism and tackle crime. We are maintaining thorough border checks. And despite those robust checks, the vast majority of passengers pass through immigration control quickly. http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Immigration.aspx

The Labour Party do not have an up to date  immigration policy on their website  but their 2010 manifesto stated:

5.2 • Control immigration through our Australian-style points-based system, ensuring that as growth returns we see rising levels of employment and wages, not rising immigration, and requiring newcomers to earn citizenship and the entitlements it brings. http://www.labour.org.uk/uploads/TheLabourPartyManifesto-2010.pdf

The Labour leader Ed Miliband said this in April 2011 to explain why Labour lost the 2010 election:

“I think the problem is that we lost trust and we lost touch particularly in the south of England.

“I think living standards is a big part of it; immigration is a big part of it. I think maybe a combination of those two issues.” http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/8462411/Ed-Miliband-immigration-lost-Labour-votes.html

Even if the three parties’ policies are not exactly the same there is much overlapping. Moreover the objections of Rotherham Social Services and Barnardos were  on the general grounds of finding  opposition to immigration and multiculturalism objectionable, so the exact detail of the objections is irrelevant.

UKIP may not be at the top of the politically correct pantheon of  secular devils, but the British National Party indubitably is. The BNP’s current policy on immigration is:

- Deport all the two million plus who are here illegally;

 – Deport all those who commit crimes and whose original nationality was not British;

 – Review all recent grants of residence or citizenship to ensure they are still appropriate;

 – Offer generous grants to those of foreign descent resident here who wish to leave permanently;

 – Stop all new immigration except for exceptional cases;

 – Reject all asylum seekers who passed safe countries on their way to Britain. (http://www.bnp.org.uk/policies/immigration)

That goes  substantially further than UKIP, the Conservatives and Labour.  Nonetheless,  if  Conservative  and Labour party spokesmen were asked to comment on what should happen to illegal immigrants, foreigners who commit crimes or whether citizenship should be removed from those with dual nationality who commit serious crimes,  I doubt whether any would say illegal immigrants  should be allowed to stay, foreigners who commit serious crimes should not be deported or British citizenship should not be taken from foreigners who have gained it and gone on to plot  terrorist attacks on this country.

As for the rejection of  asylum seekers who have passed through safe countries,  Britain has a legal right to do this under the various treaties which cover asylum.  Nor could there be any objection in principle to the use of payments to voluntarily repatriate people because the government has been happy enough to pay failed asylum seekers to leave Britain in the recent  past (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1572669/Row-over-payments-to-failed-asylum-seekers.html) and http://www.irr.org.uk/news/the-politics-of-voluntary-returns/.

It would be difficult to make a case for the BNP policy on immigration being so utterly different from that of the Conservative and Labour parties that the party  deserved to be  treated differently. As for the BNP’s rejection of multiculturalism, that is no different in principle from that of the Conservatives and UKIP.  Multiculturalism is something you either  support or oppose.  It is a general policy not one of specific detail being simply a belief that different ethnic/racial groups should be able to follow their own ancestral cultural norms.  Beyond that It does not stipulate what the relationship between the groups  should be.

The broader question

The broader  question raised by the Rotherham  case is why it is thought an unquestioned good that children brought up in this country should be raised in a way which will make them see themselves as separate from the native population.   If a child is to grow up, live and work as an adult in a country , which is probably what the children involved in the Rotherham case will do,  the  security and life chances of the child will be best secured by assimilating as completely as possible not by remaining separate from the native population.  To deliberately set a child apart from the native population by insisting that they are brought up by those deemed culturally compatible  (which is often social worker code for being of the same race) is to generate suspicion on the part of the native population of the  outsider and paranoia on the part of the outsider that he or she is always under  threat from the majority.  That is healthy for no one.  It is a recipe for racial and ethnic conflict./

Where does the extreme political correctness in public bodies come from?

The political correctness of public bodies is not accidental.   Legislation such as the Race Relations (Amendment) Act  2000 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/section/1)which lays a duty on public bodies to not only be non-discriminatory but to prove they are being so, have institutionalised political correctness with  arguably the rightness of multiculturalism as its core belief.   Such laws should be repealed because they entrench a political creed in law.

Another buttress of institutionalised political correctness is the   use of organisations such as Common Purpose (CP).  ( It is interesting that  Joyce Thacker,  Rotherham council’s Director of Children and Young People’s Service  is  reported to be a Common Purpose  graduate  – http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/jamesdelingpole/100191270/rotherham-hislop-common-purpose/).  CP represents itself as a leadership training organisation which is something of an oddity in itself.  It is very successful in persuading public bodies to send staff for this “leadership training”  for which COP is paid millions a year.  Courses  are offered for people aiming to become leaders to those who are already well up the ladder of their career path.

 Here are a few passages from the COP website which positively shout the message of political correctness:

Leadership resources

Common Purpose is interested in all aspects of leadership – when, what and how people choose to lead, and how they become better at it. We are also interested in all leaders, from all backgrounds; people at the beginning of their careers keen to develop their leadership potential to those looking to use their leadership skills in retirement.”  (http://www.commonpurpose.org.uk/resources).

“We value diversity and constantly strive to provide equality of opportunity as an employer and in the provision and delivery of all our activities. We positively encourage applications from all sections of the community and are working hard to ensure that our courses and services meet the requirements of people with disabilities.

Why do we do it?

What underpins all Common Purpose courses is a belief that society benefits from people of all ages, backgrounds and cultures working together to help guide and shape the future of their organisations and communities. This is best achieved when leaders are able to realise their full potential, through broadening their horizons and establishing firm roots in their communities.” (http://www.commonpurpose.org.uk/about/what-we-do)

No one opposed to political correctness, either wholly or in part, could take part in such a course honestly or willingly. ( For an extensive list of CP “graduates” and the positions held by them go to http://cpexposed.com/graduates).  The  aims of CP  and the courses  offered bear a strong resemblance  cadre training in the Marxist-Leninist mould.  It is probable that the ever growing political correctness in public service is to a significant degree engineered by the CP graduates who may act as a kind of freemasonary as well as promoting the idea as individuals.  There is consequently  a very strong case for banning any public servant from attending its courses.

What else can be done?

David Cameron may have spoken against multiculturalism and promised to legislate against the practice of social workers of placing children for  adoption  (and fostering) based on racial and cultural compatibility.  But he has not done this after several years in office.  Until this is done social workers  and their ilk in not-for-profit  bodies such as charities will continue to promote the politically correct and multicultural and nothing-else- will- be permitted message through their control of who is allowed to participate in their work.  There needs to be a specific legal bar to taking the political views of would be adopters, foster parents, volunteers and, indeed,  social workers themselves into account when deciding on adoption or fostering, recruiting volunteers  or employing people to engage in childcare social work.

That does not mean that  individuals should never be disbarred from such positions because of their views, but the views for which they are deemed unsuitable should be their own and not those  attributed to the person simply because  they show sympathy for  a political party, ideology or movement.   Nor should views be a disqualification unless they are directly relevant to the position sought, for example, someone espousing the view that the age of consent should be abolished who was seeking to become a foster parent might reasonably be considered unsuitable to look after children.    Opposition to immigration or multiculturalism should  not be grounds  for the thumbs down; nor should a belief in an open door immigration policy and multiculturalism result in rejection.  Finally, it should always be remembered that the behaviour of people is often at odds with their political and moral views.  Behaviour is a surer guide to the character of a person than what they say.

That those in the childcare department of Rotherham Council knew that what they were doing was dubious at best and illegal at worst is shown by their attempts to silence the couple involved; their failure  to confirm in writing the reasons for the children’s removal despite repeated requests from the couple and their refusal to publish the results of their internal inquiry into the matter. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/9706739/Ukip-fostering-row-mafia-council-told-us-to-keep-quiet-say-parents.html).

The attitude of the local Rotherham politicians is illustrated by Josephine Burton, a cabinet member at Labour-run Rotherham metropolitan borough council. She told a member of the public  “It may be advisable to wait until you have a better understanding of fostering and the current legislation that surrounds it, before wading in to pass judgement.” (Ibid).  No apology by the council has been offered to the couple involved.

Public and private confusion (and, yes, there is an alternative)

I wrote Public and Private Confusion in 2006, before the credit crisis, before even Northern Rock was saved by the taxpayer. NuLabbour’s mania for privatising anything in sight was in full spate, mostly, because the Tories had privatized all of the great state industries,  through contracting out public services piecemeal and the greatly expanded use of private money in public projects to build things such as new schools and hospitals using the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Public spending was still burgeoning , although anyone who looked closely at the still continuing fool’s paradise which was Gordon Brown’s boom could see that NuLabour’s public spending was seriously out of control as they looked at the deficits Labour had been running since 2002 – http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2011/10/02/labour-re-writes-the-past-their-economic-management/ . But the British public did not know the half of it when it came to the government debt being built up, because the frighteningly large PPP and PFI obligations were  still largely hidden as they were mostly off the government books Enron-style.

The latest quantification of PFI liabilities alone is £300 billion (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/jul/05/pfi-cost-300bn) and that could well be an under estimate because of many of the contracts have renegotiation clauses at certain points and the PFI contractors,  or those who have bought PFI contracts as they are sold on by the original supplier,  hold the taxpayer over a barrel because the state no longer has the capacity to either undertake the work itself.  Even where a re-negotiation clause does not exist or does exist but the point is years away, it is a common PFI practice for contractors to threaten to walk away from a contract unless their terms are improved. There are also the costs arising where contractors do walk away from a contract and the state has to step in or pay another contractor even more inflated prices for the work.

The most troubling result of PFI costs is hospital trusts unable to fund themselves adequately because of the ludicrous amounts they have to pay for PFI work (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2165011/PFI-Cancel-contracts-MPs-signed-dock.html), but there is another major problem: the inability of PFI contractors to undertake work efficiently or, as we have seen with the G4S fiasco and their inability to provide security for the Olympics. So lax were their recruitment methods their chief executive could not say if all those recruited could speak English fluently  or even at all (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/news/9399841/Olympics-I-dont-know-if-guards-speak-English-says-G4S-chief.html).

Despite a change of government, PFI contracts are still being signed in large numbers by the Coalition (http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_22_11.htm). More and more public core services which the vast majority of Britons would think naturally belong in public hands such as police support and large scale security operations are being taken from the public sector and given to private contractors. In addition, strategic assets such as the Government’s stake in stake in nuclear power giant Urenco continue to be sold off (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/8817089/Taxpayers-3bn-windfall-as-Urenco-nears-10bn-sale.html). In short, nothing but nothing, including even the armed forces, can be considered safe from the mania for turning public service into private business. The situation is substantially worse now than it was in 2006  in terms of the PFI debt being run up, the privatisation of essential public services by stealth (especially the NHS) and the intention to sell off  what remains of substantial public assets, most notably the Royal Mail,  in the medium term.

The purpose of Public and Private Confusion was and is to examine what needs to remain in public hands, what should be brought back into public hands, how public service might be improved and the effects of privatisation in all its guises.

Robert Henderson 23 July 2012

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Public and Private Confusion

(And, yes, there is an alternative)

Robert Henderson 2006

Contents

1. Introduction

2. What are governments for?

3. Why do we need public provision?

4. Public provision is a good deal

5. The moral value of general provision

6. Why should those who can pay for themselves pay for others?

7. What things should be public?

8. What should be provided directly by the state?

9. What should be provided indirectly by the state?

10. The railways – a classic public service

11. Safety

12. Public and private efficiency

13. What do we mean by efficiency?

14. Private enterprise providing public service

15. Public service inefficiencies and politicians

16. Other public service inefficiencies

17. What should public service workers be paid?

18. The right to strike

19. The ability of private companies to manage public services

20. Private money in public projects – “Buy now, pay later”

21. The London Underground – PPP in action

22. Capita

23. The morality of privatisation

24. Our general experience of privatisation to date

25. Private money in public service = a democratic deficit

26. When private becomes public by default

27. Corruption in public service

28. The behaviour of private companies

29. Charities

30. Does the market produce greater choice generally?

31. How government takes on obligations

32. Making personal private provision – the problems of investing

33. Supporting old age

34. The housing crisis

35. Social housing

36. Education ?

37. Healthcare

38. The Post Office and Royal Mail

39. How do we pay for better public services?

40. Does social provision corrupt?

41. Why is public provision being repudiated?

42. The nation state – the only vehicle for democracy

43. The future of public provision

44. Conclusion

1. Introduction

I was provoked into writing Public and Private Confusion both by the Blair Government’s manic dismantling of directly provided public services and increasing signs that political support for public services however provided is waning.

Those with a public voice who oppose such developments all too often wail and gnash their teeth and say how unfair and immoral it is but fail to provide detailed arguments against those who have swallowed the propaganda of private is always best. They lament privatisation and the increasing introduction of private money and

companies into public services, yet defend their position solely by moral exhortation and displays of emotion, as though to merely be on the side of direct public provision, any public provision, is argument enough.

How did we reach this state of affairs? The four decades after 1945 seemed to have made substantial public provision part of the national furniture. Even the Thatcher years did not seriously suggest that it would be generally undermined. The privatisation of the nationalised industries were one thing for Thatcher; services such

as the NHS and the Post Office quite another. Her government was driven by the batty idea of introducing entirely inappropriate private enterprise practices such as the NHS “internal market” into public service, but there was through her long period in office no reason to fear that fundamental services like the NHS and Post Office would be privatised. Indeed, Thatcher said that the privatisation of the Post Office would be “a privatisation too far.”

The consequence was that the supporters of public provision became smug. They assumed that the core elements of public provision were inviolate and consequently not in need of defending. Most damagingly, at the political level they failed to prevent both the Labour and Tory Parties from being firmly captured by those determined to introduce the supposed panacea of the disciplines of the market into public life. By the time Blair came to power in 1997 the supporters of direct public provision in politics and the media found themselves marginalised.

Since 1997 it has become increasingly clear that direct public provision is viewed by those in control of the major political parties as a bad thing in itself and that the only way forward is to subcontract private companies to do the work the state was previously doing. This is a consequence of several things: the failure of greatly increased public spending since 1997 to improve public services; the increasing demands of the EU to reduce direct state funding; and the seemingly religious belief in globalism displayed by Blair himself. (I expand on these issues in section 41).

To facilitate the move from direct public to subcontracted public provision, the public is being fed a continuous diet of bad news about the directly provided public services by the mainstream media, the majority of which is all too willing to climb on the “public service bad, private enterprise good” bandwagon. (The mainstream media has overwhelmingly bought into the free-market propaganda – ask yourself, when did you last read a newspaper article or watch a TV programme which concluded that “free markets” and “free trade” are undesirable because of their adverse consequences for substantial parts of the populations of the First World, whose natural employments are lost and whose lives are made generally insecure).

Because of its natural importance and central place in the hearts of the electorate, the NHS is the biggest and most gory source of “shock horror” stories. Every horror story about the NHS is paraded on the front pages, while the frequent errors made by private medicine rate barely a mention. The fact that any organisation as gigantic as the NHS – it employs the better part of a million people – will inevitably be the source of regular errors is barely mentioned and almost no attempt is made to place the level of failure in that context. Not only that, many of the “scandals” are less than scandals when they are looked at in detail.

There is also an increasing loud and ever more unguarded attempt by politicians and sections of the media to suggest that the Welfare State is “too expensive” in its present form to survive and that people must make much more private provision for things such as pensions and healthcare.

Sadly, the direct public provision case is now largely going by default, which is enraging because it is very strong, both as a moral necessity for a civilised and free society and as a practical necessity to maintain the efficient functioning of a modern industrial state. That is case which I have attempted to supply.

2. What are governments for?

The traditional areas of government have been defence, foreign affairs, policing, the provision of justice, the execution of legal judgements including criminal sentences, the collection of taxes and the allocation of those taxes to the public enterprises mentioned above. But long before the rise of the modern industrialised state, the more organised and effective governments recognised that something beyond this minimalist role of government was desirable, not least because underlying any society is a fear of civil disorder (which might overthrow the status quo) and crime if there are too many have-nots (this was one of the primary reasons for Imperial Rome providing a daily dole of bread to its citizens.) England has had a legally enforceable national welfare system since 1601. In the sixteenth century, enclosure of mediaeval open fields and the dissolution of the monasteries drove many from the land and removed most of the informal welfare system which had long existed through the charitable works of monasteries. The consequence was the creation of a large number of “sturdy beggars” (a substantial rise in the population of England at the time was a considerable aggravating factor). This drove the Tudors to introduce various Acts which attempted to both restrict the movement of the poor and to provide for them. These efforts culminated in the 1597 and 1601 Poor Laws. These Acts, for the first time anywhere in the world, created legally enforceable provision for the poor for an entire nation (although it took half a century or more to get the Poor Law generally enforced).

Along with the fear of social disorder ran the natural feelings of pity and moral obligation, feelings bolstered by the custom of hospitality and of a religion which enjoined a duty of alms-giving to the poor. Such sentiments were gradually assimilated into public policy.

Of course, the national and political desire to provide for the poor and the unfortunate has been massively enlarged in the centuries since the Elizabethan Poor Law was passed. In Britain, we think that everyone in our society should have the necessities of life – food,shelter, warmth, clothing, preferably from their own efforts in part or whole, but where necessary from the taxpayer. The vast majority of Britons believe that these things are desirable, although there are differences of opinion over the extent and nature of the provision.

But most Britons – both at the political level and as a large majority of the population – also think that a good deal of other state provision should exist, not merely for the poor or unfortunate but for every citizen. We recognise that there are other things which the state should do beyond maintaining the integrity of the state and providing the basic means of subsistence. These are enterprises which are deemed to be both for the public good and in need of public action because private provision will not do them at all or only do them inadequately.

We expect the roads to be maintained by the state because that increases the efficiency of commerce and industry and enhances private life (most of the population probably think the same of railways.) We believe that no one should be left without medical treatment within the limits of what can be reasonably afforded. We think it necessary that the population should be educated to a certain level because that is essential for the individual’s chances in life and because a modern industrial society requires educated people. The more thoughtful see education as a civilising process which has general value for a society.

Equality before the law, or even justice itself, is a special case of social provision because it requires social provision for it to exist. Unless the state provides the means for each individual to have equal access to the law to remedy a wrong and to have equal access to professional legal assistance when they are a defendant in either a criminal or civil case, there is no equality before the law. All legal assistance must be free, because otherwise there is no equality for an individual will either not be able to afford the assistance or be deterred from seeking it because of the cost.

Law exists to provide a peaceful alternative to private action to right hurts and no defendant has a choice of whether they are defendant. Those two facts should be remembered by those who balk at the idea of universal legal aid. Sadly, legal aid in Britain, although still generous compared with many countries, is inadequate and is being reduced.

All social provision, from the supplying of basic needs such as food and shelter to education, has a further role. In a reputed democracy, each person is supposed to be an autonomous human being capable of both existing and of making decisions about who shall govern and what shall be done. A person constantly wracked with the uncertainty of poverty and the fear of ill-health or insecure employment will have little time to devote to anything other than surviving. A person denied a formal education will probably be illiterate and have a poorly developed intellect. To possess such disadvantages in our world is effectively to be excluded both from the more comfortable and influential parts of society and, consequently, from politics. And such disadvantage follows down the generations, with the children of the poor taking on the privations of the parents.

If we are to have a meaningful democracy, or more exactly a representative system (elective oligarchy) which allows the masses to exercise meaningful democratic control over the elite through their votes, every member of the electorate has, ideally, to be in a condition whereby they both have the time to consider matters beyond the everyday and the education to understand matters of public policy. The ideal is of course unobtainable, but many more will be brought closer to such a condition if supported and encouraged by public provision than if left solely to the vagaries of private provision. It is worth noting that historically elites have generally been opposed to expanding the intellectual world and material standing of the masses. There is a good if immoral reason for this: the poorer and less educated a population, the easier it is for the elite to control it.

3. Why do we need public provision?

Why do we need public provision? Why cannot we live in the type of world envisaged by extreme libertarians, who imagine that everything could be supplied through private arrangements and charity? The short answer is that private provision never provides universality of provision or anything approaching it. We know this because all the experience of history shows no case where private provision has met the general need.

Most societies at most times have had no state provision for welfare. In those societies private charity has invariably fallen not merely short but far short of meeting need. Periodic famine, illiteracy, untreated illness and poverty have been the all too common lot of the masses throughout history. Unless a society is willing to allow people to starve, suffer and remain uneducated – and no politician in a modern western country would openly espouse such an idea – the only answer is state provision to assist those who cannot afford to pay or who are unable to find charity. Consequently, it is pointless asking the question could private charity and individual effort provide a better general service in the provision of this or that vital service than public enterprise because private charity and individual enterprise will and can never provide comprehensive provision.

The extreme ideologues who advocate private action as the only legitimate means of providing social goods invariably fail to meaningfully acknowledge the elephant in the room, namely, what happens to those who are unable to buy what they need or who cannot obtain charity? When pressed they claim that the abolition of tax, or at least its reduction to the low levels needed to maintain a minimalist state, would allow charity to rise to a sufficient level to meet all demands for social provision. The fact that this has never happened in the entire history of the world does not concern them. Like Marxists who still claim that communism only requires the right circumstances to be realised, the supporters of private provision remain convinced that their utopia is just waiting to be realised if only society was ordered by their rules (It is worth noting that a utopian libertarian society could only exist if all other political ideas were suppressed).

What can we say to these vaulting optimists who appear to be oblivious to the facts of human psychology and sociology? These extreme disciples of the free market, civil society and private charity should remember that even the Messiah of laissez faire economics, Adam Smith, allowed that there were things of purely economic concern which could not be left to private provision because it was inadequate, for example the maintenance of the roads. Smith also recognised that there was more to life than economic relationships and that the social consequences of economic decisions sometimes mean that unfettered economic arrangements are unacceptable, for example, in the provision of war materials which have a strategic value as well as an economic one. In more modern times, one of the creators of neo-liberalism, F. A. Hayek, acknowledged the need for public support of the needy, for example, “We shall again take for granted the availability of a system of public relief which provides a minimum for all instances of proved need, so that no member of the community need be in want of food or shelter” (The Constitution of Liberty Routledge pp 300-301).

It is difficult going on impossible to envisage a time when the poor (relatively speaking) will not be with us. In the most benign social circumstances, there will always be substantial numbers who through illness, injury, age, bad luck or general incapacity will need and deserve taxpayer provision. To take but one example of a widespread and unalterable disadvantage: approximately 10% of the population of Britain have IQs of 80 or less. An IQ of 80 is the point at which most psychologists consider an individual begins to struggle to live an independent life in an advanced modern state such as Britain. Because of the way IQ is distributed – more or less as a Bell Curve – most of that 10% will always be drawn from the poorer sections of society (attempts to boost IQ with enhanced environments, for example Headstart in the USA, have persistently failed to do so by more than a few points and often the gain is not permanent. The implication is that IQ is to a large extent genetically determined). The low IQ poor will be likely to need substantial social provision because their families and friends will not have the resources commonly available to the low IQ individuals within better-off families. If substantial public provision is not available to them, the likely outcome will be increased anti-social behaviour from those unable to cope or earn a living capable of supporting them. The moral to be drawn is that any society should, simply as a matter of prudence let alone morality, provide a viable life for all of its people, not merely the fortunate or able.

There is a further consideration: the responsibility of governments for the general conditions in which people live. For example, the position of low IQ individuals in poor families is considerably worse now than it used to be. British Governments over the past 25 years have changed, primarily through a commitment to free markets and free trade and increasingly uncontrolled immigration, have removed many of the circumstances which previously gave Britons with a low IQ the chance of living an adult life largely independent of the state.

Manual jobs, especially in heavy industry, long-established working-class communities, cheap housing and a tight labour market have all been greatly diminished or have vanished altogether.

Mass immigration, especially from the new EU members, is especially disadvantageous for the low IQ, low skill Briton. The immigrants, even the well-qualified, are happy to take the low paid unskilled jobs which would be suitable for those Britons with low IQs. They do this because the money they can earn in Britain doing a menial job is considerably more than the average wage in their own countries. For example, £3,000 a year in Poland is a good professional salary. A Pole earning even the minimum wage in Britain can often save that in a year because his money will probably not be taxed and he will be living either in squats or in very overcrowded conditions which cost him little. (Give native Britons the chance to save the equivalent of a doctor’s salary in Britain by working in a menial job in a foreign country and watch them flock there.)

The consequence for the low IQ, low skilled Briton is not only competition for the sort of jobs he or she has traditionally filled but reduced wages and even exclusion from part of the British job market altogether, because certain types of job become effectively reserved for immigrants of a particular ethnicity – this is particularly the case where foreign gangmasters operate for they commonly employ only people of their own ethnicity.

Of course, the effects of the actions of governments go far beyond the low IQ individuals in a population. To take another example which affects most, if governments engineer, as has happened in Britain, a decline in the state education system through demands that the same formal school exams must be sat by all pupils or that 50% of school-leavers should go onto higher education, then the politicians who introduce the policies take upon themselves the responsibility for any inability of the ill-educated to lead productive and socially useful lives. (A fully discussion of the problems with education can be found at section 36).

4. Public provision is a good deal

The essentials of life are food, water, clothing, shelter, healthcare and a livable income in times when a person cannot work through want of a job, disability, illness or old age. Most people most of the time can afford to pay for shelter, food, water, heating and clothing from their private resources. Most could not afford the rest of the essentials and very few indeed could survive long term unemployment without state aid.

It is important to realise what small incomes the majority of Britons have. Take these figures from the Government’s Regional Household Income Comparison 2004:

“Inner London had the highest disposable household income (after tax) per head of population (£16,500) in 2004. The area continued the trend of previous years and in 2004 was 29 per cent above the UK average of £12,800. This was lower than in earlier years. In 2000 it was 36 per cent higher than the UK average. Tees Valley and Durham in the North East had the lowest household income per head at £10,800. This was 16 per cent below the UK average in 2004.” (http://www.statistics.gov.uk).

The uncomfortable truth is that even the average disposable British household income is insufficient to comfortably bring up a couple of children, pay an average mortgage and make substantial pension contributions. Worse, much of the population has less than average household incomes, many very substantially less. But even those with household incomes substantially above the average – many of whom support the idea of private provision for those “who can afford it” – would find themselves deeply embarrassed if they did have to meet the cost of everything they now receive from the state.

To take a concrete example, that of a middle class husband and wife with two children with a net annual household income of £40,000. At present they can, if they choose, educate their children free at state schools. The entire family can be treated under the NHS. Until they are sixteen, the children will not even pay prescription charges. If their children go to university, as they probably will being middle class, much of the cost of the education will still be met out of taxes (tuition fees even at their new levels do not come near to meeting the full cost of a university education). If either parent falls ill or is injured, the taxpayer will provide basic support. The same applies in the case of unemployment. If any member of the family isunfortunate enough to be the subject of a criminal assault, the Criminal Injuries Board will compensate them. The family will receive child benefit which is not a means tested benefit.

Just imagine what it would cost to either provide such services by buying them directly or through insurance if one could find an insurer willing to issue cover.

A decent private day school education would be at least £12,000 for two children and could well be a good deal more. A university education would cost tens of thousands of pounds. Private health insurance for a family to cover everything covered by the NHS cannot be obtained, but even the best that could be purchased – and it will provide a much inferior cover to that of the NHS – would cost several thousand pounds a year and will not cover existing conditions either at all or for several years – those who doubt this should check out the BUPA website and see what even their most expensive plan does not cover (you will get a very nasty shock). Drugs, including prescription drugs, will have to be purchased at their full cost. If the family has a member with a chronic condition requiring regular treatment or a condition requiring expensive one-off treatment, they will soon find their private insurance will not cover the treatment or will do so for only a restricted period. Mental health problems and long term nursing care are rarely if ever adequately covered by private insurance. Where private insurance will not pay, the family will be left with bills which at best will severely constrain their lives and at worst bankrupt them. (The most common cause of personal bankruptcy in the United States is medical bills.)

Private insurance for sick pay and unemployment pay is both very expensive and strictly limited in the time it is paid – a year is normally the longest period covered. The same applies to mortgage insurance cover. There would be no child benefit or criminal injuries compensation available without public provision.

If the cost of providing for the family is restricted to just the items discussed above the family would be hamstrung by the bills even if no major disaster such as a serious operation hit them. A mortgage to purchase even a modest house in most areas would be out of the question. University education would become a very big gamble for the children.

If a major disaster did hit the family, they would not be able to cope for an extended period because any private insurance they could purchase would soon run out.

The family I have described is by normal standards comfortably off. It might be able to struggle along provided it did not hit a catastrophe which robbed the household of its breadwinner(s) or an emergency such as a serious medical condition which swallowed up vast amounts of money, but it would not be a materially comfortable or psychologically secure family. Most families (and individuals) have considerably less income than this fictional family and a substantial minority live on an income well below the average, while half the British adult population have no meaningful savings or occupational pensions. The large majority of the population would be utterly unable to provide for themselves in times of hardship such as sickness, old age and enforced unemployment.

Those who claim that all the poor in Britain are only relatively poor should reflect on this stark statistic: the latest Inland Revenue figures for marketable wealth distribution ( 2002) show the top 1 per cent own 23% of national wealth and the bottom fifty per cent of the population have a staggeringly small 6% (Office of National Statistics (ONS) website – published 2004).

In short, the majority of the British population live as they have always lived: from one pay packet to the next. They do not have the resources to withstand the withdrawal of state provision and are very vulnerable to the competition of immigrants and offshoring, which either destroy their employment or reduce their pay.

What applies to what might be termed social provision applies to all other public charges – such as defence, policing and the justice system. Most individuals do not have to bear the full cost of these because they pay far less tax, direct and indirect, than is needed to finance a per capita share of total public expenditure. A quick calculation will demonstrate this. The projected public expenditure for 2006/7 is £488 billion. There are approximately 45 million adults in Britain. £488 billion divided equally between them runs out at nearly £11,000 per adult head.

The future is even bleaker because of the absurd cost of housing, the rising cost of a university education and the likely high cost of energy and water supplies. There are even suggestions in current price movements that cheap food may be a thing of the past and the price of manufactured goods from China and its Asian cohorts is also showing signs of inflation as their populations’ wages and living standards rise and they consume more of what they make.

The effect of everyone “paying their way” just for things such as education and healthcare would have a severely depressive effect on already dangerously low Western breeding rates as people had fewer children because of the increased costs falling on the individual.

5. The moral value of general provision

If public provision is necessary should it be available to all? Why should it not be granted only to those who through a means test show that they cannot support themselves from their own resources? The answer is threefold: personal dignity, practicality and the engendering of social cohesion.

Anyone who has had the misfortune to claim means tested benefits or who has assisted someone to claim will know what a frustrating and degrading experience it can be. The rules relating to claiming are Byzantine in their complexity and a simple error on a form (which can run to 20 pages or more) can result in benefit being withheld or delayed. But even when the forms are correctly completed and the criteria for the benefit are met, the delivery of the benefit is frequently seriously delayed because the volume of claims and their complexity simply overwhelms the administrative capacity of the public servants dealing with them.

If all public provision was means-tested, including NHS treatment and education, the administrative cost would be massive and the efficiency of the delivery of the provision greatly reduced. The additional administrative costs would have to be set against any saving gained by denying provision to people.

General provision also underpins social provision. Where all are eligible, all feel that they have a stake in the Welfare State. That improves social cohesion. Exclude the better off and the odds are that eventually political circumstances will arise which allow those with the power to reduce or even destroy utterly public provision. At best, if social provision is seen as only for the poor, it will gain a stigma and the quality of the provision will be of little or no account to those who do not benefit from it.

The provision of public services gives everyone rich or poor the assurance that if the worst comes to the worst they will not be utterly without the means to live. That is the bottom line of having the privilege of being a British citizen.

Apart from simply making life more pleasant and secure, a socially cohesive society has considerable cost benefits, because it will experience less anti-social behaviour. That translates into fewer police, fewer trials, fewer people in prison and, indeed, fewer laws to moderate social behaviour to administer – regrettably many laws are passed in response to moral panics.

6. Why should those able to pay for themselves pay for others?

The most obvious reason for not allowing anyone to opt-out from that part of taxation which is devoted to public provision is that no one can be absolutely certain that they will not meet some calamity in the future which will leave them unable to pay. The experience of medical care in the USA shows how easy it is even for the rich to find their wealth shrinking to a point where they cannot get all the treatment they need – the Superman actor, Christopher Reeve, one of the highest paid Hollywood actors, found his resources exhausted within a few years of suffering the injury which paralysed him.

But there is a more subtle reason. The wealthier members of society should always remember that they owe their privileged position to the restraint of the have-nots and the power structures of society which are overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the haves. Individual effort and talent do of course play a significant role

in the lives of everyone, but it is also true that most people’s lives are to a large degree determined by the circumstances of their birth. If you are born into a wealthy family, the odds are you will live the life of the wealthy throughout your life. A person born into poverty will probably remain at the bottom end of the social spectrum. The same applies in varying degrees to those born between the top and bottom of the social pile.

No one needs academic studies to prove the truth and potency of inherited advantage. All people require is the evidence of their own experience. Let any man examine the lives of all those he knows and he will find that most will occupy a similar social position to their parents.

A simple way of understanding how much inherited social position determines lives is to consider crime. Proportionately, the working-class commit crime much more often than the middle classes (and even within the working class the frequency of offending rises with the degree of poverty). That cannot be because the working class are innately less able, intelligent or self-controlled, because we know that many of the middle class are also dim, incompetent and socially inept, yet they rarely end up with a criminal record.

The only plausible explanation for the greater criminality of the working class can be their different material and social circumstances. These are much more precarious than those of the better off. They lack money and the social network which eases access to better jobs, while the opportunities to intellectually develop that are commonly open to the middle class are denied them. Give every person the means to live a middle class life and crime would drop dramatically simply because the press of material necessity would not be there and because the alienation of the poor through being poor would have been removed.

The better-off also need to admit to themselves that there is no moral basis for inherited wealth. The person who inherits money and possessions has by definition done nothing to earn it. The person who earned the wealth, if it has been gained through moral means – and often wealth, particularly great wealth, has not been so gained – has a moral right to it, but no one else. The same applies to non-material advantages such as social connections.

There are, of course, those who attempt to treat inherited wealth as a moral matter. They claim that a person has the right through the consequence of ownership to pass on what he or she has to whoever they choose. That, of course, begs the question of how the wealth was obtained. But let us assume it was achieved entirely morally and by the direct efforts of the person – the best possible case for the supporters of inherited wealth. Even in that instance the effect of the transfer of wealth to others is to create a situation which is manifestly unfair, namely, the establishment of privilege for someone who has done nothing to earn it. Taken at the level of a society, that rapidly results in a permanent class privilege for the haves and their descendants. The fact that the development of hierarchies is an inevitable consequence of human society is neither here nor there when considering whether the consequences of a hierarchy is moral. Clearly the deliberate disadvantaging of some to the advantage of others is not a moral act, any more than enslaving a man is (the group now living who have by far the greatest moral claim to reparations are not the descendants of slaves but the descendants of the poor).

The American philosopher John Rawls in his book A theory of justice resurrected the idea of the social contract which was much in favour in the 17th and 18th centuries. He posed, in so many words, the question “Suppose a group of people were to form a society from scratch, what society would they favour if each person knew nothing about the other people and had no idea where they personally would fit, socially and economically, into the society?” He concluded that the only rational choice would be one in which people had equality because no rational man would chose an inferior position for himself and no agreement would ever be reached which created an unequal society, whether in terms of social status, rights and duties or material circumstances.

Note that Rawls did not rule out a man or woman choosing an unequal state – some might do so thinking it would be worth the gamble to have a chance of gaining one of the favoured positions in an unequal society – he merely thought that it would not be a rational or normal decision.

Although Rawls’ hypothetical state (“The Original Position”) was not realistic, his thought experiment does demonstrate that what we have now as a result of the organic development of society is not what many, if any, would risk for themselves if they had the choice Rawls’ offered them.

Why not take away all inherited wealth? All of historical experience shows that such a cure is worse than the disease. Where the state controls (at least in theory) the totality of people’s lives, such as in the Soviet Union, the consequence is privilege and abuse not by the possession of money but by the wielding of state power. There

is also something peculiarly degrading about the idea that everything a person does is to be ordered and permitted by the state. A degree of private wealth is a bulwark against state power. The trick is to ensure that wealth does not become too concentrated in the hands of the few, producing an uncaring and oppressive plutocracy.

As for the wealth which individuals create for themselves, to tax to produce material equality would plausibly have a deleterious effect on society generally. If a person is not to benefit from their own legitimate enterprise, why should they bother to make any extra effort or take risks? The obvious answer is they have no incentive to do so. However, that is to take to nakedly a material view of humanity. Even in circumstances where what someone did had no effect on their income, people would vary considerably in their willingness to work regardless of the material outcome because personalities differ and there are rewards other than material ones such as the approval of others and celebrity. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume from the experience of communist societies that the overall effect would be to substantially reduce the individual will to work and take risk.

Of course, absolute material equality is improbable in any society, but the disincentive effect applies incrementally as the personal tax burden grows. Once tax reaches a certain level people either work less or become dishonest and evade the tax. That applies not only to the obvious case of the entrepreneur but to jobs generally, for people will be generally disinclined to take the more demanding jobs if the material rewards they offer are not significantly better than those for unskilled and easy employment.

It is also true that Man being a social animal will always form hierarchies because social animals necessarily organise themselves in that way (if they did not, sociality would never arise because the members of a species would be in constant antagonism to one another and could never reach the point of sociality). Even if all material advantage was removed there would still be the advantages and disadvantages of genetic inheritance, the differing qualities of individual parents and pure accidental circumstances, such as the work available at a particular time and place, to create a socially layered society with patterns of dominance and dependence.

But that does not mean that societies should simply be allowed to develop without any state intervention to ameliorate socially determined disadvantage. Without social provision of necessities the poor are left to live hopeless lives which struggle from day-to-day, while untaxed or very lightly taxed wealth of the most successful results in a plutocracy within a few generations.

Plutocracy at best produces wider private charity – which is always inadequate – and at worst an uncaring attitude towards the masses which sees nothing wrong in allowing them to starve if that is a consequence of the economic circumstances of the society and times or even simply God’s will. Plutocracy is in fact one of the most oppressive forms of society and one of the most difficult to end because it cunningly presents itself as being the society of individual opportunity (“the Ritz is open to all”) and is not nakedly oppressive in the same way that, say, Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Russia was oppressive. Consequently, there is no obvious focus for discontent, no single hate figure and it has a much greater enduring power than an overt dictatorship.

What a society can safely do to narrow the differences in life chances at birth is to act to ensure that all have access to education, healthcare and the means to live in a decent manner. That is the minimum. A society can go further with the greatest public resources being directed at those in the poorest circumstances, for  example, more money for schools in “sink” areas. It would even be possible to devise a scheme for those who inherit little or nothing by way of money or possessions to receive a payment from the state to remove to a degree the disadvantage of inheriting nothing.

7. How should public service should be determined?

It is easy in principle to decide whether something should be left to private or public enterprise. Simply ask five questions:

(1) Is the service or product generally considered to be a necessity?

(2) Will profit compromise safety?

(3) Is the service obviously inappropriate to be left in private

hands, for example policing or defence?

(4) Can the service be provided by private enterprise without subsidy?

(5) Can free enterprise be reasonably expected to deliver the necessity universally?

If the answer to any of (1)(2)(3) is YES or the answer to either (4) or (5) NO, then it should in principle be provided either directly or indirectly by the state.

8. What should be provided directly by the state?

Certain things should be reserved to the state as a matter of absolute principle. They are defence, foreign policy, policing, justice, the implementation of judicial sentences and decisions and the administration of welfare. They should be reserved absolutely because either they involve the use of force or the threat of force, punishment or the distribution of taxpayers’ money in areas such as unemployment benefit.

For reasons which I shall shortly examine, the state should also directly control any essential service which is a natural monopoly. What counts as a natural monopoly? Railways and utilities such as water and energy are examples They are natural monopolies because it is simply not practical to have competing lines running to the same destinations or competing utility pipes and cables supplying the same area.

It is possible, as has happened in some of the British privatisations, to allow different companies to compete to supply services such as trains, energy and water, but that is at best an insufficient or incomplete competition and at worst a wholly bogus one because the actual lines of supply – the railway track and the pipes or cables – still have to be maintained and owned by some organisation, private or public. That means the infrastructure has to be either owned publicly or, if owned by a private company, the company must be rigorously controlled by the state, as is the case with the British telephone landline infrastructure which is owned by the privatised British Telecom.

British government interference with natural monopolies since privatisation has gone far beyond controlling the infrastructure. In the case of the railways, a considerable public subsidy has been paid and continues to be paid to the private operators. In every monopoly industry a regulator has been appointed to control both prices and, in theory at least, to force companies to do things such as provide a certain level of investment in new equipment and to be conscientious when it comes to maintenance and operation of the infrastructure. To pretend that these monopoly industries are private companies working in a free market is patently absurd. They are effectively public services contracted out to private contractors.

A few services only work as monopolies, the classic example being the universal letter post, that is, letters delivered to any part of a territory for the same price. This only works if it is a monopoly because if there is competition from private companies or municipal postal services they will take sufficient of the profitable trade in the towns and cities to make it impossible for the universal supplier, in this country the Royal Mail, to subsidise the loss making deliveries to parts of the country outside the main urban centres. No private company would ever provide universal coverage unless they had a monopoly.

Why should the state directly control essential monopolies? Firstly, because there is no opportunity for meaningful competition and consequently the state must step in to prevent abuse of the monopoly position. To do that, as we have seen, it has to interfere very strongly with the running of the monopolies. In practice, it can only efficiently do this if it directly controls the monopoly.

If the state subcontracts an essential monopoly to private business or allows private business to buy a monopoly two general problems arise. The first difficulty is that a private business may at any point fail as a business or simply refuse to continue with a contract if it is not making money for the business. If that happens the state is over a barrel because it does not have the resources to immediately take over the enterprise, nor is it probable that another private company would be able or willing to step in at a moment’s notice – the worst outcome would be the cessation of a vital industry. Nor, if a company failed, is it obvious how a Government would prevent its assets being sold by a liquidator. In principle when Railtrack failed – the company which after privatisation had the responsibility for maintaining the infrastructure of the British rail network – the shareholders owned the assets (the railway infrastructure including much highly profitable land) and the creditors had a legitimate charge on them.

Clearly no government could allow the railway or vital industries such as water, gas and electricity simply to go under, either at the national or regional level. Hence, any government will, when shove comes to push, have to pay through the nose (your taxpaying nose in fact) to maintain the threatened industry, whether that be through enhancing a contract to make it more profitable, granting more profitable contracts to a new private contractor or through the payment of outright subsidies. A government is in a similar bind if a company is doing a bad job: they cannot simply sack them because who is to take their place?

Natural monopolies also raise other problems if they are in private hands. There is insufficient public control over areas such as maintenance and strategic planning. Good British examples can be found in the privatised water and energy industries. In the case of water the privatised companies have failed to invest adequately to stop the considerable loss of water from cracked pipes. Nor has a single major reservoir been built in England since privatisation. These investment failures have occurred despite the water companies consistently making healthy profits. The Water Regulator huffs and puffs but achieves little because the water companies know he can do little. Indeed, he has to date not even fully used the powers he has despite issuing many warnings to the water companies. And the Government? Well, they could pass a new law giving them direct powers over the water industry but what then? If a water company simply refuses to do what is needed where does the Government go? Nowhere fast is the answer.

With energy it is the strategic planning which is emasculated. Successive British governments have allowed Britain to sleepwalk into a position where the country went rapidly from being self-sufficient in energy to becoming a net importer. This was entirely predictable as it was known long before it happened that North Sea oil and gas was going to decline substantially from the beginning of the century. Despite this no meaningful strategic planning has taken place since privatisation with governments until very recently childishly claiming that it was not for them to interfere in the actual provision of energy now the industry is privately owned (the Blair Government has just woken up to the strategic danger of being dependent on foreign supplies but even now -2006 – no definite decision has been made on future British energy policy). The upshot of this lack of planning has been rapidly rising energy prices since 2005.

If water and the energy utilities had remained in public ownership, the fact that politicians had ultimate responsibility for them would have ensured that maintenance and strategic planning was not neglected because no politician or government could afford to be blamed for a water crisis or soaring power prices. Government could also subsidise  prices, something it cannot do now even if it chose to because of EU  competition rules. . The same principle applies to most of the privatised industries – take away the political responsibility and the profit motive rules.

Certain things are simply too important to be left to private efforts. Natural monopolies such as the railways, water and gas are literally essential to the survival of an advanced state such as Britain. Because of that stark fact alone they need to be treated as something much more than a commodity which can be simply left to the market. They should to be seen for what they are, strategic assets, and placed firmly under national control.

There is a further general reason why essential monopolies should be in public hands – the need for general provision. Left to private enterprise, even with an unfettered monopoly only the profitable parts of an industry would be supplied. Roads and railways would only be maintained if the traffic warranted it. Gas, electricity, water and telecommunications would only be supplied where sufficient profit could be made. The problem is we do not want roads and railways only over profitable routes, or the utilities such as gas and water supplied only to urban areas. We want them over the entire country. Only public provision can truly satisfy that need. Of course, private companies can have a duty to provide a general provision placed on the them but what if none is willing to take it or they take on the responsibility but then fail to meet it? The government then has to decide to either subsidise the company directly or to loosen the contract conditions to which the company has agreed.

The final type of enterprise which the state should always take in hand are those which experience tells us are beyond the resources of private business. Private enterprise can never be trusted to handle Tunnel. Margaret Thatcher insisted that no British public money would be involved and that private enterprise would bear the entire cost. It soon became clear that this was a nonsense. The Tunnel itself was completed but the companies which built it were not so much bankrupt as on another planet called Debt. And this was despite the very serious amounts of money pumped into the enterprise by the French Government,  both directly and indirectly. The situation was rescued, if one can dignify what happened with the word, by the banks and other  creditors rescheduling debts so far into the future that they all but vanished and the French Government surreptitiously pushing in more money via the French banks. To this day, the Channel Tunnel is the whitest of white private enterprise elephants, with the latest ” debt restructuring” always just around the corner.

Direct provision also has a further benefit. While assets are publicly owned and employees directly paid by the state, it is politically much more difficult to reduce or abolish that part of public provision. If the provision is supplied by a private company their contract can simply not be renewed or cancelled. If the provision is directly supplied, the government has the ticklish problem of having to take responsibility for the redundancies, something which greatly raises the profile of the removal of the provision.

The best example of the dangers of losing direct provision is the gradual privatisation by stealth of the NHS. To suddenly privatise the entire NHS would be impossible, but salami slice it over ten or fifteen years by continually increasing the private sector involvement and the position is completely different. Then the politician can use excuses such as “So much of it is in private hands now that the rest might as well be,” “We can’t have such a comprehensive service because private companies can’t provide it” and “Costs have risen so much that we have to cut this or that”. The whole system will be such a confused mess of public and private that the public will not know what to think. Also, the privatisation by stealth may have surreptitiously changed the way the public view the NHS so they see it no longer as a national institution but merely as a provider of medical care through disparate means. That in itself would reduce the moral outrage needed for any successful public protest.

9. What should be provided indirectly by the state?

Just because something is a necessity does not mean that the state must or should provide it directly. In fact, the less direct provision the better, because in a free society government should only touch that which it needs to touch. For example, whereas there are not many possible suppliers of air traffic control systems or railways, there are many possible suppliers of food. Government may safely leave food distribution to the private supplier and provide assistance where it is needed through payments to those in need. It should be noted that it is not the market or private enterprise which provides the general provision in cases such as food but the giving of taxpayers’ money to those who need it which provides the general provision.

Service is really the crucial criterion. Governments should become directly involved in industrial work very rarely – the exceptions are defence suppliers, utilities such as water, gas and electricity because of their status as natural monopolies and their immense importance. No nationalised industry making or extracting anything has ever been an economic success. Governments running manufacturers, farming or the extractive industries such as coal mining are neither necessary nor desirable, because private enterprise will always do the job adequately and more efficiently provided the economic circumstances are right,that is, vital industries are protected through tariffs, quotas or subsidies to the extent necessary to make them profitable.

But such vital industries are the Government’s business because they have both a strategic and a social and economic value. Consequently, governments do have is a responsibility to ensure that they are maintained.

Any country which cannot feed itself, produce all essential manufactured products and services, is not self-sufficient in energy and does not have substantial reserves of essential raw products such as iron ore, is constrained in what it may do both nationally and internationally and the greater the reliance of imports, the greater the constraint. Of course any advanced industrial state will not be completely self-sufficient, but it is possible for a country to have a large degree of self-sufficiency in the essentials especially food. With modern crop yields and modern animal husbandry, Britain could feed itself at a pinch if her market for food was protected to allow reasonable profits to be made by farmers using not merely the best or most convenient land, but the more marginal land as well.

Where a country is severely dependent on imports, as is the case with Britain, they are utterly at the mercy of international blackmail and events. Even the most powerful state in the world, the USA, is much restricted because of its reliance on imported oil. Such constraints have the most serious of consequences. Would George Bush  have invaded Iraq if the USA was not reliant on Middle East oil? I doubt it.

The free trade dream of buying where a product can be produced cheapest is based on the absurd premise that never again will international circumstances arise which will place any country at risk of war or blockade. There is also the question of what happens when raw materials run short and the scarce materials either remain in the countries of origin or go to the richest and most powerful countries with the rest left to go hang. Free trade is not merely a fantasy but a dangerous one in the long term.

There is also the economic and social case for protection. Cheap imports from countries which have labour costs many times below those of the mature industrial states, goods made cheap by state subsidies and plain old-fashioned “dumping” means that no company in the West is able to compete with the imports. The effect of allowing such imports is twofold: either the workers in the importing countries must take lower wages or, more probably, watch the obliteration of the domestic industry.

The same thing happens where mass immigration is permitted. If the immigration did not occur the wages for the type of jobs which immigrants take would be higher. That in turn would lessen or end the shortages of native workers willing to do them. For most jobs all that is needed to solve a shortage of labour is a wage sufficiently competitive with other employments to attract enough applicants. A good example in Britain are nurses: a shortage of native applicants a few years ago has been turned into a surplus now by a substantially increase in their pay.

The loss of jobs and suppression of wages through cheap imports, outsourcing, or large scale immigration has considerable social and economic effects. Those who lose their jobs either remain unemployed or take jobs which pay much less, are less secure and have lesser benefits. Those who remain in their jobs but whose pay is suppressed suffer similar difficulties. Both groups find their spending power is reduced. They pay less tax. If they are unemployed the Treasury is a net loser. New immigrants compete for scarce public goods such as free healthcare, education and social housing. Most particularly they compete most directly with the poorer native members of society who have most need of such social supports.

Poor pay, insecurity, unemployment and competition from mass immigration all place a severe strain on the social cohesion of a country.

Neither the Left or Right need recoil in horror at the idea of a judicious protectionism and a strong immigration policy. The Labour Party has been strongly protectionist throughout most of its history. The Tory Party was protectionist before the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 and protectionist again between 1931 and the advent of Margaret Thatcher. For most of their history both parties have been in practice opposed to mass immigration.

10. The railways – a classic public service

The railways in Britain are not simply a private enterprise. They are a necessity to maintain general economic activity. Take away the railways and a substantial part of those employed in London could not continue to work there because the roads will not take the extra traffic. The same applies, to a lesser degree, to other large cities and towns.

The railways also fulfill an important social functions in providing transport to those without cars, by reducing car use generally and moving much heavy goods traffic from the roads. Finally, railways have a strategic value in times of war or blockade.

Without massive public subsidy the railways could not be maintained. No national railway system in the First World operates without taxpayers’ subsidy. Parts of systems may be profitable but not the entire system. It is not that our railways would simply shrink if left entirely to private enterprise, most of the system would not run

at all. Commuter traffic is running at near capacity in the South East of England and fares are already so high generally that the massive price hike needed to meet the full cost of rail travel would result in a vicious circle of decreased traffic and decreased revenue.

The cost of maintaining Britain’s railways is simply beyond the private sector. Profit can be made on some intercity routes but that is about it. Even with the massive subsidies given to private companies since privatisation – ironically substantially larger than the pre-privatisation subsidies in real terms – private companies have signally failed to invest adequately. Indeed, the companies have radically reduced staffing levels – which may well have contributed to some crashes – and have constantly failed to meet their timetables.

The farce of the company with responsibility for railway maintenance immediately after privatisation in Britain, Railtrack, is a cautionary tale in itself. It created a completely different culture from that under the nationalised railways. Instead of employing most of the labour directly, they engaged subcontractors to do most of the work. The army of skilled workers built up by the original private companies and inherited by the nationalised British Rail was dispersed in reckless fashion and, inevitably, control over standards of maintenance became much diluted as it always does with subcontracting.

To put the cherry on the Railtrack story, the financial resources of the company, even with public subsidies, proved hopelessly inadequate. In 2002 the plug was pulled and it went into administration to eventually re-emerge restructured as a not-for-profit company  Network Rail. But before the administration was done and dusted, the taxpayer had to cough up a great deal of money to compensate  shareholders because the government was faced with legal  action by the shareholders alleging maladministration, an  action which looked as though it might not only succeed but in the  process wash some very dirty government linen in public over exactly why and how Railtrack went into administration.

11. Safety

There is a further consideration with public services – safety. It may be that the public will have greater confidence in, for example, a state run railway simply because it is state run. The public’s confidence might be completely unfounded but that would not matter: theconfidence itself is a valuable thing.

The experience of all privatisation has been to make money by enforcing massive job cuts. Of course there was overmanning during the nationalised industry days. The trouble is that the cuts made since privatisation have often gone beyond improving efficiency. They went to the limits of safety, and probably past it, in pursuit of profit. Maintenance staff were reduced and consequently maintenance was reduced. The facts which have emerged since the Watford train crash in 2000 shows beyond doubt that many of the people involved in rail track maintenance are inexperienced at best and completely raw at worst.

When the state does not take direct responsibility for a service which has inherent safety consideration, the danger is that governments will respond to any safety fears by imposing ever more onerous obligations on the private suppliers of the service. The private companies are also susceptible to being overly cautious after an accident has happened or a possible danger becomes the subject of public comment.

Train crashes in Britain have been thankfully rare under both nationalised and privatised regimes, but when they happened under the nationalised industry the government was able to keep the show on the road because the public had confidence that safety was not being compromised simply to save money. Since privatisation crashes have been met with absurd caution by both the bodies responsible for the infrastructure and the Government, with the national rail network being reduced to a farce after cracks in some rails were found after the Watford crash mentioned above. For the better part of a year, rail travel became a misery as hundreds of emergency speed restrictions were introduced and rails were tested for cracks and a massive programme of ail replacement was begun. The consequence  was horrendous delays and vast numbers of cancelled trains. The effects are arguably still being felt in 2006.

Perhaps the classic industry to which the safety consideration applies is the production of nuclear energy. Despite this this Government is saying that if a new generation of nuclear power stations is built it must be with private money and run by private companies. A clear case of  ideology – private is best – driving common sense out of the window. (It should be added that Labour said the same when in office.)

Foreign ownership further complicates matters. When a massive explosion devastated a fuel storage and refinery complex in Hemel Hempstead in 2006 and further parts of the complex were thought to be in danger of exploding, it was impossible to get the necessary information quickly because the company which owned the complex was French and no one with  sufficient authority could be immediately contacted.

12. Public and private efficiency

Having worked both as a civil servant and for private companies, large and small, I always raise a wry smile when the advocates of private enterprise claim, with a look of religious certainty in their eyes and the ringing voice of the true believer, that private enterprise is by definition much more efficient than public endeavour. In fact, private enterprise can be every bit as wasteful and often far more reckless than public service.

Take a couple of blatant examples of crass incompetence by private enterprise from the past ten years. The directors of a major defence and electronics company Marconi managed in a few short years to reduce the company from one with several billion pounds in cash reserves and astock-exchange value of some £30 billion to a company with billions of pounds worth of debt and shares which were effectively worthless after the creditor banks took ownership of what remained of thecompany.

How did Marconi management accomplish this stupendous feat? They decided that their highly successful core business of defence equipment was just too boring and “not now” for words and sold off most of this highly profitable business. They then ploughed into telecommunications, a business in which they had little experience, which was “utterly now” and “obviously” on the brink of a mobile phones bonanza. There they caught not so much a very bad cold butcommercial double pneumonia.

The second example is the assurance company Equitable Life. In the 1980s and early 1990s this firm offered financial products with an attractive guaranteed return. Unsurprisingly, they proved very popular. Come the time to meet these obligations Equitable found they could not do so. They tried to renege on the guaranteed return promise but, after several years of legal battles, the House of Lords decided against them. At that point they were arguably insolvent. Instead of going into administration, they began a series of actions which made a mockery of that for which they supposedly stood – assurance.

For fear of trading fraudulently or even whilst insolent – any new business might well have been considered fraudulent because of the possibility of a failure to meet existing obligations – they closed their books to new business. Then by stages – the torment for the policy holders was extended – they reduced payouts to those who had not had the guaranteed return and by stages considerably raised the penalty for clients taking their money out of the Equitable. Their customers were left with the ghastly choice of losing a large slice of what was already a reduced pot of money or taking a much lower income. Most choose the latter course. Equitable said in so many words take what we offer or be fined (or even worse, drive us into liquidation and lose most or even all of what is left). Those unlucky enough to be coming up to retirement during this time were left with pensions and lump sum payments much less than they reasonably anticipated when they took out the policy and substantially below the level which could be blamed on the general stock market fall. All of this was of course quite legal, but the shareholders who did not have the guaranteed return could have had no inkling of what might happen to their policies when they took them out.

I do not claim that public service is wondrously efficient and economical. Rather, I say that private business, at least at the larger end, is much the same. In fact, any big organisation displays the same characteristics of bureaucracy, a lack of imagination, organisational inertia and less than optimum manning. Marks and Spencer, until the late 1990s one of the reputedly best run of British firms, suddenly fell prey to just these traits and has only just got back on the rails.

But large organisations also have their advantages. They are capable of providing a wide range of services. They can provide those services over a large area. They have a degree of “slack” which allows emergencies to be dealt with and bottlenecks due to variable demand to be managed when they arise. Such “slack” is very important in industries such as gas and electricity and services such as the railways. As we shall see when I turn to the experience of privatisation, the slack in many of the privatised industries has either vanished altogether or been reduced to dangerous levels.

13. What do we mean by efficiency?

There is also the question of what we mean by efficiency. Private business ultimately judges that by profit. But is profit a good indicator of efficiency generally? More particularly, does it have any place in public service?

Many a company does well for a period because it strikes lucky with a product and then plummets when the good luck runs out. Or a company may have a good profits run simply because there is a general boom in the economy and it is easy to make profits.

Then there are businesses where it is virtually impossible not to make large and regular profits, for example, the clearing banks, because the goods or services they are supplying are too essential for people not to purchase them and the number of competing companies is small, either because a few companies have been able to destroy the competition or because the cost of getting in the business is too great for new competitors to emerge. The problem of greatly reduced competition through expansion of an existing company rather than takeover of other companies is a growing one, a problem exemplified by the relentless march of Tesco in Britain – in practice British anti-monopoly law only deals with takeovers – the only thing which halts Tesco is planning permission. Once a company has a really large share of a market efficiency becomes less of a pressing problem because customers in an area dominated by the likes of Tesco often have little choice but to use the dominant company because it has destroyed local competitors.

It can also be very difficult to find out from the published accounts the true state of a company, vide Enron and WorldCom. Even where outright fraud is not practised there is still a great deal of scope for accountants to engage in “creative accounting” and massage accounts to inflate the profit in a given year. As directors are commonly paid a large part of their remuneration in the form of shares which they canpurchase at a later date at a discounted price (share options), companies have every incentive to inflate the share price in the year when the share option can be exercised.

But even if it is allowed that profit is a good yardstick of efficiency for most enterprises, a highly debatable proposition, it does not follow that it is a good yardstick for all enterprises. The provision of universal public services is by its nature not susceptible to the notion of profit because the unprofitable work must be undertaken as well as the profitable, for example the Post Office delivers letters to hideously costly rural addresses as well as to highly profitable city haunts for the same price (that service incidentally subsidises all private business in the UK because they can deliver anywhere for the same price).

If profit is not the yardstick what should be? I suggest that the real tests for public service competence should be (1) is the service being delivered to all who need it? and (2) is the cost reasonable in comparison with equivalent operations in other countries? By these tests, the NHS, for example, still compares well with the health care in other advanced countries, providing both a universal service for the vast majority of treatments and operations and doing so at a significantly cheaper cost than most, despite the great amounts of extra money pumped into it since May 1997.

14. Private enterprise providing public service

What is rarely if ever taken into account when complaints about the inefficiency of public bodies are considered is how efficient private enterprise will be or is when it is offered the opportunity to provide a public service. Take the Post Office as an example. For a century and a half it has turned a profit and ensured a level of universal service well nigh unique in the world. It has done this because it is a state monopoly.

No private company would ever provide a universal one-price service without massive public subsidy and the halfway house of part private part public merely weakens the public provider. The government first loosened the rules governing private delivery of parcel, then bulk letter mail went to full competition and in 2006 private companies moved into the delivery of letters over a certain weight. That competition alone will cripple the universal post. The Post Office has already been forced to drop the second delivery as a general service and will now provide it only for a fee, whilst the last time for collection has become earlier and earlier in the day and the single free delivery later and later.

As a second example take the BBC. Suppose the licence fee was abolished or reduced and the BBC had to introduce private finance on a large or an entire scale. The inevitable result of that would be the BBC increasingly turning from its public service role, not immediately but in time, towards commercial programming. The dismal example of how commercial terrestrial television “meets” the public serviceobligations written into their prospectuses when they bid for licences shows you what the BBC would rapidly become (the obligations/promisesmade when gaining licences are substantially ignored once the licences are granted).

There is nothing wrong with employing private businesses to perform specific functions such as road building because that does not produce a conflict between public service and profit. A road is simply a road,which will be used regardless of who built it. Once it is built,there is no ongoing direct service to the public beyond whatever maintenance is required and the maintenance of roads is completely different from the maintenance of railways, because the use of roads is free in all but a few instances and the safety issue is nothing like so important for a car can be driven on a potholed road while a train cannot be run on a faulty piece of track. Where conflict arises between the provision of a general service and the profit motive is in cases such as the NHS where the delivery of the service is directly to the public.

Private business is poor at providing services where there is no direct link between the provision of the service and the payment for it. If a service is provided to a person and they pay the provider, private enterprise will generally do a decent job if the customer has a reasonable choice of provider. Where a private business provides a service on the basis of a contract signed with a contractor, that is, it is a sub-contractor, the relationship between the customer and the provider becomes nebulous. It is true that the sub-contractor may have a contract cancelled or not have a contract renewed if too many complaints are received by the contractor, but often enough the contractor will wear any number of complaints provided profits remain healthy.

15. Public service inefficiencies and politicians

We can all recount bureaucratic horror stories and in truth there are a host of them. What most people never ask is why they exist. The answer is very often found in the irresponsible behaviour of politicians. They pass too many laws, introduce laws or other measures not requiring legislation which are administrative nightmares and demand action such as the meeting of “targets” which are simply beyond meeting.

A fine example of the “too many laws” syndrome is tax law. No living human being is a master of British tax law in its entirety or anything approaching its entirety. There is an excellent reason for this, it is beyond the capacity of any person to encompass so vast and complex and ever changing labyrinth of legislation. When the public deals with the best trained and most experienced Inland Revenue inspectors or employs the highest-powered tax consultant in private practice, they will still be dealing with people only competent to advise in particular areas of tax law. Worse, the law is frequently less than lucid because of the poor drafting of Acts of Parliament or of the statutory instruments which give administrative power to enforce Acts.Consequently, tax law is frequently open to plausible differences of interpretation. The upshot is that the Inland Revenue can often appear incompetent or unreasonable, despite the best efforts of its staff, simply because politicians have created an impossible situation.

The same applies to Customs and Excise (now amalgamated with the Inland Revenue).

To the complexity and opaqueness of most laws and regulations can be added the fact that most of the administration of such laws and regulations is not undertaken by highly educated, highly trained, highly intelligent people, but by the rank and file who find the complexity and opaqueness far more difficult to cope with than the highly educated, highly trained, highly intelligent few.

It is rare to encounter a politician who considers the administrative implications of laws before they are passed. Many laws on the statute books are largely dead letters because if they were enforced generally the effects on policing, the justice system and prisons would be dire. Imagine the numbers of prosecutions if the police religiously enforced the law on wearing seat belts for example. The magistrates courts would grind to a dead halt. Our present prison overcrowding is to a substantial degree the consequence of ever more laws with severer prison penalties being passed blithely by Parliament and the practice of Home Secretaries, both Tory and Labour, encouraging courts to be more severe in their sentencing. Either policy would be administratively defensible, whether one agreed with the principle or not, if governments ensured that the additional prison places were made available before the laws were passed or the instructions to courts on sentencing policy were issued by the Lord Chancellor’s Office. This has not been done. Extra provision is either inadequate or non-existent.

The prison population has also been significantly boosted by other government decisions. The first was the “care in the community” which closed most long-term accommodation for psychiatric patients and the seriously mentally deficient. Many of the people who fall into those categories unsurprisingly now end up in prison. The second was allowing massive immigration in the past ten years which has driven the foreign component of our prison population up to over ten per cent. To these causes could be added the government sponsored destruction of many of the jobs available to the lower IQ and poorly educated members of the population and the inadequacies of the state education system (see section 37). .

A classic of “unjoined up” Government thinking was the Community Charge known more popularly as the Poll Tax. To produce the required tax, around 90% of the adults living in Britain had to pay the tax. To anyone who understood the general problem of the tax collection, this was a non-starter. It would have been a non-starter had the system generally been seen as fair simply because people will understandably avoid tax wherever they can and tracking people to their private addresses is the devil’s own job, both in terms of identifying the addresses and in having the manpower to chase up non-payers.

The fact that the tax was seen as generally unfair provided its opponents with a ready made propaganda tool. Apart from the obvious difficulty of justifying a new tax not obviously linked to ability to pay, many suffered genuine hardship because people on very small incomes were suddenly asked to pay two or more times what they had previously paid under the domestic Rates system, which the Poll Tax replaced. Opposition politicians and parties quite naturally did everything they could to oppose the tax and soon magistrates’ courts were overwhelmed by hordes of non-payers and the receipts from the tax fell well short of what was anticipated. The coup de grace was given by a violent protest in Trafalgar Square.

A current administrative nonsense is the recent introduction of AS Level exams. For our purposes forget about whether not these are a good idea. It may seem obvious that if you introduce additional new general exams for schoolchildren you will need many more examiners. Not to our politicians. The upshot is that there is a crisis in ourpublic examination system because of overstretched examiners.

Then there are the laws which have unintended consequences. There is a beauty currently wrecking havoc throughout the land. In his 2002 budget, Gordon Brown announced changes to allow sports clubs to claim rate relief by becoming charities. The consequence has been that local authorities in many places have withdrawn or reduced the discretionary rate relief they were allowing sports clubs unless those clubs become charities. But becoming a charity is a complicated and expensive business and most sports clubs cannot afford it. To take one example of additional cost and complication. Charity law does not allow charities to sell alcohol. Most sports clubs gain a good deal of their income from bar receipts. To maintain the ability to keep a bar, the club would have to set up as a charity and then run a separate limited company for the bar takings.

Governments in the past twenty years have introduced two new forms of interference which are destructive of public efficiency. The first results from the mistaken belief that private enterprise methods can be generally applied to public services. The second is “league tables” and “targets”.

Private business practices, that is commercial practices rather than merely questions of efficiency common to both private and public organisations such as the utilisation of staff, are completely inappropriate in public service. Take the introduction of the “internal market” to the NHS and its effects on hospitals. This was a scheme introduced by the Thatcher Government with the idea of making the NHS more accountable and cost-efficient. Before it was introduced Governments decided how much was to be spent on health in a given year and, broadly speaking, the money was spread evenly throughout the country. NHS hospitals were given a budget and left to operate within it. Accounting for the expenditure was to use a favourite civil service term “broad brush”. This system worked because hospitals knew where they were at the start of a year and had the further advantage of seeming fair – everyone, NHS staff and the public, could see that each part of the country got more or less the same provision. GPs referred patients to their nearest hospital as a matter of course – which naturally set a fairly constant level of demand for a hospital – and administrative costs were low.

The “internal market” and subsequent reforms changed all that by making money follow the patient – which meant a hospital did not know exactly how much money it had to spend – and consequently required very detailed monitoring of expenditure. Worse, it also created competition between hospitals. The result is a massively bloated NHS bureaucracy which is both very expensive and a major cause of poor morale amongst medical staff, who object both to the added paperwork and procedures and the constant administrative supervision of their activities.

Similar “value-for-money” accounting schemes have been introduced elsewhere into public enterprises with similar dire results. The experience of these suggests strongly that when dealing with public service it is best to decide what is desired and what the taxpayer can afford to pay and then pay it. That does not mean money should be given out without regard to how it is spent. Rather, it means that costs should be determined by rational criteria before funding is decided upon and then the organisations should be trusted to spend the money provided they deliver what they are supposed to deliver. Provided the costing is realistic, the taxpayer can be sure that the money is being spent reasonably efficiently and no-corruptly. Gross inefficiency or corruption on any scale would show up through funding shortfalls within the budgetary year of the public institution concerned. Funding based on proper estimated costing is in effect a pre-audit which achieves essentially the same result as an audit but does so at the other end of the financial process. If a degree of inefficiency or corruption is not identified by this process, the loss both in terms of money and misapplied man power will be far less than the cost of an inflated bureaucracy and the demoralisation of public servants which arises from close scrutiny of expenditure.

Realistic costing requires that funding within an organisation is broadly similar for equivalent parts of the organisation. For example, in present circumstances any NHS hospital outside London of a similar size and range of medical treatment should cost broadly the same to run because national wages are paid in all places but London where a “weighting allowance” tops up the national salary.

League tables are an idea which has a superficial attraction. What could be more reasonable than to know which are the best local schools through their exam results being publicly available so parents can compare schools? A great deal. The effect of league tables has been to lead to a substantial rise in exclusions from schools, increased de facto selection of pupils and the restriction of the exams children may take. Faced with parental and state judgement of their performance, schools have understandably been unwilling to have children in their schools who will perform badly in exams. Inferior exam results at a school equals fewer and less able children applying which equals fewer pupils which equals less state funding. Nor, of course, are private schools immune from the pressures, for the lower their position in the “league table” the more difficulty they have in attracting pupils, especially the brightest.

The consequence of league tables in schools is that education is distorted. Children are denied the opportunity to take exams if it is thought they will do badly. 16-year-olds who do less than well in their GCSEs are denied an opportunity to take A levels at their school. Children who are seen as academically unable or disruptive are excluded from the better schools and effectively left to rot either in a state of permanent truancy or in schools which are essentially doing no more than child minding. More profoundly, the concentration on passing exams, including the National Curriculum tests, has not only narrowed the academic curriculum as schools “teach to the test”, but has led to the exclusion of non-academic activities such as sport and music. The broader idea of education has been largely lost.

Of course, unfairness and ineffective education existed prior to the “league tables”. The point is that the position has been made ineffably worse by the “league tables.”

The “league table” distortion which has arisen in schools will be and, indeed, is mirrored elsewhere because the same general pressures apply. Hospitals seek to avoid operating on high risk patients, councils want to divest themselves of “tricky” work such as running council houses and school examination boards and universities inflate exam marks to both attract students and to guard against a growing tendency for students to demand good exam results because “they have paid for them”.

The first cousin of league tables is “targets”. Government targets are of course not new. In the immediate post war years Governments delighted in announcing that so many hundreds of new houses would be built. What is new is that “targets” have become so prevalent that they seriously effect public policy. Targets to reduce street crime force the police to divert resources regardless of whether it is the greatest priority. Targets to reduce hospital waiting lists force hospitals to manipulate their waiting lists and concentrate on non-urgent treatment at the expense of more serious conditions.Targets to expel failed asylum seekers lead to the reclassification of asylum seekers. And so on for any number of public agencies.

On the privatised industry side, targets set by the various regulators are largely cosmetic and are inexorably downgraded when their honest application would severely damage or even ruin a company.

Of course, most targets, whether for public or privatized organisations are not actually met even with the strenuous massaging of figures. They are then swept aside as being of no consequence. The result is a growing public scepticism about any government plans or promises which they increasingly treat as Russians treated “five-year plans” and “potato harvest figures” in the Soviet Union. This is decidedly unhealthy because if the electorate cannot trust any promise made by a politician what is the point of elections?

16. Other public service inefficiencies

It would be idle to pretend that public service does not have substantial shortcomings which have nothing to do with political decisions. These are an over-extended a command chain, the cult of the generalist and the too ready movement of staff.

The modern British Civil Service was founded in the nineteenth century with a tripartite division based on Plato’s Republic. (This is not asbizarre as it sounds because most of those in public life then had a classical education). The Administrative Grades were the philosopher kings who planned and directed, the Executive Grades were the mechanics who put into operation and administered the plans of the  Administrative Grades and to the Clerical Grades were left the task of being the metaphorical hewers of wood and drawers of water.

This consequence of this structure was that chains of command and responsibility became ridiculously extended. In modern times there have been 13 mainstream Civil Service grades (and others peculiar to particular departments and offices). In addition, the distinction between the Administrative/Executive/Clerical general grade functions produces an artificial separation. Many jobs cannot be neatly fitted within one of Administrative/Executive/Clerical, yet the Civil Service attempts to do so. The result is that instead of having one person doing a job in the most efficient manner, the job is arbitrarily divided between different grades.

In recent years attempts have been made to reduce the numbers of grades, but without great effect. They need to be reduced to six or seven. That would put them broadly in line with large private corporations.

When the Administrative/Executive/Clerical division was devised the idea was that the Administrative Grade would be staffed by generalists who could apply themselves to any task without needing any particular expertise. Rather the Admin Grade Civil Servant would be of high intellect which he would apply to analysing any problem and producing solutions to the problem. There is of course a place for such people, but it is very limited. The trouble is that the Civil Service still largely operates on the idea that the Admin Grades should be generalists. Worse, the idea has spread to the other grades to a considerable degree. The consequence is that Civil Service jobs tend to be allocated by grade rather than the relevant experience of a civil servant. The position is aggravated by the fact that people are often placed in positions novel to them without adequate training. Much greater attention needs to be paid to both the suitability of people for posts and to the provision of training.

The frequent placing of unsuitable and untrained people in posts produces a “culture of incompetence”, whereby those in positions of authority are reluctant to criticise their subordinates. This reluctance stems from (1) the fact that they are not often insecure in their own ability and knowledge and (2) because they know that their subordinates are often in posts for which they are unsuited or untrained.

The other great structural bugbear is the all too frequent movement of staff (anyone who has had regular dealings with public bodies will recognise the frustration of dealing with a new person every time they write or phone and the immense amounts of time and effort wasted.) Most Civil Service work is administrative. Continuity is a boon when it comes to administration. Where staff are working to implement very detailed regulations, as is the norm in the Civil Service, continuity becomes vital.

Regular movement of staff, human nature being what it is, is also a device to avoid responsibility. Once a public servant has moved to another position his successor can simply say “nothing to do with me guv. Now, let’s start from scratch”. It is also rare for a civil servant to be meaningfully disciplined once they have moved jobs.

Civil servants know this and it affects their behaviour for the worse while in a job because they know that if they make a horlicks of it, they will simply be moved elsewhere or even promoted to resolve an embarrassing situation. This reinforces the “culture of incompetence” . Keeping people in post for a reasonable length of time and holding them to account for error after they move would concentrate the minds of civil servants wonderfully.

In varying degrees, the defects of the Civil Service are found in public service generally.

Any large organisation requires periodic shaking. Small businesses rarely need it because they are always subject to the pressures of the market in a way that a large company is not. A large company has greater reserves both of capital and credit than a small concern and can weather economic storms more easily. The consequence is the gradual accretion of inefficiencies and costs. What applies to big business does so with greater force to government departments, which have even less external pressure on them to be efficient. However, the shaking should always be within the context of a public service ethos not a private business one.

17. What should public service workers be paid?

“Tube drivers, who now earn £31,300 for a 36-hour week, along with six weeks’ holiday a year, a final-salary pension and free travel for their families….The Tube drivers’ salary is almost twice as much as a nurse or an ambulance worker gets for working longer hours on more complex jobs. It is half as much again as a bus driver, who works 50 hours a week, a firefighter, who works a 42-hour week, or a police officer, who works a 40-hour week – each of them doing very stressful work for the payment they get.” ( The Evening Standard commenting on a prospective tube strike 02.10.02).

Driving an underground train on a partially automated system cannot  realistically be considered as more skilled, dangerous and stressful than that of a firefighter. Most people would say the Tube driver had the easier job by far. But is the firefighter’s job more stressful than that of a bus driver who has day in day out to deal not merely with London traffic but in many cases has to take fares as well? And what of a nurse or ambulance crews? Is the emotional distress they suffer more of a burden than the fear a firefighter may feel when goinginto a fire? Going outside public service jobs, a trawlerman’s job is considerably more dangerous than that of a firefighter’s and the ordinary crew member will not earn as much as an Underground driver. In short, comparability is a minefield.

All our experience shows that “fair” job evaluation never works because no one engaged in the employment evaluated can ever objectively agree on their place in the job hierarchy. Hence, even where deals are struck, dissatisfaction soon breaks out again about “comparability”. As for the public, the pay and conditions arrangements of public service workers are generally so opaque that most people can make neither head nor tail of them. The result is an unstable situation which satisfies no one for long and leads to the general public having an unrealistic conception of what public employees earn, both by underestimating and overestimating pay.

Even in a society where there is a strong natural commitment to public provision, as was the case in the quarter century after WW2, the public servant has a vested interest in working to retain public confidence. Unless the taxpayers generally continue to think that the money being spent is worthwhile, there will come a time when a government will be elected, as happened in 1979, which will substantially reduce government expenditure and the opportunities for public service. Worse, circumstances can arise as they have done now, where not only the government but also the main opposition party are hostile to direct public provision. Therefore, it is especially important at the present time for public servants to persuade the public that they are both necessary and giving value for money. The best way of doing this is to arrive at a pay structure which is both simple for the public to understand and constructed in such a way to ensure that pay and conditions are adjusted automatically by reference to an objective standard to keep them in line with wages and conditions in private business.

What is needed are criteria based on broad similarities, which the general public can understand and support. Most jobs are much the same in terms of the general demands they make on people – stress, responsibility, intellectual effort and special knowledge or skill. Moreover, those jobs which demand more than the norm also fall into readily identifiable categories. (Anyone who doubts this should try an experiment. Produce a list of twelve disparate jobs of the same general status – all non-management or all management and so on – and which have no emotional plus or minus against them in the public mind – exclude nurses, estate agents etc. Then get people to assess their worth in terms of wages. Most people will judge the value of the jobs to be similar).

Public service jobs are even more readily categorised than the totality of occupations in a society because the range of work in public  service is much more limited. In a way the civil service already recognises this because the standard civil service grades cover an immense variety of job titles. The civil service division of grades into administrative/executive/clerical provide a starting point for the broad criteria mentioned above. These could then be augmented with categories based on danger, stress, responsibility etc. If recruitment becomes a problem in a particular area, the problem can be solved byraising pay through re-grading.

The second problem with public pay is keeping it up to a realistic level. Previous attempts a pay formulae have not been linked to the average male wage and that has been the primary cause of their failure. It has meant that periodically public sector workers have fallen behind private sector workers as governments run into financial trouble.

What is required for all public service jobs is a formula which uses the average male worker’s earnings as a baseline, with the various public service grades being a percentage of the average male worker’s earnings – the percentage could be less or more than 100% depending on the grade of the job. Such a system would mean regular upgrading of pay and avoid the demands for very large percentage increases when pay falls behind.

Should pension entitlements, holiday entitlements and security of employment be taken into account when calculating public sector pay? Only to the extent that they differ from the arrangements of large private corporations. Historically large private companies have offered non-salary benefits very similar to that enjoyed by public servants. That is changing, in particular final salary pensions are rapidly becoming extinct in private business, and any grading of public service jobs should reflect any difference which arises between public and private in the future. However, care must be taken to avoid a situation where public servants cease seeing public service as a secure career. Most of what Government does benefits from having career employees because continuity is a great deal in administrative work, which forms the great bulk of public service employment.

The third major problem is national pay. This is perhaps the most sacred of cows of public service workers and unions, but there is no logic or fairness in such arrangements. If everyone in the NHS receives the same pay for the same job regardless of where they are living, there is in reality no national pay because of the considerable regional differences in cost of living. There are parts of the UK where, for example, teachers earn below substantially below the local average and others where they earn well above the local average. Hence, we have regional pay but quite perniciously the lowest pay is paid in the highest cost areas. The consequence is that there are often staff shortages in the higher cost of living areas and the quality of staff employed in such areas may be below the standard required simply because no one else can be recruited at the pay levels. The answer is to introduce regional RPIs (Retail Price Indices) – which would include housing costs – and vary wages according to those.

Regional RPIs would solve much of the present difficulty for public service workers in high cost areas. It would not be politically possible to reduce the pay of existing employees, but it could be held static in the lowest cost areas and differential increases given in other areas until regional pay was established. For example, suppose area A is the cheapest area and area Z is the most expensive. Area A gets no increase until its pay level reaches that which matches its Regional RPI, while Area Z immediately gets an increase which raises its pay level to that required by its Regional RPI. Ditto for all areas between A and Z. If their pay is beyond that required by their regional RPI, it remains pegged until pay and cost of living equalise: if below their Regional RPI, they get a rise to match it. As time goes on, the higher pay of the higher cost areas will be balanced by the lower pay of the lower cost areas. There would be no massive extra ongoing expenditure as eventually the lower and higher pay levels would broadly cancel each other out. However, there would be an initial cost because no one will have their pay immediately reduced while some will have it increased substantially.  [RH 2012: although I am still in favour of regional pay, this is something which should be accomplished in good economic times not the times we have now. That is because some areas are much more dependent on public sector jobs than others, something which affects the economy of the area generally.  Even though the reduction in money would be gradual under my scheme it might still in present circumstances be the straw which breaks the camel’s back in areas struggling to move out of recession.]

Much of the problem of regional cost variations could be obviated if the cost of housing was substantially reduced. Government can take the lead by making more housing available in the areas in which it is scarce – see section for detailed suggestions. In particular, a ready supply of housing both to let and buy at reasonable prices would largely overcome the problem of the young who have yet to buy. A middle-aged person who brought their home 20 years before requires far less to live comfortably than someone trying to buy their first property. The latter have near insuperable problems in many places.For example, in inner London, an income of £50,000 would not be enough to buy the most basic family home because a three bedroom property would be in excess of £300,000 in even the cheapest areas.

The cost of any re-grading could also be offset by reducing the numbers of public servants in some areas. This would naturally meet with resistance from public servants, but if it is done without compulsory redundancies – and it could be – the objection to it is not strong. Staff can be redeployed to other posts and new recruitment to the remaining departments reduced to accommodate them. Attention has to be paid to the age structure of a workforce – no large organisation wantsto find itself in the position of having a sizeable proportion of its staff retiring at the same time – but with an employer as large and diverse as the Government, this should not be an insuperable problem.

Why not simply have wages set by what the market will bear  in any particular place? If there is a shortage of nurses in London why not pay them £30,000 if that is what it takes, but only £10,000 if that is a competitive wage in, say, Cornwall? That begs the question of the quality of the recruits you attract and their long term retention. You may get enough recruits at the low rate but they may be of poor quality. There is also the question of motivation once employed. Poor motivation equals less efficient working. Pay should be high enough to avoid those two evils. If higher wages produce greater motivation and ability in the staff employed, the number of staff could be reduced.

The great advantage of adopting a system of broad definitions – tying pay to the average full time wage and Regional RPIs – is that it would be both stable and largely self adjusting. Problems could arise where recruitment becomes an issue. Then, as mentioned above, re-grading might have to occur to raise pay in a particular area of work or region.

All the Public Service Unions and many public servants will instinctively reject what I have suggested because such things as national pay scales and the preservation of jobs are part of the emotional scenery in public service. But public servants do not have a right to determine how many people will be employed by the Government and they should always remember that a public servant must have a necessary and useful function to maintain public support.

What public servants do have is a right to a decent living wage for what they do and to reasonable working conditions which includes the assured opportunity for a career and staffing adequate to carry out the tasks Government sets them. If they start from those two premises they have a much greater chance of achieving their ends than they have in merely maintaining the status quo.

Above all, it should never be forgotten by the public servant that the taxpayer is the paymaster for all government spending. A statement of the blindingly obvious perhaps, but one which tends to be glossed over by governments who speak as though they are spending their own money when they talk of “an extra £3 billion for the NHS” or “£200 million to  take crime off the streets”. Public money is not unlimited nor is the level of public spending without consequences for the general economic health of the country.

Most public servants know that there are pluses and minuses in public service and that moving to private employment has its disadvantages as well as being very difficult in areas where private businesses are not thick on the ground. There is also the example of public sector employees who have had their jobs privatised. They have frequently found that their new conditions of work are inferior to those they enjoyed when in public service. Public servants also know in their heart of hearts that security of employment is still considerably greater in public service than in private business. Consequently, the government has a strong card to play if they choose to play it, namely, continued security of employment in return for the radical changes described above.

18. The right to strike

Some public service workers do not have the right to strike – the police and the armed forces. Is it unreasonable to deny them this right? I think most people – myself amongst them – would say no. They would see that the right to strike has to be balanced against the public good of having the streets policed and soldiers,sailors and airmen who will be unquestionably available to provide national defence and to attend to national emergencies.

If we decide as a society that the police and servicemen cannot strike, there is no reason in principle why the removal of the right to strike cannot be more widely extended for we have already decided it is not an absolute right. The question is how far to extend the denial of the right.

There is a case for a general ban on striking by public service workers because they are funded by the taxpayer and ultimately responsible to the taxpayer or at least the electorate. But before any such ban could be reasonably considered the general pay and employment conditions must be made fair and secure in the manner described in the previous section – their pay and conditions would have to be such that the majority of the population would think them reasonable. That would leave the problem of union action over unfair dismissal or other disciplinary action, but it is difficult for a union to argue that there is not adequate recourse through Employment Tribunals or, if the union wishes to fund a case brought by one of their members, through the courts.

If a general ban is thought too severe, there is good reason to ban strikes in those organisations which provide services which are both vital and immediately necessary. It would be difficult to argue that all-out strikes by NHS staff or firemen would cause less public damage and chaos than strikes by the police or servicemen.

Because of privatisation there are also private companies whose employees in principle need to be banned from striking, particularly the utilities such as gas, water and electricity. That raises another objection to the placing of utilities in private hands: it makes action such as ruling strikes illegal for certain workers very difficult, even impossible in practice. The utilities being private companies,  governments cannot control their wages and  conditions of employment  as they can those of public bodies. Or rather, they could do so, but then they would be taking so much of the control of a fundamental part of a private business out of its management’s hands (this would be in addition to the areas already covered by the various utility regulators) that two questions would arise: (1) could any private  company operate under such constraints? and (2) if a company has to be so constrained by government, what is the point of it being a private company? The answer to (1) is probably no and to ((2) no point.

19. The ability of private companies to manage public services

Take the case of the NHS. It is the largest employer in Europe, employing not far short of a million people. No private company has any experience of managing an organisation anything like that size. In fact, very few private companies have any experience of managing a workforce of even 20,000. A fair number of Government departments and agencies are considerably larger than the 20,000 employee business. On the grounds of size alone the transfer of large scale public service activities to private sector control is problematic because the private sector simply does not have that many people with experience of running such large concerns.

An even more fundamental difficulty is the fact that much public service work is specific to public service. The administration of complex legislation and rules present an employee with a far higher learning curve (for even rank and file staff) than would be found in the vast majority of similar level private sector posts. To this is added the need to keep up with the ever more frequent changes created by government to the law (this is partly driven by the innumerable EU directives). Consequently it is not a simple matter to substitute private sector workers for public sector workers because the private sector workers have to be trained from scratch.

Of course, when public sector work is shifted to the private sector public sector staff often move to the private employer. But private companies are profit driven and when moving into public sector work almost always seek to maximise profits by severely cutting staff. This both reduces the number of experienced staff and frequently demoralizes those who remain because they have an ever increasing burden. This in turn leads to many of the experienced staff leaving and the expertise available to the employer to continually diminish.

20. Private money in public projects – “Buy now, pay later”

The introduction of private money into public projects, whether under the title of the Public Private Partnership or its successor the Private Finance Initiative, is a fraud on the public. As Hire Purchase used to be advertised in my youth, it is “Buy now, pay later”.  Private companies put up the money for, say, a hospital, build it and  then lease it back to the NHS.. The taxpayer then pays through the nose for twenty or thirty years as the lease is serviced. For example, Tory health spokesman Andrew Lansley has just elicited the truth from the Government about the cost of the new hospitals built under PFI. For hospitals worth £8 billion the taxpayer will pay the private sector companies responsible for them a total of £53 billion over thirty years, a return on capital of 540% (Daily Telegraph 27 10 2006).

The honest way for Governments to finance projects is to raise taxes or increase the national debt. Then the public can see clearly what is being done and judge the cost. With PFI and its ilk, the cost does not appear as government spending immediately. It is “Enron accounting”, the removal of expenditure from the balance sheet for the present but not the future. The expenditure only appears gradually as the debt is met by charging the government for the services provided or alternatively by charging the customer directly. For example, if toll roads are built and/or maintained by private capital, the contractors could charge the motorist directly to recoup their costs.

But the deceit goes beyond the hidden deferral of expenditure. Much of the detail of the contracts made with private companies is not being made available to the public on the spurious grounds of “commercial confidentiality”. Even the Government has had to admit that the cost of PPP and PFI projects will be considerably more than if they were undertaken directly by the Government using taxpayers’ money. The deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, made such an admission in his speech to the 2002 Labour Party Conference. What we cannot be sure of, because of the lack of public openness in revealing the contracts, is how much more expensive PFI and its ilk will be. What we can be sure of is that the difference is likely to be considerable.

The Government’s justification for paying over the odds is that it allows things to be provided quickly rather than having to wait for the money for direct public funding to become available. As more public money will have to be found in the future to fund PFI projects set in train now, the consequence will be much less money for public provision when the PFI bills come in. Therefore, at best, future generations will be paying more in tax for less in public services. The real justification for PFI is of course that it allows a government to claim credit for what is provided now in the knowledge that when the bills come in the people making the decisions cannot be held responsible.

Many of the contracts being granted to private companies are for periods of 15, 20 even 30 years. The life of a politician in government is short on average, either because of election defeats or sacking by the PM of the day. Five continuous years as a cabinet minister is good going. In the vast majority of cases the politicians who made the decision to go ahead with PFI will be out of office not merely long before the final bills are paid but in all probability by the next Parliament after a contract is signed. Once out of office, they can ignore any problem which arises and the sad truth of the matter is  that nothing can be done to make them take responsibility for their decisions as things stand. At worst, all that will happen is the electorate in a constituency throwing them out at the next election, which for an ex-minister is no great loss. It should be added that it rarely happens that an individual MP is thrown out by the electorate for his or her personal failings because the power of party label is too great.

Why are private finance schemes so much more expensive? They have to make a profit of course but there are other reasons. The private concerns financing the projects have to borrow money at a higher rate of interest than the Government can, perhaps 1-2% more. That is because the risk is greater for the lender . The borrower has to make a profit on the borrowed money so he must charge more than he is paying for the money to finance the scheme. That is the obvious extra cost. But there are many hidden additional costs.

Most problematic is the fact that private business will not accept all risks. For example, the company bidding for the Tube maintenance contract will not accept the financial risk of tunnels under the Thames being flooded. The consequence of this is that contracts exclude the really high risks. The Government has to cover them. So it ends up with both the major risk and paying more for the construction work.

The actual position is even worse than that. Private companies may accept risks and obligations in their contracts which they simply cannot meet. The Government is then forced to step in. Thus the Government in practice underwrites the whole business, either officially or unofficially.

Much of what is happening is a halfway house to public disengagement. Hospitals can be granted “Foundation Status”. This allows them to raise whatever money they can on the private market on terms they decide upon with the lenders. That in turn implies that they may l have to start charging for services if Britain’s economic circumstances  alter seriously for the worse – thus reducing tax revenue – or a government’s attitude to the NHS changes. . The difference between an unambiguously privatised NHS and what is likely to occur some years down the line is very narrow. And, of course, the closer the situation gets to full privatisation, the more probable will become full privatisation, because the financial structures required for it will exist and the moral argument against it will have largely eroded by the failure to stoutly defend the principle of public service.

21. The London Underground – PPP in action

Christian Wolmar’s book “Down the Tube – the battle for London’s Underground” points the way to the shape of public/private things to come. It is a truly depressing future.

Ignoring the shambles which are our privatised railways, the Labour Government has forced a PPP on the London  nderground, one of the largest Metro systems in the world and a transport conduit absolutely necessary to London’s functioning, carrying as it does millions of people a day. They have added insult to injury by retaining the running of the trains in public hands while putting the maintenance of the infrastructure – track, stations, signalling etc – in the hands of private companies. The fact that it is the maintenance of the infrastructure which has caused the most serious of the problems in the privatised overground railways has simply been ignored.

This PPP has just about every flaw that one could imagine. The contract is very long – 30 years. Even if everything goes to plan, the cost to the public is unknown. Right from the start the taxpayer will be paying a subsidy to the private consortium of œ1 billion a year, despite assurances originally that no subsidies would be paid. Worse, even the Government admits that it does know what level of subsidy will be required throughout the 30 years of the contract. Nor can it give any figure of cost to the taxpayer if the PPP fails, that I, the private companies either liquidate or walk away.

“Walk away?” do you say? But surely the companies have accepted the risk and are legally liable for any failure to meet performance targetsor for any catastrophic events such as flooding of the tunnels under the Thames?  Actually, no. Their liability for cost overruns is capped, more or less, at £50 million for each quarter of the 30 year deal and they have written into the contracts a disclaimer for events such as flooding. If the private companies really run into trouble, the taxpayer takes over responsibility for 95% of the loans taken out by the private companies.

Then there is their profitability. The private companies have a “guaranteed” rate of return on capital of almost 20%, a return twice that considered to be a good commercial profit.

On top of all that cost and potential risk to the taxpayer, there will be a truly daunting administrative burden. The contracts to set up the PPP run to some two million words.  Responsibility is diffuse and the criteria for assessing the performance of the private companies opaque. The PPP will require a large additional bureaucracy just to oversee the workings of the contracts and the inevitable disputes between the private companies and the public body as to interpretation of the contracts will be a bonanza for the lawyers.

22. Capita

We already have a great deal of evidence of the effects of private enterprise on public services. The results generally have been less than sparkling. Remember the Criminal Records Bureau fiasco of September 2002 when schools were prevented from opening for the new term because those working in the schools had not been vetted for criminal convictions in time? Or how about the Individual Learning Accounts scheme which resulted in a loss of at least tens of millions of pounds in the past few years? If you are a resident of the London Borough of Lambeth you may recall housing benefit being so badly run by a private company that it was rapidly returned to the control of the council. Or how about the maladroit administration of the London Congestion charge which makes London drivers’ lives a misery? All these are examples of a private company taking over the administration of public matters and making a pig’s ear of things.

More worryingly, they were all the responsibility of a firm called Capita. I say worryingly, because Capita, far from being shut out from other public contracts, is positively cornering the market for such business. In addition to the contracts mentioned above, Capita collects the BBC’s licence fee. It also runs the written part of the Diving Test in parts of the country. The “Connexions” card being promoted to schoolchildren by the Government, a Trojan Horse for a general ID card, is run by Capita, who also supply management software to 23,000 UK schools. Capita even have the contract to run the pension scheme of the Inland Revenue.

Had Capita proven itself to be a model of competence, such a concentration of work in one company would be disturbing for it suggests at best that the competition for these contracts is extremely limited. It would be interesting to know who else tendered and what the tendering process was. But even if these details were made public, the old cry of “commercial confidentiality” would almost certainly prevent any meaningful public examination of the merits of the various tenders.

Capita is far from being the only company rewarded with new contracts despite clear evidence of incompetence . The people who brought you the Railtrack maintenance fiasco, Jarvis, have just been awarded the contract to build a new surgical and heart care unit for an NHS hospital in London, the Whittington at Archway.

There are two possible reasons why poor performance does not disqualify a company from future contracts. The first is structural. Many of the contracts being offered are of a size and complexity to reduce the number of realistic bidders to at best a few and at worst one. Thus the idea that private input into public business will ever generally equal greater efficiency is doomed. All that has been created is a form of public/private monopoly.

The other possible reason for continued contract winning regardless of performance is corruption. That is not to suggest that corruption has occurred to date, merely that the possibility exists. It deserves a section to itself (see section 27) .

A company bidding for public contracts may well quote a price which is simply too low to maintain performance. They may deliberately bid too low. Having gained the contract, the company confronts the Government with a claim that they can only make a profit (or even break even) unless they reduce the service from that for which they have contracted or receive more favourable payment terms. The government is then left with a decision: can they afford to drop the contractor? Is there another contractor which could take over? The answer to both questions is almost certainly no.

23. The morality of privatisation

Does a British government have the right to sell off industries and property owned by the state? In Britain the answer legally is yes. Barring restrictions agreed to in treaties, most particularly the Treaty of Rome and its successor treaties, a British government may legally do what it wishes. It may also repudiate existing treaty obligations. Parliament may in principle pass any law it wishes. That demonstrates the danger of having a political system without any constitutional bars to government action.

But if privatisation is legal, it does not follow that it is morally justified. These are enterprises and property which were either developed from scratch by government or were taken over by the state, often from municipal undertakings which were public developments in themselves. In each case taxpayers’ money was used to either start or acquire them. For Britons who bought shares privatisation was a form of taxation. They paid money for that which the state already held on their behalf. Non-British taxpayers purchased that which was not morally the State’s to sell. But the deceit went beyond this. By selling that which was held in common for the British, they robbed those Britons who did not purchase shares and the future generations who would have no stake in that which was sold before they were born.

Privatisation could perhaps have been morally justified if every British citizen had been issued free shares in each privatized industry, which they could then have held or sold as they chose. The Government would not then have had the proceeds, of course, but it should be remembered that the prime reason given by Margaret Thatcher for privatisation was that it would modernise great British industries through the invigorating blast of free enterprise. Ostensibly at least the raising of money for the government was not the prime motivation.

The money received from privatisation has simply vanished into general government expenditure. Had the money been earmarked for particular projects dear to the public’s heart, such as new hospitals and schools or placed in a separate fund to help pay the state pension in the years when it is anticipated that those working will substantially decline in relation to those who are retired, at least the public would have something concrete and identifiable to set against the loss of public assets. As it is the public as a whole has nothing.

It is of course impossible to prove whether taxes would have been higher or that government expenditure would have been lower if there had been no privatisation proceeds, but it is a fair bet that extra money in government coffers has simply meant additional government expenditure without a proper regard to whether the expenditure was warranted. That is the common experience of governments and public money.

The money obtained through privatisation should not be viewed as pure gain in terms of government expenditure. Privatisation has caused agreat deal of what private business euphemistically call “downsizing”. The resultant unemployment costs – unemployment pay and other benefits – have to be set against the privatisation receipts. In addition, a large proportion of those who have gained alternative employment have found themselves earning a good deal less than they did previously. That equals less tax paid.

24. Our general experience of privatisation to date

The prime problems with privatisation are (1) the provision declines,(2) the taxpayer has to pick up the bill when things go seriously wrong and (3) privatised industries are often left in a situation of naturally restricted competition.

The best example of what happens when the state simply opens up amarket to private interests is probably bus deregulation. This happenedin the mid-eighties. The consequence has been predictable and devastating, with the countryside being virtually denuded of buses and even the big cities apart from London – where a massive public subsidy has continued – have experienced a decline in services as bus operators concentrate on only the most profitable routes. In addition, on the profitable routes, there are so many competing buses that the buses themselves can become a cause of congestion themselves – Manchester is a good example of this phenomenon.

The railways are the most disturbing example of cost to the taxpayer after privatisation. Not only has the taxpayer paid larger subsidies to the rail companies since privatisation than were paid to nationalised British Rail, and absurdity in itself, several billions of taxpayers money have been required to rescue the company responsible for maintaining the track and associated equipment, Railtrack, after it became insolvent and was put into administration. (The company has now been reborn as a strange hybrid creature, anon-profit making company called Network Rail.)

Another example is the immediate difficulty suffered by the National Air Traffic service (NATs) after partial privatisation in 2002. The new company had barely started trading before the Government had to extend a £30 million loan to it.

As for competition, the government appointed regulators are supposed to remove the natural abuses of restricted competition by controlling prices. Whether it is possible for even a genuinely disinterested person to determine objectively what a reasonable or efficient price for a product or service is in such circumstances is dubious,  because what constitutes legitimate profit, the right level of investment or the desirable level of service to be offered are ultimately matters of opinion.

But these problems of definition are in practice redundant, because regulators are subject to pressures from politicians, the public, the industry they regulate and business in general. The result is that pricing frequently bears little relationship to any considered view of what is necessary, but is variously a response to what the government wants, a reaction to higher than anticipated profits being made by the regulated industry or threats from the private companies of dire consequences if prices are not raised.

What are the unambiguous successes of privatisation? Telephones, perhaps, most older people would probably say as they remember the absurdly long wait for a new line and the complete lack of choice of phone in the days of the nationalised British Telecom. Beyond telephones, it is difficult to see any privatisation in which the balance of advantage has been clearly in the country’s or the individual’s favour. The railways have been an unmitigated disaster, basic industries such as coal and steel have either collapsed or effectively been exported – with a massive loss of jobs inducing structural employment in places. The gas and electricity companies produced cheap power for a while but that was largely the result of Britain’s because of North Sea gas. When that self-sufficiency began to wane energy prices rose dramatically. In the case of water, prices have risen substantially since privatisation while shortages have grown and customers are now facing the prospect of compulsory water metering – some areas already have it. Investment has been inadequate – for example, no new reservoir has been built to serve the water starved SE of England since the privatisation of the nationalised water utility – and service, especially on the maintenance side, is widely perceived to have declined because of the dramatic cuts in the workforce.

Even in the case of telecommunications the picture is blurred. Nationalised British Telecom might have been a something of a disaster on the marketing and customer front, but it did ensure that coverage with landlines was near universal in Britain, something which would have been impossible had their provision been left to the market – how many private companies would have laid and maintained lines to small villages or even small, isolated towns? So when BT was privatised it started with the immense advantage of a near universal infrastructure which existed because of public provision.

But the rise of the mobile phone has made any proper comparison between the pre and post privatised situation virtually impossible. Even if BT had never been privatised and the landline phone market had remained a  monopoly, they would still have had to face private competition from mobiles. In other words, privatisation in that case largely pre-empted what would have happened naturally.

25. Private money in public service = a democratic deficit

The employment of private companies to carry out public tasks necessarily involves heavyweight contracts between the companies and the Government. These invariably carry a large compensation provision in the event of a government or a lesser political authority such as a Borough council deciding that it does not wish to honour a contract to its end. If they did not carry such compensation provision no private company would accept the contract.

The practical effect of such contracts is to create a democratic deficit. Because the compensation to be paid is very substantial, politicians are understandably reluctant to cancel contracts. Consequently, it becomes very difficult for a party to change a policy if it involves the cancellation of a contract. A first rate example is the introduction of the Congestion Charge in London by the Mayor of London , Ken Livingston. In the next mayoral election his principal rival, the Tory Steve Norris, promised to abolish the charge. It is dubious whether he could have done so if he had won because, according to Livingstone, £80 million in compensation would have had to be paid to Capita.

If an enterprise is run directly by public servants, it is in principle much easier to change policy because there are no contracts which require compensation if they are cancelled.

26. When private becomes public by default

Any really large private company by virtue of its size takes on aspects of the public. It does this because it becomes too important to be ignored by Government. If Barclays Bank was in danger of going bust no British Government could allow it to liquidate because of the effect on general confidence, both national and international, in the British economy. To confidence may be added cases where very large job losses would result from a liquidation or a vital domestic industry would be severely damaged by a company’s failure.

The implications of this for government are clear: they cannot simply stand back and ignore the behaviour of large private companies. That means governments should recognise that they may need to act to protect domestic industries – even in rare cases taking them over – and, where there is a strategic interest such as arises with a major domestic defence supplier, to place legal restrictions on what the company can do, for example by requiring export licences for weapons.

27. Corruption in Public Service

In modern times the British Civil Service has been remarkably free from corruption (local government is a different matter), a fact made all the more surprising because of the truly colossal amount of money it disposes of each year – government spending for the financial year 2006/7 will be around £500 billion. There are two reasons for this. The first is the hard-won tradition of public service which in which the Civil Service as an apolitical institution and as such serves no political ideology or party but provides politicians of all stamps with disinterested advice and executes their policies. This tradition has been underpinned by the lifelong working careers which public servants, especially senior ones, have commonly had. Of course, that was merely the ideal and, as with any human institution, the reality fell some way short of the ideal. Nonetheless, such sentiments and conventions have affected the behaviour of public servants for the better, especially in the area of honesty.

The second reason for a lack of corruption has been the direct provision of most the services provided by central government. This has meant that the number of large central government contracts offered to private business has been small in relation to the money spent on the direct provision of public service in all its aspects. In such circumstances serious fraud becomes difficult going on impossible for most civil servants because they do not have access to large amounts of taxpayers’ money. (Where they do have access, for example in the Inland Revenue, in most instances there are strict accounting procedures which make the embezzlement of large amounts of cash  extremely difficult). Moreover, where there are few government contracts, most civil servants are not in a position where someone would find it fruitful to bribe them because they have nothing to sell.

Unsurprisingly, where serious corruption amongst public servants employed by central government has occurred in the past, it has been overwhelmingly in those areas where large government contracts exist, most notably in Defence Procurement and building contracts. It is a reasonable assumption that the more public contracts offered to private companies, the greater the corruption will be simply because the opportunity for corruption increases.

The Thatcher and Major Governments began the attack on these two anti-corruption pillars of public service – the public service tradition and direct provision – by appointing people from outside the civil service to senior posts within the civil service, introducing private enterprise culture to public bodies (for example, the NHS “single market”), privatisation and by increasing the use of private finance and contractors in public services. But what they did pales before the Blair Government’s behaviour, which has done the same things but on a much greater scale. In particular Blair’s Government has shown a truly obsessive drive to replace direct public provision with private money and private firms. Literally nothing seems to be off limits, with public provision as disparate as the Prison Service and logistical support for the NHS being treated as suitable.

The Blair Government has also done two things the Thatcher and Major Governments did not do. First, it has radically altered the terms of employment of new civil servants, especially with regard to their retirement age and pensions, thus undermining the unspoken pact between government and civil servants that relatively poor pay was balanced by a relatively generous pension. Second, the Blair Government has classified “special advisers” that is political advisors, as civil servants, the most notable of whom is Blair’s erstwhile Press Spokesman, Alistair Campbell. These people have been given authority over career civil servants.

All this change is undermining the British public service culture. The appointment of special advisors as civil servants is destroying the apolitical nature of the civil service. The idea of a career civil servant is falling into disuse because no one can be sure what is next to be privatised or where a department may be moved to. The morale of civil servants is generally depressed. All of that translates into less commitment to the job, on average less time in a job and probably the employment of fewer able and trustworthy people as civil servants because the more able and trustworthy are now less willing to come into public service and standards have had to be lowered to recruit sufficient staff.

The weakening of the public service ethos and the probable lowering of the quality of the people employed is likely to have increased the number of civil servants willing to behave corruptly if the opportunity arises is increasing at the very time that the opportunities for corruption are multiplying because of the large number of private companies being given government contracts. Put those two circumstances together and it is odds on that civil service corruption has increased substantially.

What is applicable to national politicians and civil servants applies to other public servants, at both the national and local government level, and politicians below the national level.

In theory competitive tendering for public contracts should be a guard against corrupt practices. The problem is that in most instances the number of firms tendering will be small. Quite often there will be only two bidders. On occasion the process lapses into farce and only one firm will bid. This happened in the London borough of Camden where a £62.5 million contract for renovating an estate called Chalcots attracted only one bidder, a consortium going under the name of United House. The council’s housing director Neil Litherland claimed bizarrely that talking to just one bidder would lead to “better uses of [council] resources by reducing the negotiation and evaluation period” (Camden New Journal 12 12 2002).

There are good reasons why the number of bidders is often small. First, the size of the operations and their frequently unusual nature (often there is no comparable private sector work) means that there will only be a few private companies able to plausibly bid for a contract. Second, the bidding process is very expensive both in terms of money and time, especially management time. These two entirely rational and legitimate reasons for a paucity of bidders build great opportunities for corruption into the system of bidding. Where there are, say, only four companies capable of undertaking work in a particular area such as social housing, they can act as a cartel and effectively deal out public contracts amongst themselves by agreeing who will put in the highest bid for any contract.

Corruption is more than people receiving money in brown envelopes or material benefits in kind such as  expensive holidays. It is also the  granting of jobs years down the line, directorships for politicians and civil servants who have controlled the granting of Government contracts or who have used their influence to progress things such as planning applications.

The current rules regarding ministers and public servants taking posts in private industry are so lax as to be next to meaningless – they can take up posts after a year or two, regardless of how closely the private sector job is linked to their previous post. Moreover, the definition of which private industry posts are sensitive enough to demand even that slight obeisance to common decency is open to an elastic interpretation by those supposedly enforcing the rules if the secret view of politicians and senior public servants is that the rules are simply a public fig-leaf to cover their indecency. In effect, successive governments have legalised corruption and of course the more government contracts offered to private business the more opportunity there is for this type of “legalised” corruption.

Corruption can also be the giving of an honour or public service appointment in return for corrupt behaviour. For example, a contract could be granted to a private contractor corruptly through a conspiracy between the contractor, a cabinet minister and a senior public servant near retirement. The public servant corruptly facilitates the granting of the contract, retires and is rewarded with a quango sinecure. Again, the increase in contracts offers greater scope for such corruption.

That which is corrupting national politicians and the Civil Service is also evident in other public bodies, both national and local.

28. The behaviour of private companies

The blurring of lines between the public and the private arguably has a general effect for the worse on the behaviour of those in the public sphere, the bad practices of private enterprise being imported into the public sphere.

Private business is very prone to corrupt practices, from outright bribery to the formation of cartels and tricks such as industrial espionage, but the legal behaviour of private companies is frequently morally scandalous.

Directors of even the largest and ostensibly most publicly accountable companies commonly act in a manner which to most people’s  minds is immoral. The executive directors have absurdly generous and long-term contracts which are so undemanding that no matter how  badly a director performs, if they leave the board they can expect  the outstanding period of the contract to be paid in full. In many cases they receive more than their contract entitlement to persuade them to resign and go quietly.

While on a board, they executive directors receive performance bonuses set at targets which are simple to achieve. They will probably have  share options which, even if accounts are honest, are a one way bet for the director. If the shares rise above the discounted price of the option, the directors sell and pocket the profit. If the shares fall below the discounted price, they simply do not buy. It is of course easy enough to manipulate shares to boost their price at a particular time.

Why do directors get away with such behaviour? Simple: they can effectively control the company for their own purposes. In large public companies, directors’ remuneration is normally decided by a remuneration committee, which is normally composed of non-executive directors. Non-execs are supposed to act as a restraint and a check on executive directors. In practice they do not – try to find a case where a non-exec has blown the whistle on even criminal action within a large company. When it comes to directors’ remuneration, they know the score, produce the right executive director contracts or run the risk of being excluded from the lucrative non-exec gravy train.

The matter is complicated by the fact that many non-execs are executive directors with other companies where they have overly-generous contracts. What more natural than to think that because I earn this someone in another company should be similarly paid? Finally, especially in the largest companies, there is also a good deal of you-scratch-my-back-and-I’ll-scratch-yours. Executive directors of one company will expect to be non-execs of companies in which their non-execs have an interest.

Most of these practices cannot of course be imported directly into public service – inflated salaries, perks, bonuses paid on soft targets and generally overly favourable contracts are three which can and have been imported, for example, Johnston McNeil, the former head of the Rural Payments Agency, left his post after farm payments to English farmers were left in chaos early in 2006 but is still being paid his £114,000 salary in October 2006 (Daily Telegraph 18 10 2006). But the mentality rubs off on public servants (particularly the senior ones) who now deal with private business far more often that they use to and are urged by government to follow supposedly superior private enterprise practices. Sometimes the values are directly imported by the parachuting of people from outside of public service into senior public service positions. Where some part of public provision is subcontracted to a private contractor the ills of private business are imported wholesale.

29. Charities 

Most people when faced with the word charity attached to an institution are inclined to be well disposed to the organisation regardless of what the charity is supposed to do or how efficiently it does it.  If it is a popular area of work, such as medical research or the provision of services to disabled children, rationality goes out of the window. Hardly anyone questions how the money is spent or how much of it actually goes to the people the charity are supposedly helping. Nor do people distinguish between the sources of charitable income and many perhaps most are unaware that much of it is public money. This means that governments can support unpopular policies, such as those associated with political correctness, without the general public being aware that public money is being used to promote the policies.

The use of charities by politicians has other pernicious effects. It allows a government to evade responsibility even more effectively than the employment of private companies does because charities, especially popular ones, throw up a moral shield. As mentioned above people feel that money spent by a charity is a good in itself. That applies even when it is taxpayers’ money. A government can also make charitable donation part of their PR because they can gain kudos from the public by publicising their donations of taxpayers’ money to popular charities.

There is general  objection to the use of charities as publicly funded providers. They have a moral and civic role. The whole point of a charity is that it is the product of the individual will, a conglomeration of the active decisions of those who choose to make a contribution. It is part of what academics like to call civil society, those institutions which men naturally form in a free society and which fall outside the ambit of the state. Lose or even seriously diminish those institutions and the state determines all, for there is nothing to oppose it or offer an alternative.

Making a charity simply or largely a client of government undermines the very idea of charity. There is every chance that if charities are seen as arms of government, private donations to them will begin to dry up. That in turn would have spending implications for the taxpayer, because although often inefficient, charities do fund a considerable amount of what would otherwise be described as public provision. The taxpayer would end up footing the bill for extra public provision. State funding also makes charities forget their original role and become dependent on the state funding.

Government already channels gigantic wads of public money to charities for the purposes of research and active provision of services. This fits in with the drive to subcontract public provision which is now officially supported by not only the Labour Party and Tories but half-heartedly by the LibDems. Whoever is in power for the foreseeable future, it is a fair bet that the relationship between charities and the Government will broaden and deepen.  That will remove charities ever further from their original moral purpose.

Charities also epitomise the practical difficulties of mixing private and public. It is true that as non-profit making bodies they share some of the ethos of public service and the profit motive is absent. The problem is that charities, even large ones, are often very inefficient. The poorly run ones spend a great deal on administration. Many of the largest use professional fund raisers who take between 15-50% of what they collect from the public (the young men and women who increasingly infest our pavements on behalf of charities are paid employees of a professional fund raiser). They spend inordinate amounts on advertising. They hoard money rather than spend it. They manage their money poorly. They fail to modernise their service. Their accounts are inadequate.

Take the case of Scope, the charity previously known as the Spastics Society, which aids those with cerebral palsy. It is a mainstream charity of just the sort to attract public sympathy in large measure. The first thing to note is that it changed its name in 1994 from something everyone could immediately understand – the Spastics Society – to something which most people would not have a clue about. The charity had allowed itself to be seduced by the marketing sirens. It is difficult to imagine this confusion did not have some effect on fundraising.

In January 2006 Scope announced it was shutting 50 of its shops because it had a predicted £310 million deficit. (Daily Telegraph 13/01/2006). The Telegraph account went on to disclose that Scope’s last accounts showed that it was budgeting to spend £35.6 million more than it received in the financial year 2006/7, that there was a hole in its pension fund and that its buildings suffer widespread dilapidation through lack of investment. I think most people who think about it would be somewhat disturbed by the idea that a charity had a pension fund of any size and that a substantial part of their donations are going to fund it. Charities in the public mind are thought of as institutions where people offer their services either free or at a discounted rate. The idea that their paid employees are just like any other employee does not fit comfortably with the public’s idea of charity.

One of the directors of Scope Jan Hildreth (also a former director-general of the Institute of Directors summed up the mentality of his and many other charities: “Like many charities, the concern of the society has always been its activity and not its finances.”

Interestingly, Scope blamed part of its plight on ‘the Government for underfunding services it provides, such as residential and school places. “It wants our services, but it doesn’t want to pay for them,” the spokesman said. “This is a drain on our coffers.” ‘

The idea that charities will generally be more efficient than direct public provision is simply laughable. Not only do they suffer from the structural ills of public service they lack any proper public accountability. Charities are audited each year, but that audit is much less demanding than the audit required of large public companies. Moreover, their frequent failure to keep adequate records makes any audit of the use of public money very difficult. It would also be a very expensive job to monitor their spending of public money meaningfully.

As the Scope complaint quoted above suggests, governments may also see charities as a cheap means of public provision. Whether it is or not is another matter – personally I would doubt it because of the widespread incompetence in the charity world.

There is a further problem wih charities, namely what is a legitimate charity? Take our public schools. They are overwhelmingly charities. They also have in most cases a history of one hundred years or more. This means that the profit motive is absent and a quasi public-service (civil society) ethos has had time to evolve. Yet public schools – which get around £100 million tax relief – have always subsidised the education of the poorer middleclass children rather than the education of the truly poor. Why should they have status of a charity?

There are also many questionable cases where the charity exists to fund something which is essentially, even in principle, a private or sectional interest, for example the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Why should the taxpayer subsidise such institutions?

[RH in 2012 There are more than 200,000 charities in the UK. Does anyone honestly believe that there can possibly be that number of good causes? http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/networking-discussions/blogs/116/09/10/06/how-many-charities-are-there. Many disburse little of the money collected or, in quite a few cases nothing, to the causes they ostensibly support. Quite a few are set up by the wealthy who gain tax relief on donations to their charity and then use the money donated to finance their pet projects and/or draw substantial payments in the guise of expenses or pass on some material benefit to friends and relations by getting the charity to employ them].

30. Does market competition produce greater choice generally?

One of the prime arguments for introducing business practices, private money and private business into public provision is that it improves choice. British citizens, increasingly referred to as consumers or customers rather than patients, passengers or any other appellation which emphasises the public nature of the provision, supposedly want choices of schools for their children and to go to the “best” hospital or to enjoy the “superior” service coming from private companies with public provision contracts such as those running the railways or utilities such as water or gas.

Take the case of the privatised railways. Before privatisation all a passenger had to do was buy a ticket and get on a train. The only thing the passenger had to consider was whether there was a time or date restriction on the ticket. Now, the passenger has to not merely worry about time and date, but whether he or she is getting on a train run by a particular company – how many people have been on an intercity train when the ticket inspector has got into a dispute with someone who has bought a ticket for the train’s destination but it is the wrong ticket for that particular train? The customer is also besieged by a bewildering array of pricing, far more than was on offer when the railway was state owned.

I doubt whether the average passenger welcomes either the multiplicity of carriers or ticket prices. A person can have too much choice. Human beings want some but not a vast amount, which merely becomes confusing. If you want to travel somewhere you do not want it to be a demanding exercise in both finding out what the cheapest fare is and ensuring that the terms of the ticket are not inadvertently breached.

Does market competition produce greater choice even in a “free market”? There is a good argument to say it does not. The natural tendency of a free market is to produce reduced competition. Governments of all colours in countries which have a large free enterprise component to their economy recognise this by maintaining anti-monopoly legislation. (What are called free market economies are in fact state regulated economies and regulated in the most fundamental way, that is,  the prevention of increase of market share beyond a certain point).

But anti-monopoly legislation only prevents the worst anti-competitive excesses. There is still very wide scope for anti-competitive forces, especially in capital intensive and technologically advanced industries – think Microsoft and operating systems or airliners in a market of two or three suppliers.

But the process is a general one. Even enterprises which are not innately capital intensive are affected. Retailing is a good example. A hundred years ago department stores were still in their infancy. Supermarkets and shopping Malls unknown. The vast majority of purchases  were made from small, privately owned shops or from open air markets.  Most of the shops specialised in a narrow trade.

Today we have far fewer shops and markets. Supermarkets and Shopping Malls abound. The chain stores of at most a few dozen companies become  ever more pervasive. There are many fewer specialist shops. The private retailer is assaulted from all sides by the large  multiple-store retailers and increasingly succumbs as the public is seduced by the immediate temptations of price and convenience without regard to the social long-term consequences of what they do. The  =privately owned shop does not even have to be in the immediate vicinity of a giant chain store to suffer. It merely has to be within reasonable driving distance of the chain store. The consequence is that the poorer areas of larger towns and cities and country villages and small towns are denuded of their shops. The choice of the poorer residents of such places is tremendously reduced. The wealthier do not of coursecare about this because it has no direct effect on them. They have the wherewithal to either live in areas well serviced by stores and services or can afford to drive to the large supermarkets or have goods delivered from far afield. Such developments fall within the remit of government. It is not for Government to operate supermarkets but it is within their remit to prevent commercial behaviour which is anti-social.

What constitutes choice anyway? Is it, for example, having more shops offering a smaller range of products or fewer shops offering a greater range of product? In practice fewer shops will mean reduced variety of product as well as service. But what of all the choice in giant supermarkets you say? Do they not have a much greater range of product? Surely they provide more choice. They may provide a greater range in one place but that is all.

The advent of industrial-style agri-farming, the bringing in of increased amounts of imported food from around the world and introduction of new manufactured foods may give the impression of greater choice, but is an illusion. The number of varieties of staple fruits and vegetables has been massively reduced, as have the various breeds of farm animals.

Of course, the providers of anything which sells can always say “If people didn’t want it they wouldn’t buy it”. But that begs the question of what alternatives are available. If only three types of washing powder were available doubtless they would sell massively more than any one brand does now. That does not mean they are more popular merely that people have to have such a product and were forced to buy one of the three brands available. Such restriction of choice is increasingly commonplace.

31. How Government gratuitously takes on obligations

Governments regularly make rods for their own backs. Social policy is an area more prone to this sickness than most.

When a government urges the electorate to take action it places itself under both a moral and democratic  obligation. It may even in certain circumstances place itself under a legal obligation when a government sponsored supervisor such as those supervising the financial services industry, fail to act to prevent the mis-selling of pensions.

Since the 1980s British governments have pressed people to buy houses, take out private pensions, pay for private healthcare and insure themselves against unemployment. The consequences have been at various times, negative equity in houses and widespread repossessions, pension scandals ranging from the Maxwellian hand-in-till to an attempt to renege on the conditions of policies by the Equitable Life and ever more expensive private health care and unemployment insurance. The consequence has been that time and again the taxpayer has had to come to the rescue either by paying compensation in cases such as Barlow Clowes or through increased benefits paid to those who have lost their saving or investments. In those cases where the Government has forced private companies to compensate people directly, such as the various mis-selling scandals in the pension industry, the result has been higher premiums for all and frequently reduced pensions, annuities and endowment payments for many.

The sensible course for a government is to allow people to make private choices completely unhindered by state propaganda. That way they do not incur any moral obligation if things go wrong. It also ensures that the electorate does not automatically blame the government when investments turn sticky.

Of course, the state does have to regulate those who offer private insurance, mortgage and pension schemes to prevent outright criminality, such as that which occurred in the Robert Maxwell Mirror Pensions Fund scandal. This regulation should consist of (1) laws laying out what can and cannot be done, (2) very strict auditing rules

for such businesses and funds, (3) laws placing responsibility firmly on the shoulders of those who administer the businesses and funds and (4) the efficient enforcement of such laws – those responsible for the businesses and funds must believe that there will be no walking away from a mess if money goes missing or reckless mismanagement occurs.

What, no regulators for financial institutions? Well, experience shows that having a regulator to licence such businesses is pointless at best – think of BCCI and Barlow Clowes – and may even help fraud and gross mismanagement by giving a spurious respectability and solidity to the firms they licence. Moreover, the rules which regulators operate by are frequently bent as circumstances dictate, for example, the solvency rules by which Assurance companies operate have been relaxed several times in the past ten years simply because, with the fall of the stockmarket, many of the largest companies would probably have gone under if the original rules had been enforced.

32. Making personal private provision – the problems of investing

To expect the vast majority of human beings to be expert enough in financial matters to make wise private investment decisions is absurd, as absurd as expecting every man to be his own lawyer. Therefore, all but a few of us will turn to supposedly expert advisors for advice. The problem with such people is twofold: they often have a vested uniters in selling or promoting a particular product and even when they do not, they are frequently bad judges of the financial future. (If investing was easy and certain for the so-called experts, all financial institutions would be permanently hugely successful).

When someone sells you a private pension plan or insurance, he does not do it out of the goodness of his heart. He does it because he earns a commission or fee from it. As the pensions mis-selling scandal of the Thatcher years showed, that incentive drives many, probably most, financial service consultants to sell the product most beneficial to their income rather than to the customer.

The customer can also get misled if he takes reputedly independent advice, whether this be from a self-described independent financial adviser or out of the financial pages of newspapers and magazines or investment newsletters. The advice given may be anything but independent. Unbeknown to the client, an advisor may get a commission for recommending an investment and media share tipsters often have no scruples about recommending shares which they know to be poor performers, either because of direct inducements from the companies or because they work for a company which gets business from the share tipped. Share tipsters can also make a profit by “ramping up” a price in shares they hold by recommending it or depress a share by criticising it and then buying at the depressed price.

Those recommending shares or financial products are in a wonderful position: they can tip to their heart’s content without taking any responsibility for their tips. No tipster has a consistent record of predicting successful investments. Quite a few have utterly dismal records over years. Indeed, so poor is their general performance that one might ask whether it is any worse than randomly selecting investments. It may even be worse. As Woody Allen once remarked, “A stockbroker is someone who invests your money until it is gone”.

The Daily Telegraph put the matter of share tipping to a sort of test in 2001. It employed a professional tipster, an astrologer and a four year old child to notionally invest £5000 in the stock market. The professional tipster applied his supposed expertise. The astrologer selected her shares using her star charts. The four year old child chose by repeatedly tossing (at the same time) a number of pieces of paper in the air with the names of shares written on them. At each toss she caught one. After a year all the investments had lost money, but the four-year-old-child lost least, followed by the astrologer with the supposed financial expert bringing up the rear quite some way behind.

A rational examination of the actual performance of tipsters and advisors could only lead to the conclusion that predicting the future economy is a mug’s game. Why would an expert do worse than a four-year-old child and an astrologer? Well, it could have been a fluke, but an unlikely one as both the child and the astrologer did better. More probably the financial advisor’s knowledge is a positive hindrance. A parallel is with the football pools. Many people have a very considerable knowledge of the form and general state of professional football clubs. Yet these people do not appear to be any better at predicting results than the punter who knows nothing about football and does the pools by putting a pin in the matches or has fixed numbers.

The truth is that no one can guarantee investment for a secure future or even come anywhere near to it. All calls for private provision replacing public in whole or part should be placed in that context.

33. Supporting old age

The most problematic of all public provision is what to do about the old. The value of actuarial calculations – the statistical analysis of risk based on instances of the risk occurring – made sense for pension calculations when life spans from generation to generation were fairly stable. Because of our ever increasing ability to cure and prevent disease and to provide a more materially certain livelihood for the majority, life expectancy in the future is no longer easily predicted. Even if the wilder extremes of SF are avoided, it is reasonable to assume a significant rise in life expectancy in the next forty years. The rise does not have to be dramatic to make a nonsense of pension provision made today – even a five year rise in the average would have dramatic consequences for pension planning.

A substantial rise in the average lifespan does not necessarily imply some major scientific breakthrough to slow or even reverse ageing. All that would be required is for scientific advances to reduce the diseases which kill many before they reach the average age of death. In other words, more people survive to the ages which are now the average lifespans. It is quite conceivable that within the next 40 years simply reducing early death could extend the average lifespan by ten years.

More dramatically, it is conceivable that science may extend human lifespans substantially beyond their current limits. Work on animals such as mice have resulted in greatly extended lifespans simply by restricting food intake from early in life. If human lifespans are extended greatly all pension bets are off. In such circumstances no meaningful actuarial prediction for pensions could be made for the odds would be that further, unforeseeable increases in life span would occur continuously after the initial scientific breakthrough was made. The fact that such scientific advances are possible in itself makes current pension planning hideously uncertain.

What should we do as a society to plan for the future lives of the old? Let us assume that average lifespans are extended simply through the diminution of early death rather than from any radical scientific discovery, what then? If the average lifespan of Britons rises to, say, 90, over the next 40 years, an obvious move would be to delay retirement. But that raises a problem. Most people could probably work to 70, but beyond that the incidence of severe but non-fatal disease rises steeply. Keeping people alive longer does not at present equal keeping them fitter. More 70+ year-olds means more people suffering from various forms of dementia, crippling diseases such as arthritis and people simply too physically weak to undertake work which could provide an income to support them. Hence, extending the retirement age, for both state and private pensions, is only a partial answer unless science advances enough to massively reduce the infirmities of old age.

It is also true that many people are struggling to cope with their job long before the current age of retirement. People in manual jobs cannot be expected to work to 70 and those in heavy manual jobs or those in jobs which require physical strength and fitness such as grassroots policing, are probably past useful employment by the age of 50, certainly by 55. In principle they can retrain to lighter work, but in practice this is very difficult. People who have spent their lives working with their hands in a workshop or in the open air often do not take easily to working in an office or shop. Moreover, the pay they will get from such “second career” jobs is likely to be low, which is both a disincentive to work and may leave the person unable to support themselves fully.

But even if a person can adapt to new ways or has been throughout their lives in the type of employment which can be carried on into old age, the odds are that they will struggle to remain in employment as they reach late middle age. Employers are prejudiced against the older worker for various reasons. Part of that reason is financial – the cost of employing them is high compared with a youngster – but it is also in large part to do with the adaptability and energy of the young compared with the old. In a time of ever increasng technological change the natural resistance to change and learning becomes ever more of a handicap than it was in the past. Government can pass whatever age-discrimination laws it wants but employers will still find ways to employ who they want to employ without falling foul of the law (short of a law which insists that a percentage of people in an organization had to be in various age categories).

However much as we may like to believe – and I write as a budding wrinkly myself – that experience compensates for youthful enthusiasm, the truth is that all of us become much less receptive to new ideas as we get older, energy falls, physical strength fails, our memory diminishes and concentration becomes harder. Consequently, employers have good cause for employing younger people in most jobs. Of course experience does count and in some jobs can be valuable well into old age, but in most jobs it does not count for much after the age of 60. Even in “people” related employment, which the older person is supposedly better equipped to handle, experience may be a positive disadvantage. For example, suppose an employer wants to employ someone serving the public. It may well be that the average customer for the business prefers to be served by someone young and employing the old would be the kiss of death for the business.

The position of the older worker is being further undermined at present by the high levels of immigration, both official and unofficial. Most of this immigration is of the young, much of it young males. These young workers will tend to take much of the work which would otherwise be available for the old.

Even in the most benign likely circumstances – an extension of the average lifespan by five or ten years through the deduction of early death, it is clear that many people will require support for a very long period of retirement or reduced employment. Some of that may well come from private pensions and savings. But clearly for a very large part of the population adequate private resources guaranteed to support someone for 30 odd years will be beyond their grasp. Hence, state provision sufficient to allow people to live in old age is a must.

If great scientific advances are made which greatly extend life we shall simply have to start planning again from scratch. Obviously if average lifespan was increased to, say, 150, the whole perspective of a life would have to change. There are any number of exciting or disturbing possibilities. For example, it might be that only the newly conceived or newborn children could have their lives increased by a new treatment. We would then be in a position where that generation and succeeding generations had the increased lie span while anyone born before the treatment became available lived to an average age of 90.

The other great concern about pensions is demographic. The population is ageing and the British birthrate is substantially below (around 1.7 children per woman) the replacement level (roughly 2.1 children per woman). The doomsday scenario is insufficient working people to pay the pensions of the old in the future. If we were talking about a demographic change which was going to take place overnight I would be worried. However, we are not. Rather, the demographic effects will be worked out over thirty or forty years. Past experience suggests that society will evolve to make the necessary arrangements. We cannot foresee what the birthrate will be in five years let alone twenty or thirty.

However, we should not put all of our eggs in basket. It would be wise now for the Government to begin a state pension fund into which one per cent of GDP (currently around £11 billion) was put each year. This fund would not be touched for 20 years at least and would be used to ease any future pension problem arising from a tax shortfall due to a smaller working population.

The currently fashionable solution for the future pension bottleneck – importing large numbers of young immigrants – would be no answer in the long term. The young people who arrived in this generation would eventually grow old and would need people of working age to support them which would mean more immigration which would mean more old people  to support in the next generation and so on ad infinitum, a literal absurdity because any territory has a limit to the number of people it can support. In other words, confronting the problem of a demographic  imbalance would merely be delayed for a generation or two by immigration.

34. The housing crisis

Because it is one of the essentials of life, government clearly has a moral responsibility to ensure, directly or indirectly, that there is sufficient housing. It also acquires responsibility because it interferes considerably with the housing market, often with the effect that new building is discouraged, for example, by overly strict planning laws.

The government sets the rules for building new homes, renovating old ones and adapting non-residential buildings for residential use. The provision of taxpayers’ money for social housing is dependent on government. The rules by which social housing is allocated are the government’s rules. Planning permission is in the gift of politicians. The terms on which property may be rented and leased are set by them.

Then there are the measures which indirectly the housing market. To a very significant degree the government still controls the economy by the use of taxation, the indirect setting of interest rates through Bank Rate (the targets for the so-called independent Bank of England to meet – at present merely the inflation rate – are set by the Chancellor), the obligations placed on employers, subsidies to industries such as farming, the size of the public sector and the acceptance or otherwise of free trade obligations. All of these things feed through into the housing market by increasing or diminishing the amount of money in the public’s pockets and their confidence or otherwise in the future. Governments also determine the level of net immigration into a country – when it is running at the level Britain is currently experiencing substantially affects the demand for housing. In short, the cost and availability of housing is to a considerable degree determined by government policy.

The ongoing and seemingly inexorable rise in British property prices is rapidly making many parts of the country a desert for first time buyers (according to a Halifax survey the average house price has risen from £62,453 in the first quarter of £1996 to £179,425 in the third quarter of 2006, a rise of 187% – Daily Telegraph 28 10 2006) ). A combination of very low interest rates, lax lending rules by mortgage providers (some are lending up to 5 times salary), the introduction of easy to obtain “buy-to-let” mortgages, rising wages for substantial parts of the population, the continuing right-to-buy policy (RTB – the right of tenants to buy their council or other social housing properties at a discount) for those in social housing and a great diminishment in the building of new housing, both public and private, has led to a shortage of housing which can be bought by someone on average earnings in a majority of counties. In some areas of the country, most notably in the SE of England, prices have been further substantially inflated by the massive and ongoing immigration into Britain, most of which ends up in the South East.

The position in the rental sector mirrors that of home ownership. Social housing is in desperately short supply in those areas with higher property prices, particularly London, while reasonably priced private rental property is effectively non-existent. Every London Council has a waiting list of thousands for social housing.

The provision of housing, whether rented or purchased, that most people can afford is necessary for the simplest of practical reasons: every community, no matter how wealthy, requires large numbers of people who are not well paid. They must of necessity live fairly close to their jobs because, apart from considerations such as travelling time, those on small wages will not be able to afford the fares if they have to travel a long way. That means there must be reasonably priced homes for them to buy or rent not too far from their work.

There is also the moral and political case. There will always be housing segregation of people by price, but there is a big difference between not being able to afford to live in the most expensive parts of a town or city and not being able to live there at all. That is the point which is being rapidly approached for people on even above average incomes in a surprising number of English counties. In such circumstances free movement – one of the defining practices of a free society – becomes practically a dead letter. It is also very socially divisive, which is poison to the democratic process.

What can and should a government do to ease the problem in those areas where houses are in dangerously short supply? The first and most obvious move would be to stop mass immigration and restrict social housing to British citizens. Whether that could be done either legally or in practice if it could be done legally, while Britain remains within the EU is extremely dubious. However, other things could be done.

A Labour government of old (indeed, a Tory government of the fifties and sixties) would have turned to fiscal and practical measures to relieve the problem. They would have put controls on the amount of money mortgage providers can lend, used compulsory purchase to acquire  land in the property hotspots and engaged in an extensive programme of  council house building. Instead, we have the Blair government tortuously twisting and turning within the limits of the free market ideology with ill-thought plans to provide an inadequate number of “affordable homes” in the South East, without any mechanism to ensure  that they remain available to the people they are supposed to cater  for, that is, the likes of teachers and nurses. But even if the scheme for these “key workers” was successful, it would not address the general problem of house prices being out of the reach for the large majority of people working in the South East and it cannot be morally sustainable to say that only those with vital functions should be subsidised, a subsidy which would in effect subsidise those wealthy enough to live in the area who can afford to buy or rent a property at market rates because the services they received would only exist because of the public subsidy of “key workers” homes.

In areas with a shortage of housing, the Government should begin a massive programme of social house building with truly affordable rents, It should use compulsory purchase to acquire land being hoarded by private builders. If a builder has not built on land within a given period, it should become available for public housing or for another private builder who is willing to build on it. The Government should limit the amount of money a mortgage lender may advance to a level whereby a borrower can continue to pay if interest rates rise considerably. It should relax the planning controls for private developments. It should give priority in social housing to those local to the area and to workers with scarce and needed skills.

The question of RTB is a difficult one. I do not criticise anyone for exercising RTB because once such a scheme is in operation, for an individual not to exercise RTB is to place themselves at a massive disadvantage. It is also a fact that in a council tenant in a large block of flats may have a very real fear that if they do not buy, at some point in the future control of the block in which they live may be transferred to a less sympathetic and politically responsible landlord such as a housing association or a private developer, and they as a tenant would have absolutely no control over the landlord.

In areas where there is substantially more social housing than can be let, it makes sense to sell them and give purchasing priority to their tenants to maintain a community. But the selling off of council houses is self-defeating in areas where demand exceeds supply, which is now much of the country after twenty years of RTB and much diminished building of homes both publicly and privately owned. If council properties were sold at their full price it would be damaging enough, but the discount given pours oil onto the flames.

The Blair Government has (since January 2003) restricted the value of the RTB in areas of high demand such as London by reducing the maximum discount available to tenants. Such reductions are arguably open to legal challenge by existing tenants with a RTB. The RTB is a form of property in the same way that an option-to-buy can be considered a property. The question is whether the Government is entitled to arbitrarily reduce the value of the property. It has not been tested in the courts to date.

Similar considerations would arise if the RTB was simply abolished. The Government could certainly remove the RTB from future tenants, but if they were to try to remove the right from those who already have it, they could leave themselves open to legal challenge on the grounds that they were being dispossessed of property. If the courts upheld such a challenge, the Government would then be left with a choice of depriving only new tenants of the RTB or compensating those from whom they take an existing RTB. In the first case, this would greatly distort the effect of abolishing RTB – its full effect might not be felt for 40 years – or would result in a truly horrendous bill for the taxpayer as all those with the RTB would have to be compensated, not merely those who were actively seeking to exercise the right.

The desperation of the Blair Government is epitomised by their announcement on 6 January 2003 that it was considering taking to itself the power to compulsorily seize empty residential properties and let them. It is still kicking this idea around. This would probably be illegal because of the protection provided for private property under the Human Rights Act. Even if it is not, it is highly questionable whether property owned by private individuals should be compulsorily taken by the state in such an arbitrary manner. It is true that compulsory purchase has existed for many years, but this is different. It appears that the Government is thinking not of purchasing the properties for letting, but merely taking them for an unspecified period and letting them.

But even if these properties were to be compulsorily purchased before letting, it would go against the normal principle of compulsory purchase, namely that it should only be used where it is impossible to achieve a clearly defined general public good such as a new road or railway line which cannot otherwise be achieved. That is not the case with housing. To be a meaningful public exercise the forced seizures would have to be very substantial and thus not exceptional, and the increase of housing could be achieved by other means such as I have described previously.

35. Council housing

Nowhere is the hostility to direct provision seen more clearly than in the provision of council (municipal and state funded) housing. This type of housing was created to provide secure tenancies for decent accommodation at a rent the poorer members of society could afford. In the years after 1945 both Labour and Tory governments were committed to building a great number of such properties and ironically in view of their later Thatcherite policy it was a Tory Housing Minister, Harold Macmillan, who boasted in the mid 1950s that the Tory Government intended to build 300,000 council houses and flats in a year.

The rot for council housing set in under Margaret Thatcher. Many council properties (unsurprisingly disproportionately the more desirable ones) were transferred to private hands through Right To Buy (RTB). Most of the money from these sales was not used to build new council properties because central government forbad councils from doing so.

RTB had two consequences. It reduced the social housing stock and complicated the ownership and running of council properties. Councils were left with a housing stock which was gradually honeycombed with the private purchases of freeholds and leaseholds. This meant that a council had to establish a new relationship with their new leaseholders – a particularly fraught business in large blocks of flats where disputes over service charges, ground rents and external repair charges have been legion – which increased the costs of managing the properties.

More importantly RTB blurred the relationship, both legally and in the public’s mind, between what was public and what was private. There is a good deal of difference between saying here is a public asset and here is a part public part private asset. To move the entire housing stock of a council out of council control when it is just council housing is politically difficult because it is seen simply as the transfer of a public asset. That was particularly true in the 1980s when the public at large still had imprinted in them the idea that the state owning public goods for the public good was natural. But let that housing stock be sold off to private buyers bit by bit until, say, a quarter is privately owned, and the public no longer sees the council housing stock simply as a public asset. Indeed, with RTB much of the public sees possession of a council house as not a social good but something akin to a lottery win because of the substantial discount it brings – RTB has created a great deal of envy from those who have not been able to get a property. (This envy is misplaced in the majority of cases because, as many tenants who have bought properties in less desirable locations – especially on large council estates and in large blocks of flats – have found to their cost, the charges made by councils for service charges, grounds rents and most particularly external repairs – these are capped only for the first few years after purchase – are extortionate and the properties often next to impossible to sell at a reasonable price or even at all).

This blurring of the relationship between councils and council housing and the change in public attitude towards council housing has fitted neatly into the strategy of all governments since 1979 which has been to diminish the direct control of council housing by councils. The primary tactic used apart from RTB and a diminution of state funding for low rent housing, has been the transfer of government funding of most new build social housing from councils to Housing Associations which are non-profit self managing corporations. These, unlike council housing, are not subject to any degree of democratic control.

There has also been a push by governments to get existing council housing transferred to Housing Associations. This is somewhat tricky because tenants have by law to vote for such a transfer. To get round  this awkward and annoying piece of democracy the Blair Government has  been attempting transfer control of council housing stock into Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs). These are limited companies (limited by guarantee not by shares). The council housing stock is still owned by the council but the management of the housing stock is transferred to the ALMO board which is bound by company law. Thus the relationship between tenant and the council is completely changed because (1) local councillors no longer have any responsible for the management of the housing stock and (2) the ALMO board, being bound by company law, have to operate according to that law not a political agenda. Again, democratic control is broken.

A third tactic is to allow PFI companies into the management of part of a council’s housing stock. This again ties the hands of politicians because the contract with company means the council cannot act of its own volition.

The experience of tenants in Housing Associations and ALMOs has been mixed but there have been too many instances where rents and service charges have been raised to levels higher than those in directly owned council properties and where management of the property has left much to be desired. Worst, some Housing Associations and ALMOs have got into financial trouble. The only ways out of such a mess, after rents have been raised as high as they can, is for either a council to rescue the properties by taking them into direct control or for the properties to be placed in the hands of a private company, either through some form of PFI or outright sale of the property. The private option is the one almost all councils go for in such circumstances.

Whatever tactic is used – ALMOs, transfer to a Housing Association or PFI – it is always sold to tenants by councils insisting that remaining in direct council control is effectively a non-starter because central government money for renovations will not be available if that happens.

But even where council housing stock remains within council control there are an ongoing problems. The “affordable” rents plan of the Blair government will raise rents to considerably over the next ten years. In addition, council are increasingly seeking to charge additionally for services such security, cleaning and caretaking.

Service charges have the advantage for politicians of allowing them to say they have kept rents down to a lower level whilst effectively raising the rents. In addition, there are probably fewer legal restrictions attached to levying and raising service charges than there are attached to raising rents.

Council housing was never intended to make a profit for central Government or even local councils. It was social provision for the poor. This appears to have been lost sight of by Government, viz: “Your average council home generates roughly £2,500 a year in rent, £1,000 of this goes on management costs, £500 for repairs, leaving £1,000 being siphoned off by Government. Why can’t councils keep this sum?”. (Labour MP Austin Mitchell “Defend council housing” Camden New Journal 30 Jan 2003).

If nothing is done to prevent the privatisation/commercialisation of council housing, I sincerely wonder how long it will be before the poor are unable to afford council housing in London.

36. Education

Education is a first rate example of how quasi-commercialism can corrupt. It was a pincer movement from the bottom and the top, from schools to universities.

Prior to the end of the 1980s our universities had been funded for decades by the University Grants Committee (UGC) which was made up  academics. The UGC received an annual sum of money allocated by the Government to higher education. The UGC then allocated this to the universities. This was not a perfect system because the academics tended to favour the older universities over the older regardless of performance. However, broadly speaking it worked and most importantly there was no pressure on universities to tout for students regardless of quality. This in turn meant that academic standards were maintained. Indeed, the newer universities were very sparing in their granting of degrees because they wished to build their academic reputation.

The Thatcher Government changed all that. They first cut in real terms the funding of given to the UGC, then abolished the UGC in 1987 to be replaced by the University Funding Council (UTC) which was manned not by academics but businessmen. The money was then primarily attached to  the individual – a second criterion based on the quality of research was also introduced but it was the numbers of students which brought in the large majority of the money. This forced universities to actively compete for students. This might not have mattered too much if the numbers of students had remained static but it did not because the Thatcher Government began the push towards dramatically expanding student numbers without a corresponding increase in funding. This meant that spending per student was reduced and universities had to get as many students as they could to maintain income. That alone caused universities to drop their standards, both in terms of who they accepted and the class of degrees they awarded, because universities with a reputation for high entry standards and strict marking of degrees risked being shunned for those with a reputation for being laxer. To take on stark statistic: in 1970 less than 40% of degreesawarded by British universities were firsts and upper seconds: the figure for these classes of degree awarded in 2006 is over 60%.

The massive increase in student numbers from the late 1980s meant that the average quality of student was lowered. This is not a subjective judgement. IQ is distributed within the British population approximately as follows: IQ below 90 25%, IQ 90-110 50%, IQ Above 110 25%. In 1970 less than 10% of school-leavers went to university. They could all comfortably come from those in the 111+ range (they will not have done but most would). Raise the numbers to the current level of around 40% and as a simply matter of arithmetic, many must have IQs of less than 111 and because a significant part of those with above average IQs will not go to university, there must be significant numbers now going to university with IQs below of 100. The difficulty of degree courses had to be lowered to cater for the lass able.

Because the increase in student numbers has not been met by a proportionate increase in state funding,  staff-student ratios have increased, teaching time for each student reduced, both in terms of direct instruction and the time available to staff for marking.

To these attacks on university standards were added eventually the toxic effects of the poison injected into the opposite end of the education system. “Progressive, child-centred education” really gained a hold in the 1960s. Anti-competitive and ideologically driven, the grammar schools were first almost destroyed, ironically rescuing the public schools which were on their financial knees by the mid-sixties because of the drain of middleclass pupils to free grammar schools, and teaching methods gradually corrupted so that children were not challenged over errors and all opinions (at least the politically correct ones) became equally “valid”.

The progressive ideal was greatly furthered by the introduction in the 1980s of a single school-leaving exam (the GCSE) to replace the CSE and O Level’. Had assessment remained entirely by final (synoptic) exams, The introduction of the GCSE would still have been mistaken because no examination can meaningfully assess the broad range of ability displayed by those who sit it – there has been a tacit recognition of this by the inclusion of questions and course tasks of different difficulty within a GCSE subject and candidates can choose to do the hard or the easy and this is reflected in their grades. The exam consequently says nothing about the standard of the candidate as such because the mark tells you nothing about the difficulty of the tasks attempted: for example someone taking just the harder questions in an exam could score the same mark as someone attempting only the easy  questions.

Mistaken as the exam was in principle, it was further damaged by the inclusion of substantial amounts of coursework – cue plagiarism and third party out-of-school help – and coaching by teachers, licit and llicit (the licit includes teachers being able to take an initial piece of coursework by pupils and making suggestions for its re-writing) and the use of modular exams (exams which tested only part of the course) which can be retaken several times during a course.

The school examination system has been further contaminated by the various examination boards becoming nakedly commercial bodies who compete greedily for candidates. The result is similar to that experienced by universities: standards have been dropped to attract business. The old practice of setting percentages for those gaining a grade and for those passing was dropped allowing any number of people to gain any grade. Freed of this constraint grades have inexorably risen year after year for both GCSEs and the university entrance A Levels. So bad has the inflation become that A* grades had to be introduced because A grades were so plentiful that they allowed no distinction to be made between the better candidates. Predictably, theA* grade has now met the same fate as the simple A.

Finally, because so many more pupils were taking GCSE than O Level, the standard of the exam had to be reduced for the same reason that the standard of the degree was reduced: the number of less able students taking the courses increased dramatically. The dire failure of GCSE has begun to be acknowledged by even the Blair Government with first the Education Secretary Alan Johnson announcing that coursework would be reduced in some subjects and abolished in a few such as maths (the Times 6 10 2006) and then a junior education minister Lord Adonis announcing that consideration was being given to allowing state schools to substitute the International GCSE (IGCSE) for the GCSE (Daily  Telegraph 25 10 2006). The IGSCE is an exam closer to the old O  Level and is taken by pupils outside Britain and increasingly by private schools in Britain.

The upshot of all this is a decline in academic standards generally. The decline of GCSE standards meant A Level pupils began their A Level courses less well prepared than they had been previously which meant A-Levels had to be reduced in difficulty which meant that those arriving at university were less well prepared and the degree courses had to be made easier.

A further pernicious consequence of the gigantic expansion of university numbers is the abolition of student grants and the imposition of tuition fee to fund the much greater numbers. . This is not only discouraging students from poorer homes – there is now a lower percentage of workingclass students  in the British university population than there was in the 1960s (although many  more because of the increase in student numbers)  – and leaving most students with considerable debts, but also creating a mentality amongst students, politicians, educationalists and indeed the general public, that education is only a tool to obtain a better job, that it has no general value.

The irony is that even at the economic level this mentality is at odds with reality. Successive governments have claimed that the lifetime earnings of a graduate are on average £450,000 greater than that of a non-graduate. This may have been true of graduates before the great expansion in student numbers but it is not now. The £450,000 has been revised to £150,000, a pretty small sum divided by the 40 years of the average working life. Of course that figure, even if it is true, hides a multitude of difference, with some degrees being next to worthless either because of the subject or the class of degree obtained.

37. Healthcare

The NHS was founded on the principle that all treatment should be free at the point of use regardless of income. The amazing thing is that 58 years after its foundation the principle is essentially intact. We have prescription charges and charges for dentistry and the work of opticians. However, even these charges for the poor, old age pensioners and children are either considerably mitigated or waived completely. For the vast majority of illnesses and injuries NHS treatment is available and no one who is entitled to and receives it need fear that they will be bankrupted by the cost of the treatment and care or that at some point the NHS will say no more treatment because it is too expensive. There are increasing disputes over the funding of expensive treatment, especially drugs, but these affect only a tiny minority of patients. The sole major NHS blot is dentistry where it is difficult to find dentists who take NHS patients in many parts of the country.

But the NHS ethos is under severe attack. The introduction of the “single market” by Margaret Thatcher and then the Blair government’s version of “money following the patient”, league tables of medical outcomes at hospitals and schemes such as hospital trusts being granted “foundation status” (which allows them greater freedom of action) are seriously damaging the idea of a national health service, the stress being on “national”. Hospital trusts are now competing with each other for both patients and the “right” type of patients, the “right” type being those most likely to be easily treatable and to have a good response to treatment.

“Money following the patient” has also resulted in a significant number of hospital trusts running into financial trouble and different areas of the country offering varying levels of treatment, the “post-code lottery”. The variation has been amplified by devolution which allows the devolved assemblies, especially the Scottish, to allocate money independently of Westminster. This has resulted in some treatments being offered in Scotland and Wales but not in England, for example drugs such as Aricept, Reminyl and Exelon which are used to treat Altzeimers are being denied to early stage Altzeimers sufferers while it is available to such people in Scotland and Wales (Daily Telegraph 18 10 2006).

Then there are the targets for waiting times which distort clinical judgements because hospitals begin to treat the conditions which reduce government targeted waiting lists rather than the conditions which clinical judgement would suggest should be given priority. Waiting list targets also result in hospitals fudging figures by devices such as putting people on waiting lists on lists euphemistically called something else, or moving people in Accident and Emergency out of A and E when they have exceeded the target waiting time and putting them onto trolleys in corridors to wait for treatment, which device allows the person to be classified as having been dealt with in A and E within the target time. So desperate has the Blair Government been to reduce waiting lists that it has even adopted a policy of exporting patients to continental hospitals where their treatment will be paid for by the NHS. (This policy could lead to far more NHS patients being referred abroad with the taxpayer paying than the Government anticipated because challenges are being made in the British courts to refusals by individual British health authorities to fund particular foreign treatment.)

In the past twenty years the NHS has almost certainly been subject to more politically initiated upheaval than any other taxpayer funded body, with both Tory and Labour governments forcing major change after major change on the NHS. The introduction of policies such as “the single market” and foundation status” for hospitals have caused profound administrative changes, with people having to re-apply for their jobs over and over again as each new regime is introduced and a general sense of impermanence and staff insecurity has been created. This sense of uncertainty and insecurity extends to new medical staff such as doctors, nurses and physiotherapists. Some years ago the Blair Government correctly identified the underproduction of such people in Britain and quite correctly acted to increase their numbers, both by providing training places and by significantly increasing NHS pay scales. This has had the effect of producing large numbers of these previously scarce medical staff from Britain. All well and good. But supply is only one half of the equation. The Government neglected the demand side and the upshot is that in 2006 there are large numbers of expensively trained medical staff unable to find work within the NHS.

The reasons they cannot find work are four. First, large numbers of foreign medical staff have been recruited and they are still in position. Second, Britain’s membership of the EU means that any medically qualified person from any EU state can compete with the British for jobs within the NHS (large numbers from outside the EU are also competing for the jobs because of Britain’s generally lax job entry requirements for non-EU foreigners coming to the UK). Third, the shortage of money in many hospital trusts and the demand by the Government that each trust balances its books, means that trusts are cutting staff, for example, the Epsom and St Helier Hospital Trust which serves 650,000 people in Surrey and South London, are looking to lose 25% of their staff by early 2008 (Metro 24 10 2006). Fourth, insufficient numbers of particular types of posts have been created, for example, training posts in hospitals for junior doctors.

The general utility of the NHS for patients has been reduced and will, if government plans go through, be much further reduced by a policy of “consolidating” hospital care by closing smaller hospitals and concentrating resources on a relatively small number of “super-hospitals.” Many smaller hospitals have already been much reduced – especially their A and E services – or even closed and many more cuts are in the pipeline. For example, the Daily Telegraph reported (17 10 2006) that 80 cottage hospitals in England were marked for closure. The rationale for such “consolidation” is that smaller hospitals cannot provide the same range of sophisticated treatments as a much larger hospital. This may be true but most treatments are of the simpler kind which can be dealt with in the smaller hospitals and any really difficult case sent to a specialist centre. The consequence of such a policy is that patients have to travel further and further for hospital treatment, often fifty miles or more. There is also some grounds for believing the closures are politically motivated because the Sunday Telegraph (22 10 2006) “surveyed 177 hospitals already affected or likely to be affected by cuts, [and] revealed that Conservative and Liberal Democrats seats are two and a half times more likely to be affected by cuts than Labour seats.”

A special case of hospital closures for “clinical reasons” are the military hospitals, all of which bar one have been closed and the one remaining is waiting decommissioning (Daily Telegraph 17 10 2006). This has meant troops returning injured from places such as Iraq and Afghanistan have been forced to use ordinary NHS hospitals. This has caused problems of morale, security and access to treatment – servicemen best recover psychologically when they are with their fellows, there is nothing to stop any anti-war radical attacking or abusing them in hospital and the treatment they need is not always immediately available, with servicemen having in some cases to join NHS waiting lists.

An unpleasant mentality is also distorting the notion that the NHS is a national health service. Increasingly, politicians, the media and medics are taking the line that treatment can be legitimately withheld from people wicked enough to disobey the official disapproval of smoking, drinking, getting fat and so forth. For example, Norfolk Primary Care Trust has decided that confirmed smokers are to be taken off waiting lists for “all non-urgent operations such as hip replacements….[because] Smokers have three times the complications as non-smokers”. (Metro 23 10 2006) I think anyone needing a hip replacement would dispute the operation’s definition as non-urgent. It is worth adding that the story mentions the Trust is “£50 million in the red” and an unkind soul might conclude that the withdrawal of treatment to smokers is connected to the debt. Nonetheless, the fact that smokers have been targeted speaks volumes for the ideologically driven mentality within the present day NHS. It is only activities which come within the ambit of official disapproval and moralising that are the subject of such withdrawal of treatment – it is noticeable that no politician or health trust has suggested that treatment for AIDs or HIV should be withheld because it is in most instances the consequence of the individual’s behaviour.

The moralising which bolsters the supposed clinical case for withdrawing treatment from certain groups runs along the lines that people are being selfish and irresponsible by smoking, drinking,getting fat etc. Wild claims are made for deaths supposedly due to such behaviour – any smoker who dies at a ripe old age is as likely as not to be classified as dying from a smoking related disease. All this supposedly self-inflicted illness is portrayed as being a massive burden on society and especially on the NHS. Most absurdly and dishonestly, smokers are claimed to be a drain on the taxpayer despite the fact that tobacco taxes greatly exceed any additional costs smokers might place on the NHS.

But do smokers, drinkers and the fat, who on average die younger than those who do not display such traits, actually impose extra costs on the taxpayer? Writing in the Sunday Telegraph (22 1 2006) the historian Niall Ferguson baldly and erroneously claimed those who smoked, drank and got fat are being antisocial because they “tend to expire slowly and expensively”. Most do not and whatever cost to the taxpayer arises from such people it pales into insignificance compared with those who live to a ripe old age. Not only do the latter draw pensions and benefits for far longer than the shorter lived smokers, drinkers and the fat, but the most costly of NHS patients are those who live to extreme old age for they frequently end up in hospitals or nursing homes for months and years. The most antisocial thing a person can do from the taxpayers’ point of view is live to an extreme old age.

The most fundamental threat to the NHS is the creeping privatization of the NHS which ranges from the logistical and administrative to the medical. Hospitals are being built under PFI and their maintenance placed in private hands. Hospital meals are provided by private contractors. Medical supplies to hospitals will soon be distributed by the German firm DHL. Most disturbingly, private medical firms, often American, are being granted massive contracts to take patients away from the NHS, a policy made all the more dangerous for the long-term security of the NHS because the treatments the private firms take are the simpler ones. The NHS are left with a reduced patient base for the simpler operations, which can result in the closure of NHS departments or even hospitals, and leaves the NHS with the more difficult and expensive cases to treat.

But even after the chaos wrought by governments over the past twenty years and the vast amounts of additional money pushed into the NHS to no great visible benefit by the Blair Government – the Health Secretary Patricia Hewitt recently made the astonishing admission that “For all the extra money, all the extra staff and all the extra patients treated, NHS productivity has remained almost unchanged” (Daily Telegraph 21 9 2006) – the NHS still represents magnificent value. Anyone who has ever had private medical insurance will know how incomplete the cover is. Common exemption clauses are a two year waiting period for existing complaints to be covered, a complete exclusion of psychiatric treatment and severe restrictions on aftercare, which is frequently excluded when active medical treatment ends.

Those who have had chronic and serious illness soon discover that the amount of private active treatment and aftercare they can obtain is considerably less than they imagined. Many begin courses of treatment which end before the utility of a treatment is exhausted. They then transfer to NHS care. Frequently operations are funded by their insurance but not the subsequent nursing which is undertaken by the NHS.

Those in Britain who laud the idea of private insurance as a substitute for taxpayer funded health service should examine the effects of such a system in the richest country in the world, the USA. Around 40% of the population have no health insurance. Even those with insurance find themselves left high and dry more often than not. Here are the words of a British journalist living in New York, Zoe Heller,from the Daily Telegraph London 6/5/2000:

“One of my best friends was short of cash one month and  let her insurance lapse. That same month, she was diagnosed with breast cancer. Seven years later, she is still paying off the credit card debts. Another uninsured friend was rushed to hospital for emergency intestinal  surgery. She will be paying her bill on an installment plan.  She counts herself lucky that the hospital has a relatively liberal policy about treating uninsured  patients…”

A recent study established that one in four of every  American declaring bankruptcy in 1999 cited illness or injury  as the main reason for his financial problems and that of  that group, roughly half were insured. In other words, paying extortionate sums to the insurance companies  doesn’t protect you from financial ruin if you happen to fall ill with something serious and expensive enough.

Even the rich in the US find healthcare beyond their means if the treatment is long and serious. The Superman actor, Christopher Reeve, one of the highest paid Hollywood actors, had exhausted his savings within two years of the terrible injury which left him paralysed. Private medicine will guarantee virtually any treatment – if you can afford to pay for it. That is the long and short of it. The NHS provides a remarkably wide range of healthcare free at the point of use. It mitigates strongly against “unfairness”.

The other great threat to the NHS is the media which is only too willing to feed the public with NHS “horror stories”. A good example occurred in the Sunday Telegraph recently. On 27 August 2006 their front page ran “Blunders by NHS kill thousands of patients a year”. Does anyone seriously imagine that any healthcare system in the advanced world does not suffer such casualties or that private medicine is generally more efficient or safer? Of course the NHS makes many mistakes and these add up to a sizeable bald global figure but when you are catering for a population of 60 million that is scarcely surprising.

The real question to ask is why is no public audit of the safety and efficiency of private medicine ever done? If it was it would make interesting reading because private medicine in Britain is notoriously prone to pushing any bungled private treatments back on the NHS without compensation. It also makes little investment in private sector facilities because it can rent NHS facilities for more complicated treatments, facilities which are purchased at well below any realistic cost. Private medicine also makes no contribution towards the cost of training medical staff. In short, private medicine in the UK lives off the back of the NHS and the taxpayer.

The Health Secretary should stop private medicine taking up scarce NHS resources. Even if private medical treatment using NHS resources was paid for in full, it does not follow that would be a good thing for the NHS because the money received may not adequately compensate for  the loss of the NHS facility during the time it is in private use. This is particularly the case where complex treatments, especially surgery, are concerned because the number of NHS facilities able to offer the treatment will be very limited. It is worth mentioning that a sizeable proportion of private medical treatments in the UK, especially the more demanding cases such as those of serious heart disease, involve the treatment of foreigners. It is morally indefensible toallow NHS resources to be hired to be used on a foreigner rather than used to treat a British citizen on the NHS. Where there is genuine spare capacity in the NHS, private medical providers should be charged a realistic price for it. In cases where private medical treatment goes wrong, the private medical provider should pay for the remedial NHS treatment.

The NHS consultants would doubtless froth and whine about reduced private work opportunities and it might be necessary to give their NHS pay a very large boost. But there are not that many of them and the cost would not be vast in the context of total NHS spending.

Apart from making private medicine pay its way, the NHS ideally needs to (1) not only stop further privatisation but to take back into its direct control that which has already been lost; (2) ensure that enough medical staff of all sorts are trained in this country and NHS posts reserved for them; (3) end the practice of money following patients; (4) fund NHS healthcare on the basis of an area’s population and demographic distribution; (5) retain and where necessary build new local hospitals; (6) restrict treatment to the hospital within a health authority area; (7) lay down a national schedule of treatments which must be offered throughout the NHS and (8) restrict NHS treatment other than emergency treatment to British citizens.

No 8 is necessary because a great part of the problem for the NHS in areas such as London is that it is being overwhelmed by the large number of foreigners who one way or the other either have a right to NHS treatment or who obtain it because NHS staff are unwilling to check whether some is entitled to NHS treatment. Of course, there are supposedly reciprocal arrangements for Britons to obtain health treatment abroad but the balance of advantage is all against Britain because the range and quality of provision in many of the countries which provide supposedly reciprocal treatment is inferior to that of the NHS. There are also potentially vastly more foreigners eligible for NHS treatment than Britons eligible for treatment abroad, for example,  400million non-British EU state citizens.

That is the ideal. How much of it could be achieved as things stand is debatable because our EU membership and other treaties severely restrict control over both our borders and what any British government may do. For example, while we remain in the EU we cannot stop any person legally resident in the EU from coming here (apart from special cases of crime or terrorism) and either working for the NHS or claiming NHS treatment.

The NHS goes to the heart of what should be public and what should be private. The prime distinction is between service and profit. Public provision is the provision of necessary services to everyone, which private provision never has nor can supply: private provision is simply the provision of services to those who can pay. This seems to have been lost sight of by successive governments.

Let the NHS become anything other than what it is, a national health service free at the point of use and you will never get it back. It was created in the extraordinary circumstances of the immediate post-war national solidarity when both the electors and the politicians were determined that Lloyd George’s boast of creating “A land fit for heroes” should not be mocked twice.

It is vital that the NHS survives because even with present life expectancies, there are going to be an awful lot of people who will need intensive medical support in their extreme old age. The cost of that will almost certainly exhaust the resources of even those who have made seemingly substantial private provision for their old age.

The NHS has many faults, but for most of the population, it is a better and more complete supplier of medicine than private medicine will ever be or could be.

38. The Post Office and Royal Mail

The treatment of the linked organisations of the Post Office and the Royal Mail epitomises the current state of public provision. The Post Office network has long been a source of social glue throughout Britain. It has provided not merely postal but a wide variety of public and quasi-public services acting as a conduit for such things as the payment of state benefits, applications for state issued licences, the payment of bills and the easy transfer of money. Recent governments have taken a significant amount of that work away from post office by such policies as encouraging the payment of benefits though bank accounts and the removal from post offices of applications for TV licences, which has made them less viable as self financing enterprises.

It might seem inevitable or efficient that benefit payments (including the state pension) should be made through bank accounts, but that ignores two things. First, it takes no account of the general utility of post offices, which utility could be judged to mean that the retention of benefit payments through the post office was justified because it helped maintain the post office network. Second, even today many people either do not have bank accounts or do not wish to have their benefits paid through a bank. The Daily Telegraph (25 10 2006) reported that two million pensioners rely on Post Office Card Accounts to draw their pensions and All Pay, one of the businesses which deal with Post Office over the counter bill payments, has stated that “Even though lots of people have some form of bank accounts, there are all sorts of reasons why people want to pay in cash….If post offices close, millions of people will be under served.”(Daily telegraph 21 10 2006).

Governments have been steadily closing main and sub post offices for the past twenty years but the pace of closure is increasing. The Blair Government is currently making noises which suggest that the current £150 million annual taxpayer subsidy may be curtailed or even dropped altogether. This would result in very large numbers of sub post offices and quite a few main post offices being closed. This would have a considerable effect on many local communities, particularly those in rural areas where often they are an essential part of a village because they will combine the function of sub-post office with that of village shop. Let the post office go and the shop will go. There is also a modern problem, namely, the increasing lack of outlets in rural areas and the poorer parts of towns and cities where someone can withdraw their money. Banks are rapidly deserting both, especially rural parts, and often the only place left where someone can withdraw cash is the local post office.

The fact that British governments over past fifteen years ago have been so casual in their maintenance of the post office network simply reflects the general political mentality of the modern British political elite which no longer sees politics as making pragmatic policies for the entire country but of dancing to an ideology (neo-liberalism) which reduces life to nothing more than economic relationships. This mentality means that the modern British politician does not ask when confronting an issue such as the maintenance of the post office network “what social benefit does this bring?” but “is it profitable.” The fact that we currently have a Labour government which has relatively little support in rural areas suggests that party politics may also play its part in ignoring the interests of the rural population.

This causal ignoring of the interests of some sections of the population can be seem more generally in the failure of Government to take into account the difficulties of those who through a lack of money, knowledge or intellect do not have access to the internet. This lack is increasingly making day-to-day living highly inconvenient as more and more organisations either insist on dealing with people through the internet or make it very difficult to do otherwise. Millions of people are in this position yet the government often seems oblivious to the fact that so many have not joined the digital age, a classic example being the decision to end the analogue TV signal in a few years. The idea that millions of OAPs will be able to negotiate the change from analogue to digital comfortably is fanciful  (there is also the likelihood that substantial numbers of people will not be able to get digital TV when the switch is made because even the engineers estimate that 2% of the country will not be able to receive the signal).

The Blair Government’s attitude towards the Royal Mail displays the profit-is-all mentality as well. They have not had the nerve to go for outright privatisation, but this may well come in the next few years – the Royal Mail chairman Alan Leighton, is currently lobbying for Royal Mail workers to be given a 20% share of the business. (Daily telegraph 14 10 2006). If the scheme goes through it would presumably make it much less likely that Royal Mail employees would resist outright privatisation as that would improve the market for their shares.

The hand of the EU is also to be found in Royal Mail. As mentioned before, the EU competition rules have forced Royal Mail to compete with private companies for much of their business and adopt inconvenient practices such as having to measure letters because Royal Mail can no longer do what it has done for a century and half, deliver letters under a certain weight no matter what their size.

39. Can we afford better public services?

The GDP of the UK is approximately £1.1 trillion (note trillion not billion – a trillion is a thousand thousand million). In the financial year 2006/7 the British government will spend approximately £500 billion. The size of the economy and the British budget alone suggests that there is considerable scope for economies and changed priorities.

 There are immediate substantial savings which could be made. The Treasury per capita funding of the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish is approximately £1,400 pa per head greater than the per capita funding of the English. If the Celts’ funding was reduced to the English level – note to not below the English level – that would save £14 billion.

Foreign Aid is scheduled to rise to above £6 billion pa in the next few years. After 40 years or so since decolonisation it is reasonable to ask why the British taxpayer is still funding supposedly independent states.

Britain’s present contribution to the EU is around £12 billion. About two thirds returns to Britain leaving a deficit of £4 billion. However, much of the £8 billion is only spent because we are within the EU, for example the agricultural support payments. It is not unreasonable to assume that at least half of the £8 billion would not need to be spent if we were not in the EU. Leaving the EU could plausibly represent a saving of £8 billion. Thus, those three areas alone – the over-funding of the Celtic Fringe, foreign Aid and the EU – could produce a saving of around £28 billion.

What departmental reductions could reasonably be made? Some departments are frankly difficult to justify at all in terms of any useful activity, for example, Trade and Industry, while others have large swathes of administration which exist only because of every modern government’s mania for trying to regulate everything, for example, the Department of the Environment. Such departments could be much reduced or lost altogether if a government was brave enough to make a bonfire of unnecessary regulations. It is also true that even in those public organisations which do a thoroughly necessary job, there is often genuine overmanning, ie, overmanning beyond that required to cope with all likely circumstances, to be found. For example, the heavylayers of bureaucracy inflicted on the NHS by “reforms” over the past twenty years could be substantially reduced if the “front end”financial controls advocated in section ? were introduced.

At the level of strategic decisions money could often be better spent. Take defence and large computer projects. Our armed forces are being shaped not to defend Britain but to engage in action abroad. A good example of this is the ordering of two giant aircraft carriers at a cost (with planes) estimated to be £13 billion, not far short of our present annual defence budget. Such carriers are also hideously expensive to run and require large numbers of ships to defend and supply them. They are also vulnerable to missile attack. By ordering them the whole defence budget has been distorted. Moreover, they have absolutely no military value in defending the UK for any defending aircraft can be launched from land. If our defence forces were restricted to the defence of the UK, our present defence spending would be sufficient at worst and at best might prove more than was necessary and could be cut.

Large scale government computer projects have been an unmitigated disaster, from passports to the ongoing farce that is the NHS computer system which is intended to link every GPs’ records with every hospital. Any large computer system changes the structure of how an organisation works. It means that the people have to work to the machines’ limitations rather than doing the job as best they can.

This means that vast amounts of resources of both money and manpower have to be devoted to training staff, maintaining the system and coping with thesystem when it fails. That alone should raise a question in any organisation as to whether any particular computerisation is wise or necessary. When an organisation is as large as the average government body, the questions looms very large indeed because the costs of such systems and their failures are vast.

Take the case of the NHS system mentioned above. The estimated upfront costs of this ran into several billions initially. That cost has already multiplied a few times and doubtless will continue rising. It is quite possible that if the system is ever completed more than £10 billion will have been spent – and that takes no account of the hidden costs of restructuring the organisation to accommodate the system. Even if it was a success the question has to be asked was it money well spent? Does it really add much to the smooth running of the NHS for hospital staff to be able to access GPs records immediately or GPs to be able to access hospital records? I would suggest it does not. If hospitals or GPs need such information they can get it rapidly by using email. Would not the œ10 billion or more have been better spent keeping wards and hospitals open?

The other problem with large-scale government computer systems is that they do not work properly or even at all. There is every indication from IT experts that this NHS system will not work as a national system and that all the taxpayer will get for his or her money are some remnants of the system which will work within limited areas such as a single hospital trust.

There is also a role for one-off hypothecated taxes, that is,  taxes earmarked for a definite purpose. Suppose £10 billion extra is needed to build and renovate hospitals. A government could impose a new tax to be collected once only to raise that amount. Most taxpayers would support such a tax if it was going to a cause of which they approved. It would also avoid the bane of the taxpayer that once a tax is imposed it normally remains indefinitely. As such a tax would be a one-off, it would not suffer the usual objections to hypothecated taxes, such as the fact that the amount raised could not be guaranteed to correspond with the amount needed for the designated purpose or that people would only support hypothecated taxes for popular causes if all taxes were hypothecated.

Finally, there a great deal of money to be saved by removing all the politically correct trappings from within public service. To give an idea of the scale of that expenditure consider the case of the Metropolitan Police. Last year they spent on “equality and diversity training” £187 million, one sixth of the force’s budget (London Evening Standard 27 10 2006). Apart from the money spent, there is also the loss of efficiency and morale created by the habit public servants have had to develop of constantly watching what they say and do.

40. Does social provision corrupt?

One of the favourite arguments against social provision is that it corrupts the receiver by making them dependent and ultimately damages society by significantly reducing initiative and making people selfish. The facts do not bear this out as a general proposition – there will always be some free riders in a welfare state. Today we have a society in which the self-help gospel is constantly preached, people work longer and longer hours and most mothers work at least part time. This has produced a society in which the birthrate has dropped well below replacement rate. During the period when state provision was most heartily endorsed as part of the national furniture (1945-1979) the birthrate was above replacement rate. The ability and willingness tobreed is surely the ultimate indicator of the health of a society.

But that is not to say all social provision is benign. It is one thing for a society to provide those things which most cannot be reasonably be expected to provide for themselves, but quite another to build dependency into the system. That is what has happened in Britain where more than half the population now draw some sort of public monetary support. Some of those benefits are part of the legitimate armoury of social provision, for example, child benefit, unemployment benefit, sickness benefit and old age pensions. Others are not.

The most pernicious of the current benefits is Working Families Tax Credit, which can be drawn by families with a household income of over £50,000. This is a scheme in a long line of similar ones dating back to the old Poor Law of 1601. It is the granting of state money to those in work. The best known Poor Law example was the Speenhamland System  of the 18th century which allowed outdoor relief to those (primarily agricultural labourers) whose wages fell below a certain level. The result was predictable. Where the scheme operated employers dropped the wages they paid to the level where the Parish (which administered the Poor Law) made up the wages through outdoor relief to those whose wages were lowered.

The Speenhamland System was a subsidy to employers. So is the Working Families Tax Credit. All it results in is employers paying lower  wages. That is not because they are all evil grasping men or women.  Lower wages are forced on all employers because there will always be a substantial number of employers who will take advantage of opportunity offered by any government subsidy to lower their wages. That means all employers must do so to compete.

Apart from the fact that it siphons off large amounts of taxpayers money, Working Families Tax Credit is a pernicious form of subsidy because it makes employers who employ many low wage workers dependent on its continuance, which obviously cannot be guaranteed. Either a  future British Government may decide to abolish it of their own free will or tax harmonisation within the EU may force them to do so.

If it is abolished, such companies will be left stranded because they will have to pay higher wages. Moreover, the subsidy they are receiving now will cause them to be less efficient than they would have been without it. On the other side of the employment coin, families receiving the benefit will also be left high and dry if it ends, for they will have altered their lives according to the income they have received.

This type of structural dependency has evil effects beyond the economic because it can distort the democratic process. If sufficient people become dependent on a benefit such as tax credits they may make it next to impossible for any party wishing to be elected to propose its abolition because to have such a policy will drive anyone in receipt of the benefit to another party which supports its continuance.

41. The future of public provision

The present outlook for public provision is dismal going on hopeless. The Blair Government, having aimlessly thrown vast amounts of extra money at direct
public services such as the NHS to no good effect, is attempting to cover its political blushes by funding much future public provision through private finance and private corporate involvement.

The policy is being introduced into every conceivable part of our public service from the running of prisons to the administration of NHS hospitals. This provokes remarkably little political debate despite the fact that it not only radically changes the relationship between the public and the service they are paying for, but has already proved to be more expensive than direct provision in many instances. Despite the ever more dismaying experience of railway privatisation, Blair’s Government in its second term permitted the part-privatisation of the Air Traffic Control system and careered on in mindless fashion with plans to part privatise the London Tube system and to introduce private finance into a multiplicity of public enterprises from roads to social housing. On the supply side of the public service coin, Labour increasingly stands aside from providing any new direct public provision, no matter how obvious the need in areas such as housing.

Despite David Cameron’s “Tories aren’t complete bastards, honest!” propaganda campaign, the Conservative Opposition are still immobilized in the morass of Thatcherism. Look behind Cameron’s “right on” language and it is clear that the party still instinctively feels the welfare state is bloated and views the direct state provision of goods or services as a recipe for waste and incompetence ay best and as ideologically unsound at worst. The Tory Party continues to advocate private provision wherever they dare and private finance in public projects for virtually everything else in those areas where they do not have the courage to go the whole hog and say that the individual should be left to fend for themselves. The distance between NuTory soft words and policy was nicely encapsulated by Cameron’s portrayal of himself at the 2006 Tory Party Conference as “the defender of the NHS”, while remaining quite content to allow ever more private business involvement in the NHS.

There is a further fly in the direct provision ointment. EU Competition rules are forcing Britain to destroy or greatly reduce in effectiveness some aspects of public provision, for example valuable and justified public monopolies such as Royal Mail (dying the death of a thousand competitive cuts – see section 38) and the 192 directory enquiries system (abolished).

The EU is also threatening public provision through attempts to restrict public spending, for example, Reuters reports (12 10 2006) that the European Commission (EC) is attempting to reduce public spending throughout the EU to prepare for the “pensions crisis” which is supposed to engulf the EU over the next half century.

The EC claims that unless something is done, public debt within the EU will treble to 200 per cent of GDP by 2050. This is reckless scaremongering because no one can meaningfully predict demographic trends that far into the future, let alone the immense economic changes that will happen over such a period. Sadly, that fact will have little bearing on whether the EC will be successful in their quest to cut public spending because that will be a political decision not a rational one. As cuts in public spending would fit neatly with the present “public service bad, private business good” ideology adopted by so many governments within the EU, there is a fair chance the EC will be at least partially successful.

If the EC is successful, any cuts in public spending would in theory bear heaviest on members of the Euro (and thus not Britain) because Euro members are legally committed to keeping their deficits within limits (pause for hollow laugh). However, past experience suggests that whether Britain is a member of the Euro or not, she will find the same rules imposed on her by EU hook or by EU crook to ensure “equality” throughout the EU. (It is worth noting that Britain is already morally committed to keeping within the Euro public spending deficit limits).

Mass immigration is also undermining public provision. It does this in two ways. First, immigrants compete for the social provision Britain offers because the British system allows many millions of foreigners who have not contributed anything to enjoy the full benefits of the considerable public provision available to a British citizen. Any person granted the right to reside permanently in Britain qualifies. That includes some 400 million EU nationals and anyone else legally resident within the EU. British citizens have reciprocal rights in other EU countries but these rights merely require each EU member state to grant the same social provision rights to Britons as they do their own citizens. The social provision in many of the EU states is, as a package, considerably inferior to that offered in Britain. It is also true that far more foreign EU nationals settle in Britain than Britons settle in the rest of the EU – Britain is particularly vulnerable to such immigration because English is the second language of choice for so many foreign EU nationals and the Blair Government, unlike almost all other EU states, made no attempt to stop immigrants from the EU new entrant states such as Polnd.

To the EU population legally entitled to settle may be added those granted asylum, the dependent foreign relatives of British citizens in Britain who are granted the right to join their relatives in Britain, the spouses of those who marry British citizens and those allowed to remain on compassionate grounds, foreign students from outside the EU and those granted work permits.

Finally, many of those who are here illegally manage to obtain access to British social provision by fraud. There is also the problem of “health tourism”, whereby foreigners come to Britain simply to obtain free treatment on the NHS – they are frequently successful because the NHS in practice rarely checks a patient’s immigration status.

All of this puts a tremendous extra burden on the British taxpayer and causes widespread resentment amongst the native population who naturally think that they should not be paying for foreigners or having to compete for the social provision which exists. The poorer members of society are particularly affected because they are the ones who most need social provision, especially in the areas of housing and healthcare – the poorer the area the more need for social housing and often the medical services available locally are meagre compared with more prosperous neighbourhoods. The success of the BNP in Dagenham at the local elections in May 2006 was due in part to the issue of social housing being perceived to be being swallowed up by recent immigrants.

The second way immigration weakens social provision is more subtle. If it is perceived by the native population that large amounts of money are being spent on foreigners, many, particularly those who are less in need of social provision, will begin to question its value at all. This is important because for social provision to be maintained in the long term it requires a general social acceptance. If the better off start to feel they should be paying less for that which they do not use (the better off actually get a very good deal out of the taxpayer – see section 4) there is the danger that necessary social provision will be significantly lessened.

What applies to first generation immigrants also applies to members of ethnic minorities who are born in a country. There are sufficient academic studies (for example, Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism ed. Frank Salter) of how ethnicity affects the willingness to pay for public provision to tell a clear story: people generally are more willing to support public provision where the provision goes to their own ethnic group.

The public, which is generally in favour of the Welfare State and other public provision such as education, stands helpless, trapped by a stagnant political system which offers them no choice. The ordinary working man is alarmed and resentful to see whole swathes of British industry vanishing as his political leaders tell him this is “inevitable” as employers look abroad for cheap labour. He is nervous when he hears constant calls to introduce private money into public services. Yet he finds that whatever he thinks it does not matter because neither the Labour or the Conservative parties offers him a conduit for his political wishes for both parties disagree with him. Nor can he gain access to the media to express his dissatisfaction or engage in debate. In short, the ordinary elector is practically disenfranchised.

42. Why is the repudiation of public provision happening?

It is easy to see why the Tories are supporting private initiatives over public, but what about Labour? Why are they so determined to go against all their tradition? The answer lies in a mixture of ideological change, expediency and international treaties.

The Labour Party is engaged in an ideological war. New Labour believes it transformed itself into an electable entity in the 1990s by repudiating the Party’s past. Whether that is true is irrelevant for our purposes. (My own view, for what it is worth, is that the Tory Party simply came to the end of the political road and Blair came in by default). What matters is that the received opinion amongst those who control the party today is that the Blairite “re-modelling” was the cause of Labour returning to power.

Blair’s government has increased public spending considerably. The problem is that it has been done shamefacedly and without any clear sense of direction or commitment that neither those in the public services nor the public have any clear idea of what the Government wants or how it will achieve it. Money has been flung at public services and individuals haphazardly, in the manner of a man making a religious or charitable offering, the giving being the important act.

At the same time as direct public spending has increased, the Government has crashed on with introducing ever more private money and private business activity into public service. Those in the public service do not know whether they are coming or going and the public just see more and more money being spent apparently to no good purpose. The consequence is both a blurring of the lines between public and private and a general feeling, whether justified or not, amongst the public that the future is horribly uncertain for public provision, a feeling made more poignant by the absence of any meaningful political opposition to what is happening. The danger is that much public provision could fall by default in such circumstances with the public becoming defeatist about the power of the state to provide the basics where the individual cannot.

Old Labour was and is wholeheartedly pro-public service. New Labour has to a significant but one-sided degree donned the economic clothes of Thatcherism. They have not in practice retained the low tax, low spend part of Thatcherism, (although in truth that was often more observed in theory than practice during the Thatcher years). What they have accepted with the fervour of the religious convert is the Thatcherite commitment to introducing private enterprise into public matters, either directly or through sub-contacting. In particular they want the burdensome government responsibility for complex organisations such as the NHS to be placed either at one remove in so-called freestanding agencies or, even better, cast adrift entirely into fully fledged private business where the public will pay directly rather than through their taxes.

This is not done from noble or even purely ideological motives. It is largely grubby expediency, both at the national and international level. On the domestic front, if a service can be put entirely outside the public realm, the government loses a responsibility. It neither has to account to the public for the service nor raise the money to pay for it. The public pays directly and the one time public employees cease to be a charge on the public purse, both as employees and as future pensioners.

Of course, the provision of some services is so absolutely essential that the government cannot shuffle off all responsibility – such as health and welfare provision – but even there they distance themselves by placing responsibility with so-called freestanding units such as the Benefits Agency or by diluting direct public control through contracting out such jobs as cleaning, transport and food supply. The advantages for the Government are two. First, the government has the opportunity to muddy the waters by saying that the people providing a poor service, for example, hospital cleaners, are not government workers (thus giving the spurious impression that the government are not responsible). Second, overt long-term costs are reduced because no pension costs are incurred by the taxpayer. I say overt because often such savings are offset by increased benefit take-up by those made unemployed, take low paid jobs which qualify them for benefit or who require more state aid in old age because they have no adequate workplace pension.

Although Labour has accepted the distancing of government from direct provision of public services part of Thatcherism, it has not accepted the other half of the equation, that government control of private enterprise should be slackened as much as possible. Judged by their performance since 1997, Labour’s general economic tactic at present is to control business without owning it. This, ironically for a government supposedly of the left, is the classic economic tactic of fascism.

Those are the mundane, dirty causes of the trend towards a repudiation of public provision, but there is also the question of psychology. The most corrosive aspect of politics is ideology. (The only sane way of approaching politics is to ask what ends you wish to achieve and then seek the means to achieve them. The means are important in as much as they should not be immoral or their employment in some way to compromise the desired ends.)

By ideology I mean a political creed which purports to have the  answer to everything. Marxism does that with its attachment to the  inexorable march of the dialectic through history: Neo-Liberalism does it with its quasi-religious belief in the market. It is the latter which has captured modern British politics, at least at the level of those who control the major parties.

Neo-liberalism, like Marxism, has considerable emotional rewards for its disciples because it offers a complete explanation of and guide to action for its disciples. The need for hard thought is removed, all the disciple has to do is refer to set principles and interpret any situation in their light. It is the type of creed to appeal to the religious temperament such as Blair’s.

The Blair Government is reflecting a general trend in the First World. We are moving into an age of plutocracy, of a time when the rich use their power to advance their own interests without concern for the poor and the poor have no power to stop them.

Nor is it only the poor who are affected. The middle classes may ape the rich and parrot their ideology, but they are increasingly finding it more and more difficult to sustain the lifestyle which people in their position had previously taken for granted, such things as home ownership, private schools and even a university education having all become so expensive that even an income well above the average cannot meet them all.

There is nothing surprising in this behaviour. Elites as a group will always behave selfishly at best and be deliberately abusively at worst.There may be individuals within an elite who will have a genuine concern for the poor – Lord Shaftesbury in the 19th Century for example with his campaign against child labour – but their concern will be corralled both by the limitations of their social horizon and by self-interest. Often a humanitarian cause will be divorced from the general inhumanity of the conditions of the poor – Wilberforce’s anti-Slavery campaign is a classic example. Very rarely indeed do members of an elite give up t eir own material privilege – two examples are the philosopher Wittgenstein and the Victorian English missionary C.T. Studd who both gave away their inherited wealth. However, even they did not give it to the poor, but transferred it to other members of their family.

All human institutions become corrupted by elite self-interest. The German sociologist Robert Michels developed the notion of the iron law of oligarchy early in the last century. He intended it to explain why institutions and movements supposedly devoted to the promotion of the interests of the poor, for example Social Democratic parties and trade unions, invariably became corrupted into being vehicles primarily for the promotion of the interests of those who gained power within them. In fact, what he was describing was a general behaviour associated with any formal institution. They invariably become a vehicle primarily for the promotion of the interests of those who gain power within the institution. Its ostensible purpose will be pursued to a degree but only in so much as it does not clash with the interests of its controllers. If we accept that elites will always exist because human  society is inevitably hierarchical, the central political question becomes how far can the masses prevent thwart the naturally abusive tendencies of the elite? For most of history the masses have been generally very unsuccessful in this aim. Their only times of success have come within the context of the modern nation state.

43. The nation state – the only democratic platform

Democracy in the literal direct sense does not exist in the modern world, indeed for practical reasons cannot exist in a state of any size. What we have is what political scientists call elective oligarchy, a political system whereby the electorate is offered a choice ever few years between competing parts of a society’s elite.

That paints a dismal picture for the masses. However, even within an elective oligarchy, they can exercise considerable control given the right circumstances. What the masses can do and have done for most of the past century and a half in Britain is exert an ever increasing control over the elite through representative institutions. But they have only been able to do this because the representative institutions have operated within the context of the national state. Elites as groups have been forced to take heed of the masses because they relied upon their votes to be re-elected and the system worked by and large because the major political parties offered a meaningful alternative on the most of the great issues.

In the past thirty years our political circumstances have changed dramatically. Two things have happened. The freedom of action of the Government and Parliament has been greatly reduced and the political parties have become ideologically aligned.

Entanglement in the EU has resulted in a majority of British legislation ultimately originating not in Parliament but within the European Commission, while various treaties have removed whole swathes of political choice from the electorate, ranging from proper control over foreign policy and border control to the pursuit of a national economic policy. Most profoundly the European single market agreement and the GATT treaty arrangements and membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have left British parties with no choice of economic policy, or as things stand they have to support the notions of free markets and free trade. Any party wishing to offer protectionism and state intervention in the economy cannot do it unless they commit themselves to withdraw from the EU and WTO.

The consequence of the our membership of the EU and our other treaties is that our politicians in practice can offer very little difference in policy to the electorate. And, of course, our politicians find it convenient to use our EU membership and other treaty obligations to excuse themselves from responsibility for unpopular measures or as justification for forcing through vast amounts of detailed legislation which Parliament, let alone the electorate, is barely aware is being passed into law.

The position is worsened by the careerism of the modern politician. This has always existed to a degree, but what we have now is of a different order of magnitude. The really depressing thing about the House of Commons now is the sheer narrowness of experience of the members, many of whom have never had a career other than their political one. Hence, once on the political career bandwagon they cannot afford to get off. The current bandwagon is the internationalist one.

Internationalisation od economics and politics dissolves national sovereignty. The left may cheer this but they are discovering by the day just how restrictive international treaties and membership of supranational groups can be. As things stand, through our membership of the EU and the World Trade Organisation treaties, no British government could introduce new socialist measures because they cannot nationalise companies, protect their own commerce and industry or even ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent in Britain with British firms. As far as economics is concerned, a British government can have any economic system they like provided it is largely free trade, free enterprise.

The Right are suffering the same sickness with different symptoms. They find that they are no longer masters in their own house. They cannot meaningfully appeal to traditional national interests because treaties and EU membership make that impossible. Control of national borders has gone.

A reversion to nationalism need not be a party political matter in Britain, but the modern British left are unfortunately conditioned to believe that the national state is at best outmoded and at worst xenophobic, racist even. This ignores both the history of the mainstream British left and mistakes form for content.

The Labour Party for almost all of its existence has been strongly protectionist and hence de facto in favour ofthe nation state. Indeed, Blair in the late 1980s was still an economic nationalist. Moreover, for most of the time Labour has been consciously in favour of the nation state and of Britain’s independence – few could give the likes of Attlee and Bevin lessons in patriotism.

As for mistaking form for content, it is simply a matter of empirical fact that the nation state does not produce a uniform behaviour – take Switzerland and Iraq from the present day as examples of that. The idea that nation state equals aggressive, xenophobic, badly behaved warmonger is a literal nonsense. In particular, there is good empirical evidence that where there is significant democratic control within a nation state, this makes aggressive war much less likely than where a dictatorship exists.

It is also true that supranational bodies are not noticeably better behaved than nation states. Worse, they have a large element of the sham in them, being invariably dominated by the more powerful component states, for example, the UN being heavily manipulated by the USA and the EU broadly controlled by its major members. Supranational bodies are not simply vehicles for the normal process of power-mongering, but, in practice, that is their prime function. That they give a spurious appearance of international agreement and legitimacy adds to the ability of the dominating states within them to exercise control over weaker states by direct threats, the withholding of money and, most insidiously, the development of bureaucracies which carry forward the policies forced on the supranational bodies by the most powerful members. ( It is often said that the UN has no power. This is utterly mistaken. It may not have an army but there is a vast web of agencies which allow a great deal of control and influence to be exercised over states which seek their assistance. Some such as the IMF and World Bank control client countries from the outside, while others such as UNHCR permit direct internal interference on the ground.)

44. Conclusion

Nothing I have written is meant to suggest that private enterprise is not the best way of managing most human economic activity. Being in favour of public services and the welfare state does not mean being in favour of spending for spending’s sake. Nor does it mean recklessly advocating public provision regardless of the cost.

History shows that governments are poor at managing enterprises in comparison to private business where proper competition exists and universal provision of the basics of life are not at stake. Nor should the government provide directly where the provision of money to those in need will solve the problem. It would be grossly inefficient, for example, if a government decided to supply food directly to people in need rather than give them the money to buy the food and even more outlandish if the Government decided they had to produce the food as well as supply it.

But there are some items which are beyond the realistic reach of most people. The provision of healthcare, education and a liveable pension in old age are absolute necessities because few of the population can undertake the cost of providing for these for themselves and their children. It is also essential that decent housing is available for all and the state should intervene to ensure its provision.

As a matter of policy direct public provision should be restricted to areas of service where universal provision is required and where it cannot be supplied by private businesses because of the need to make a profit.

It is also unhappily true that bureaucracies have no natural size. If a government is willing and the tax revenues sufficient, there is no end to the expansion of administrate for administration’s sake. Strict limits need to be put on the number of administrators, the limits to be set by deciding in advance what is to be provided and how much it will cost.

Universal provision has the advantage of simplicity and of maintaining the dignity of recipients. That rich and poor are eligible for the same provision is neither here no there because any seeming redundancy in providing benefits to the better off can be adjusted through the tax system, that is,  the richer you are the more income tax you should pay. (The very rich and the self-employed to a degree can avoid income tax, but most cannot).

Mixing public and private, as with PFI, fatally blurs lines of responsibility. This means that when things go wrong no one is held responsible. Politicians point the figure of blame at public servants running “arms-length offices” such as the Benefits Agency or the private companies which have supplied the service, civil servants point at private companies or even, whisper it softly, politicians, and private businessmen blame politicians and civil servants. The taxpayer is left with the worst of all worlds, the ultimate responsibility for picking up the bill but no meaningful control over how it is spent.

Necessary and desirable as public provision is, it should be, like private charity, a safety net not an end in itself. Monetary benefits to those of working age should not be so generous as to dull or even remove the desire and need to work where the individual is capable of doing so. Take away the need for private effort and the economy will suffer.

Supporters of public provision should always keep firmly in mind the fact that the money from the provision comes from the profits of private business. Take too much from that and the less there is for reinvestment and the starting of new businesses. In high tax, high regulation economies there is a considerable disincentive effect on business generally with a marked tendency for domestic companies to move to countries with a more friendly tax and regulatory regime and for foreign companies not to invest. That in turn will reduce the amount of future profit and private employment and consequently lessen the tax available for public provision. It is important not to kill the goose which lays the golden egg. This should be obvious, but all too often the supporters of public provision seem incapable of making the link between public spending and the ultimate source of the taxes which fund it.

In short, public provision should be kept to the minimum of what is  necessary for an advanced, civilised and stable communityand that provision should be adequate but not lavish. What needs to be understood above all is that if public provision is lost, the large majority of the population will find not that it is choice between public services and private services. Rather they will find the choice is between much reduced services or no services at all.

Administrative justice: Gordon Brown misbehaved in the same general way as Jeremy Hunt

A very large research laboratory, The Francis Crick Institute,  is being built on land behind the British Library in Kings Cross, London –  http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/2010/12/16/objection-to-ukcmri-planning-application-for-a-research-centre-in-brill-place-london-nw1/.

The land on which it being built was publicly owned. It was sold by ostensibly  public tender  by the Department of  Culture, Median and Sport (DCMS) in 2007 to  a consortium the United Kingdom Centre for Medical Research and Innovation (UKCRMI).

Just as the decision on the Murdoch bid to buy all the shares in BSkyB that News  Corps did not own was supposed to be decided impartially by a minister (Jeremy Hunt),  so was the sale of the land by the  Secretary of State for the DCMS . The reality was that there was no impartiality exercised. As is clear from the documents below which I obtained using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Gordon Brown persistently interfered with the sale by putting his weight behind one of a number of bidders. This invalidated the bidding process and

I made great efforts to get the story into the mainstream media and politics  – see http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/. These were unsuccessful which says a great deal about both our politicians and political  journalists. Nonetheless, it does stand as evidence of the persistent willingness of politicians to misuse their power  and of the British media to suppress political stories when it suits them.

There is another strong public interest in this story because the Francis Crick Institute will by dealing with highly toxic viruses and bacteria in its research. This makes it a serious and potentially catastrophic danger to London, both from lapses in bio-security and terrorist action.  The full story can be found at http://ukcmri.wordpress.com/.

Robert Henderson 27 4 2012

Gordon Brown’s involvement in the sale of the land to UKCRMI

February 21, 2011
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To make  the matter as simple as possible to follow,  I have selected from the  documents in my possession which show Gordon Brown’s illegitimate involvement in the sale of  the land to UKCRMI six which form a paper trail from the period before the closing date for expressions of interest  to the announcement of the sale of the land by Gordon Brown.  Some of the  documents are lengthy. To prevent readers having to plough through them   I have highlighted  (by bolding) the passages in the documents which refer directly or indirectly to Brown’s interest.  Where a figure such as  [40] appears, that means redaction has occurred under the exemptions in the FOIA –  the number relates to the clause number of the exemption.  These documents  also give a good sketch of the background to the bidding process.

Further relevant documents can be found athttp://ukcmri.wordpress.com/2010/12/16/objection-to-ukcmri-planning-application-for-a-research-centre-in-brill-place-london-nw1/

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NB This document shows that  Brown was interfering even before the closing date for expressions of interest was closed.  The relevant date is not that on Rosemary Banner’s letter, but the enclosure which came with the letter, i.e., 1 August 2007. 

HM TREASURY

I Horse Guards Road London SWIA 2HQ

Rosemary Banner

Head of Information Rights Unit

Tel: 020 7270 5723

Fax:

rosemary.banner@hm-treasury.x.gsi.gov.uk

http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk

Mr R Henderson

24 June 2009

Dear Mr Henderson

Freedom of Information Act 2000: medical research centre   We wrote to you on 27 August 2008 conveying the conclusions of the internal review carried out in relation to your complaint to the Treasury about the handling of your April 2008 request for information under the Freedom of Information Act.

In light of your complaint to the Information Commissioner we have reconsidered the single item of information that falls within the scope of your request that has not already been disclosed. As a result of this re-examination we have identified additional information that we are now able to provide to you. Please see attachment at the end of this letter. For the avoidance of doubt we should make it clear that the Treasury continues to regard its original decision not to release this information as correct at the request and review stage. However, given the passage of time, we believe that the public interest in withholding has diminished and can now be released.

We have, however, decided to continue to withhold two sentences from this information under section 35(1 )(a) of the Act. These sentences continue to relate to ongoing policy. We have explained our position to the ICO regarding this, and are able to clarify that the redacted sentences contain information on a bid for funding from the MRC that the Department for Business Innovation and Skills are assessing in the normal way. Funding decisions have not concluded. As always the Government will publish actual funding provisions once a decision has been reached. Due to the way funding bids are negotiated and assessed this was been a live issue at the time of the request; internal review; and remains so at this present time. To be helpful we refer to evidence published by the select committee in December 2007. You will see that at that time the bid was £118 million.

http://www. parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdius/1 85/1 85we02.htm

The Treasury is not able to comment as to what the final figure will be until a decision has been made, I reiterate that once decided it will be announced publicly.

Rosemary Banner

Head of Information Rights Unit

For HM Treasury

EXTRACT of relevant information extracted from a report prepared

 1 August 2007

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL RESEARCH (NIMR)   MRC concluded some years ago that the NIMR’s future location should be close to a London Teaching Hospital. With this in mind, MRC purchased at their risk for £28M in March 2006, but with Treasury’s knowledge, a one-acre site at the National Temperance Hospital location (NTH) in London.

MRC has recently learnt that its earlier preferred site for NIMR, a three-acre site adjacent to the British Library, has now become available. This larger site would have the major advantage of accommodating more translational research. Encouragingly MRC has most recently proposed that the site would be developed in partnership with Cancer Research UK (CRUK), Wellcome Trust and UCL as a potentially strong consortium. The Wellcome Trust have mentioned that they would be prepared to make a sizeable investment to help establish a new world class medical research facility in North London if they can secure DCMS-owned land and planning permission from Camden Council. At present the consortia has registered its interest in buying the site.

This project has had a very long gestation period, during which the arguments for the strong scientific case for relocating within London (which has a cluster of medical research and teaching hospitals) and the need to retain MRC’s highly skilled staff.

The recent preparation of a suitable business case has been further complicated of late by both the re-emergence of the British Library site as a possible location.  

The PM is also most recently stated that he is very keen to make sure that Government departments are properly coordinated on this project and that if there is a consensus that this is indeed an exciting project then we do what we can to make it happen. This is extremely helpful from a DIUS and MRC perspective, but, formally a NIMR relocation project in London has yet to receive Lyons approval from Treasury (for either the first planned NTH site or the possible BL site).

MRC have employed Deloitte to prepare a full business case for the relocation project.

The scientific and operational case for a London location is strong in our view.

Key Dates for the Preparation and Appraisal of the NIMR Proposal

- July 2007 — Letter to Treasury to inform CST of MRC’s proposed bid for the BL site.

-July/August 2007 — Expression of interest in the BL site registered by  the MRC Consortium.

-September 2007 — further substantive discussions with MRC/Deloitte  on Lyons and emerging business case material.

-September 2007 — MRC NIMR project included by RCUK in the 2007 Roadmap consultation.

-October 2007 — first full draft business case prepared by MRC/Deloitte.

-October 2007 — MRC consortium formally bid to DCMS for the BL site.

-November 2007 — Full revised business case received and Lyons case consideration undertaken by Treasury.

-December — Progress submission to Ministers.

-December 2007 — MRC Consortium formed and, if successful in bidding, payment to DCMS for the BL site.

-December 2007 — MRC’s NIMR project prioritised by Research Council Directors for receipt of DIUS funding through the Large Facility Capital Fund.

-February/March 2008 — Submission to Ministers for approval of LFCF allocation to support the MRC’s NIMR project, subject to our final assessment of (a) the outcome of the Lyons case (b) the full business case and (C) prioritisation by RCUK of the use of the available LFCF,

April/May 2008 — DIUS Ministerial announcement of NIMR relocation project approval (subject to all the above).

Further Background to the National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR) The NIMR is one of the MRC’s largest and oldest research institutes. The NIMR is recognised as once of the UK’s foremost basic research institutes with a strong scientific track record and reputation. NIMR currently  houses the World Influenza Centre (WIC), which was established by  World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1948. The Centre, works with a  network of collaborating laboratories to detect and characterise the emergence of new influenza virus anywhere in the world including avian virus H5N1. NIMR is also at the forefront of international research to discover how molecular changes in the virus affect its ability to infect people and cause disease.

The NIMR has been at its present site since 1950. If it were to remain there the buildings would need substantial refurbishment. It is currently a ‘stand-alone’ Institute not physically linked to any University, Medical School or Hospital. In 2003 the MRC set up an expert Task Force to examine the strategic positioning of the NIMR research within the MRC portfolio. The Task Force concluded that their vision for NIMR would be best delivered through an intramural — i.e. with the staff employed by MRC — research institute on a single site in central London in partnership with a leading university and hospital (they received proposals from King’s College and University College) and this would enhance: – The multidisciplinary nature of NIMR’s work, providing access to other biologists, physical scientists, engineers, and mathematicians – Opportunities to collaborate more closely with clinicians and strengthen the focus of translational research.

Remaining at Mill Hill was considered by the Task Force where the majority view was that this would not be a viable option as it would not deliver Council’s vision for a world class research institute carrying out basic, clinical and translational research in partnership with a leading university and hospital. The position was endorsed by the MRC Council. This disappointed some staff at NIMR and there has been much lobbying of Ministers and MPs and as a result the issue has received some media interest.

MRC Council selected UCL as its preferred partner for the renewal and relocation of NIMR in Central London, in close proximity to a major teaching hospital (University College Hospital) and relevant university departments, including chemistry and physics.

The MRC Council approved an outline Business Plan for the renewal and relocation of NIMR in July 2005. The Business Plan confirmed the feasibility of developing the renewed Institute on the National Temperance Hospital (NTH) site in Hampstead Road, which MRC bought (at its own risk but with Treasury’s knowledge), for £28M in 2006, suggesting that the new site could provide accommodation for up to 1,058 staff, including 248 from UCL and potentially 40 additional research staff.

MRC have recognised that their development of the business case needed to ensure a successful project and to satisfy the requirements of DIUS and Treasury requires additional skills to those residing within the MRC and most recently further advice has been procured by MRC from Deloitte for assistance with preparation of the business case.

It was also not our intention at review stage to withhold names of senior civil servants of the email provided at initial request. While we explained that the sender was Jeremy Heywood from the Cabinet Office we overlooked to state the other officials who were recipients of that email. They were: The Permanent Secretaries of DIUS and DCMS Ian Watmore and Jonathan Stephens; the Managing Director of Public Spending in HMT, John Kingman; and the Chief Operating Officer, DCMS Nicholas Holgate.

————————————————————————————

NB This document shows Brown’s  interest just before the short list of bidders was decided. 

RESTRICTED – POLICY & COMMERCIAL

To James Purnell Margaret Hodge, Jonathan Stephens,Ros Brayfield

From Nicholas Holgate

Date 18 September 2007 ____________

SALE OF LAND TO THE NORTH OF THE BRITISH LIBRARY

Issue: mainly for information but also to ask how you would wish to be involved in this transaction.

The Department owns 3.6 acres to the north of the British Library. With the completion of the new train terminal, we are able to sell it and have been conducting a competitive process so that Ministers can choose what represents best value, comprising not just the proceeds from sale but also the use to which the bidder intends to put the land.

2. We are bound to be concerned about proceeds:

a. There is an obvious obligation, on Jonathan as the department’s Accounting Officer, to secure the best return we can for the taxpayer;

b. the Government is close to breaching its fiscal rules and has set itself a demanding target for asset disposals. Your predecessor strongly rebutted the Treasury’s proposal that we should sell assets worth £150m by 2010-11 and it has not formally been debated since your arrival; but we are likely to have to raise some funds from disposals. In any case:

c. proceeds from this sale are earmarked to contribute towards the budget of the Olympic Delivery Authority for 2007-08.

3. Subject to Treasury agreement, we can nevertheless also take public value” into account. We are aware of two such bids one led by the Medical Research Council, with support from the Wellcome Foundation and others for a research facility; and one that wishes to remain confidential but which is essentially related to faith and education.

4. The facts are:

a. We have now received 28 bids in response to a prospectus. Amongst other things, the prospectus drew attention to the local planning policy guidance, which steers bidders towards a scheme that is roughly 50:50 commercial and residential development with 50% affordable housing. It is Camden Borough Council and the Mayor who will have the last word on what is in fact built on the site;

b. Our professional advisers have scored the bids on various criteria and are interviewing the top seven plus two others (the medical research bid is one of the two others) next week;

c. There is a significant financial gap between the top bids and the medical research bid.

5. Jonathan and I are meeting Jeremy Heywood (who is aware of both public value bids), Ian Watmore (Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills) and John Kingman (Treasury) tomorrow. We need to agree an orderly and appropriate process for selling the land, given the public value bidders, other Departments’ interest and the likelihood that the Prime Minister might wish to take an interest too.

6. We will report back to you then. Subject to your views and others’, one potential way forward is a. DIUS economists be invited to assess the public value of the medical research bid. We will need some such calculation if we sell at a discount. DCMS should not do this as we should display some neutrality between bidders . We decide whether we expect the medical research bid to match the best bid, improve their offer but not necessarily to match, or take a lower value on the chin. Given their backers, they can afford to match. But they may refuse to play; and/or we may not wish to be seen to be reducing their funding for good causes just to maximise proceeds;

c. We see whether there is a Government champion for the other bidder;

and

d. We then fairly characterise the two public value bidders and the best commercial bid (or bids, if they differ significantly in what they propose) to Ministers and No 10 for a decision.

Nicholas Holgate

Chief Operating Officer

————————————————————————————

NB This shows Brown’s interest a few weeks before the sale to UKCRMI was agreed.

BRIEFING NOTE FROM POLICY ADVISERS DATED 12 NOVEMBER 2007 TO THE PRIME MINISTER COPIED TO No 10 OFFICIALS.

THE NOTE WAS ENTITLED: PROJECT BLISS – CREATING A WORLD-LEADING MEDICAL RESEARCH FACILITY IN LONDON

Disclosable extracts:

We are close to being ready to announce Government support for the creation of a world-leading medical research facility in London.

The key component being finalised is the sale of land, which will allow the BLISS partner organisations (the Medical Research Council, Cancer Research UK, the Wellcome Trust and University College London) to develop their detailed proposals for the creation of the centre.

We anticipate that the deal will be finalised over the next few days and we should be able to announce the outcome of the process In the next few weeks. On current plans, we would expect the sale to complete during December and preparations for development to begin straight away. The expectation is that the Institute would be up and running by 2012.

This is an important opportunity to demonstrate what the UK’s commitment to medical research really means in practice. And it fits very well with the focus of your intended health speech.

What would you be announcing?

• We would be committing Government support to the creation of a new centre for UK biomedical research, with 1,500+ scientists, at a level commensurate with the very best institutions in the world.

• The BLISS consortium brings together four of the leading medical research institutions in the UK – the Medical Research Council, Cancer Research UK, the Wellcome Trust and University College London.

• The Centre responds to the vision, outlined in Sir David Cooksey’s review of UK health research presented to Treasury in 2006, of better integration and translation of research into patient and public benefit. The Centre will benefit from economies of scale, enhanced infrastructure, the critical mass to optimise collaboration, and the capacity to take scientific discoveries from the lab bench to the hospital bed.

• These four key partners, together with the expectation that other organisations would come forward to invest In the centre or to lease research space, bring a powerful combination of skills and capabilities — basic research, applied research, the capabilities to convert research and innovation for public and commercial use, and the skills and opportunities presented by access to a leading university and teaching hospital. The potential, In terms of understanding disease, and developing new drugs, treatments and cures, is huge.

How to announce?

The suggestion is that you announce this a few days before your health speech, planned for 6th December. We would suggest a visit to a high-tech medical site in the morning to get pictures, followed by a meeting at No lO with all relevant stakeholders (primarily the four partner organisations) at which you make the formal announcement and ‘launch’ the project. Let us know your thoughts on whether this is the right way to proceed with the BLISS announcement?

Background

The vision for the BLISS Centre has six themes:

Research innovation and excellence • Bring together outstanding scientists from two world-class research institutes (MRC NIMR and the Cancer Research UK London Research Institute), collaborating with UCL, to address fundamental questions of human health and disease. • Through Wellcome Trust funding, development of tools for integrative biology, with an emphasis on the development of advanced microscopy imaging and on the mathematicaland computational needs in this field.

• Increase scientific innovation through new links with the physical sciences, life sciences, mathematics, engineering and the social Sciences at UCLI

• Develop close links between the Centre and the outstanding hospitals nearby (Including the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases at Queens Square, Great Ormond Street, Moorfields and University College Hospital) and other major hospitals in London (including Hammersmith Hospital and the MRC Clinical Sciences Centre at Hammersmith, and the Maudsley Hospital and the Institute of Psychiatry)1 State-of-the-art research facilities

• Develop a multidisciplinary research complex operating in state-of-the-art facilities, with the size and diversity to be internationally competitive with the world’s top research institutes.

• Establish a new centre for development of advanced imaging technologies and analysis. A national focus for biomedical science

• Interact with other local centres of excellence to foster and facilitate collaboration between basic, translational and Clinical scientists1  Host national and international research meetings and conferences, facilitated by its proximity to national and International transport links and the conference facilities of the British Library. An effective interface with technology transfer and development

• Facilitate the effective development of therapeutic and diagnostic devices and drugs, by allowing the technology transfer arms of MRC and Cancer Research UK to work closely together.

• Drive innovation in developing tests and technologies through interaction between researchers and development laboratories.

Finding and developing the scientists of the future • Provide an attractive environment to secure and retain world-class scientists by providing an outstanding setting for research and collaboration. • Boost the recruitment and training of scientists and doctors of the future by providing an excellent environment for postgraduate and postdoctoral training, and for training outstanding clinical scientists committed to medical research.

Engaging with the public

• Educate the public on important issues in health and disease.

• Bring together and enhance partners’ public information and education programmes, with a particular focus on engaging younger people.

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NB This document shows Brown’s involvement just prior to the sale of the land.

BRIEFING NOTE FROM NO 10 POLICY ADVISER TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 27 NOVEMBER 2007

COPIED TO NO 10 OFFICIALS

ENTITLED “MEETING WITH PAUL NURSE ON BLISS PROJECT”

You are meeting Paul Nurse who is likely to lead the BLISS institute, along, with Mark Walport, Director of The Wellcome Trust, and Harpal Kumar, Head of Cancer Research, two partners in BLISS

We are close to being ready to announce Government support for plans to create a world-leading medical research facility in London, led by the BLISS consortium made up of the Medical Research Council, Cancer Research UK, the Wellcome Trust and University College London.

We have now effectively finalised negotiations on the sale of the 35 acre site, adjacent to the British Library: a price has been agreed with DCMS, and the deal is complete subject to agreement on how much of the proceeds DCMS will retain. We are therefore ready for an announcement next week on the sale of the land – but will not be announcing full details of the project overall, as there remain various Issues to resolve, including reaching agreement on business plans and gaining planning permission. We would therefore announce the Government’s support for the vision of the new centre – rather than definitive support for the centre itself. The Project BLISS consortium brings together four leading medical research institutions in the UK and will create a new centre for UK biomedical  research, with 1,500+ scientists, at a level commensurate with the very best Institutions in the world.

The Centre responds to the vision, outlined in Sir David Cooksey’s review of UK health research presented to Treasury in 2006, of better integration and translation of research into patient and public benefit.

The Centre will benefit from economies of scale, enhanced infrastructure, the critical mass to optimise collaboration, and the capacity to take scientific discoveries from the lab bench to the hospital bed. The Centre will create a place for:

• collaboration, between leading scientists and clinicians, working on some of the most pressing medical problems of our time;

 • excellence, maintaining the quality of the UK’s life sciences research base;

• application, making links between research, medical practice and the pharmaceutical industry;

• innovation, translating research innovation into new treatments;

 • learning, bringing forward a new generation of scientific leaders;

  •discovery, showcasing the challenges and potential of life sciences to a new audience.

• Using the close proximity to the British Library, the Centre will develop a public engagement and education programme.

Sir Paul Nurse

Sir Paul Nurse is President of Rockerfeller University, formerly Joint Director General of Cancer Research UK and winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize for Medicine. His appointment has not yet been publicly announced,but he is set to lead the project as chair the Scientific Planning Committee.

Briefing note from Bliss

————————————————————————————

NB This document from just before the sale of the land shows  the extent of Brown’s involvement with the suggestion that he would arbitrate.  

Sent: 27 November 2007 13:09

To: HOLGATE NICHOLAS

Cc: _[40]_____________

Subject: RESTRICTED – Land to the North

Hi Nicholas,

Jonathan spoke to Jeremy Heywood this morning. Jeremy said he needed the bid to be agreed by next Wednesday – 5 Dec (or Thursday  latest) as PM wanted to get MRC in then (or possible public announcement.

Jonathan explained that there are two issues from our point of view: .No revised formal offer has been received by DCMS .HMT are not being helpful of recycling returns – without an improved offer from HMT JS said it would he v hard to justify.

JR said he thought the offer was sent to us yesterday – have checked but  nothing in JSs post or email – JH will chase. JH also said he would go   back to HMT to see what more they can do, but that ultimately PM may have to arbitrate.

Cheers

[40]

[40]

Private Secretary  to Jonathan Stephens

Department for (Culture, Media and Sport 2-4 Cockpur Street, London

SWlY 5Dl1 email: [40]@culture.gsi.gov.uk tel: 0207211 fax: 020 72116259

————————————————————————————

NB This document shows Brown’s state of mind immediately after the sale of the land was agreed.

Treasury document

From – name censored

Sent: 04 December 2007 19:49

To: name(s) censored.

CC: name(s) censored)

Thanks for everyone’s help and support in making the announcement tomorrow happen. The PM is truly delighted that departments have been able to work together to secure this huge opportunity for Britain

RESTRICTED – COMMERCIAL

The Great Charity Scam

Most people when faced with the word charity attached to an institution are inclined to be well disposed to the organisation regardless of what the charity is supposed to do.  If it is a popular area of work, such as medical research or the provision of services to disabled children, rationality goes out of the window.  Hardly anyone questions how the money is spent or how much of it actually goes to the people the charity are supposedly helping. Even fewer ask where charities get their money from, the public commonly  subscribing to the  benign but erroneous assumption that it is collected largely from money put into collecting boxes or donations made by the living or the dead directly to charities. There is a further commonly believed  fantasy that those collecting for charities are  unpaid volunteers cheerfully giving their time out of  pure altruism, a fantasy which quite incredibly often extends to  that  persistent nuisance known as  “chuggers”  who aggressively buttonhole  people in the street.

The truth is a great deal more complex and murkier than the general public imagines.  The most dramatic subversion of charities comes in the form of national and local governments directing taxpayers’ money to charities to perform work which would otherwise be undertaken either directly by the public body or through the employment of a private enterprise contractor.  The charities who accept  public money – and the vast majority of the larger ones do – become no more than subcontractors  to  government.

The extent of  public funding is massive:  In 2010 the Charities Commission (which oversees charities in England and Wales) concluded  “that almost a quarter of the large charities consider public sector funding to be their most important source of income. (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/government-cutbacks-could-wipe-out-25-per-cent-of-charities-1926155.html). In February 2010 ‘ Cardiff University’s school of social sciences on behalf of the public services union Unison predicted that many charities will go bust” [because of coalition cuts in funding]’ and concluded  that ‘More than half of charities’ income now comes from government contracts to deliver public services.’  (ibid).

The use of charities to provide public services  fits in with the Coalition Government’s  drive to subcontract public provision. This means that all three major British political parties officially support the use of charities as government subcontractors, albeit  half-heartedly by the LibDems. Whoever is in power for the foreseeable future, it is a fair bet that the relationship between charities and the Government will broaden and deepen.

As for fundraising from the public, “chuggers”  are paid, a basic and sometimes  bonuses.   They work for fundraising firms who receive payments from a charity for every recruited donor. (http://www.pfra.org.uk/face-to-face_fundraising/do_you_object_to_chuggers/they_are_paid/).  Many of the larger charities run regular raffles. My experience of these is that once a raffle a raffle has been entered  they will not only send  details of all future raffles but in many cases send out second letters urging entry into the raffle if an entry has not been received a few weeks before the closing date. I  have also been positively bombarded with requests, both by letter and email, for  donations not only from charities to which  I have donated , but also from  charities to  which I have never contributed .   This can only mean charities sell on donors details to other charities and quite probably to private business.

The other prime problem with  charities, even large ones, is the fact that they are often very inefficient. The poorly run ones spend a great deal on administration.  They spend inordinate  amounts  on advertising. They hoard money rather than spend it. They manage their money poorly. They fail to modernise their services. Their accounts are inadequate. The idea that charities will be more efficient than direct public provision  is simply laughable. Not only do they suffer from the structural ills of public service they lack any proper  public accountability. Charities are audited each year, but that audit is much less demanding than the audit required of large public companies. Moreover, their frequent failure to keep adequate records makes  any audit of the use of public money very difficult. It would also be a very  expensive job to monitor their spending of public  money meaningfully.

Take the case of Scope, the charity previously known as the Spastics Society, which aids those with cerebral palsy.  It is a mainstream charity of just the sort to attract public sympathy in large measure. The first thing to note is that it changed its name in 1994 from something everyone could immediately understand – the Spastics Society- to something which most people would not have a clue about. The charity had allowed itself to be seduced by the marketing sirens.  It is difficult to imagine this confusion did not have some effect on fundraising.

In January 2006 Scope announced it was shutting 50 of its shops because it had a predicted £310 million deficit. (Daily Telegraph 13/01/2006). The Telegraph account went on to disclose that Scope’s last accounts showed that it was budgeting to spend £35.6 million more than it received in the financial year 2006/7, that there was a hole in its pension fund and that its buildings suffer widespread dilapidation through lack of investment.  I think most people who think about it would be somewhat disturbed by the idea that a charity had a pension fund of any size and that a substantial part of their donations are going to fund it. Charities in the public mind are thought of as institutions where people offer their services either free or at a discounted rate. The idea that their paid employees are just like any other employee does not fit comfortably with the public’s idea of charity.

One of the directors of Scope Jan Hildreth at that time  (he was also a former director-general of the Institute of Directors summed up the mentality of his and many other charities: “Like many charities, the concern of the society has always been its activity and not its finances.”(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1507717/Scope-to-close-50-charity-shops-as-10m-loss-looms.html). Interestingly  Scope blamed part of its plight on ‘the Government for underfunding services it provides, such as residential and school places.  “It wants our services, but it doesn’t want to pay for them,” the spokesman said. “This is a drain on our coffers.” ‘ (ibid).

To inefficiency add fraud. The National Fraud Authority estimates  internal and external fraud against the charities costs £1.3 billion a year ( http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/about_us/contacting_us/p_brief_charities_fraud.aspx).

The use of charities as government sub-contractors has other pernicious effects. It allows a government to evade responsibility even more effectively than the employment of private companies does because charities, especially popular ones,  throw up a moral shield. As mentioned above people feel that money spent by a charity is a good in itself. That applies even when it is taxpayers’ money.

Often the public is not even aware that public money has gone to a charity. This means that governments can support unpopular policies, such as those associated with political correctness, without the general public being aware that public money is being used to promote the policies. A  government can also make charitable donation part of their PR because they can  gain kudos from the public by publicising their donations of taxpayers’ money to popular charities.

As the Scope complaint quoted above suggests, governments may also see  charities as a cheap means of public provision. Whether it is or not is another matter – personally I would doubt it because of the widespread incompetence in the charity world.. There is a further objection to the use of charities as publicly funded providers. They have a moral and civic role. The whole point of a charity is that it is the product of the individual will, a conglomeration of the active decisions of those who choose to make a contribution.  It is part of what academics like to call civil society, those institutions which men naturally form in a free society and which fall outside the ambit of the state. Lose or even seriously diminish those institutions and the state determines all, for there is nothing to oppose it or offer an alternative.

Making a charity simply or largely a client of government undermines the very idea of charity. There is every chance that if charities are seen as arms of government, private donations to them will begin to dry up. That in turn would have spending implications for the taxpayer, because although often inefficient,  charities do fund a considerable amount of what would therwise be described as public provision. The taxpayer would end up footing the bill for extra public provision.

State funding also makes charities forget their original role. The  natural tendency for charities who become heavily dependent on public money is to  cease to view their organisation as a charity and see it simply as a business.  There was a good example in the news this week.  The St John’s Ambulance (SJA), a charity which provides medical services at most major public event in Britain and which is much admired by the public has decided to “rationalise” the charity by moving from a system of localism with money raised in an area being spent there to a centralised  treasury which will collect all the money raised throughout the UK  and distribute it as their  central management sees fit.  The volunteers fear that the change will make people less willing to volunteer for unpaid work.  As the SJA has 1,600 paid staff and 40,000 volunteers, the effect  of the change could be dramatic.  (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/8684165/St-John-Ambulance-abandoning-volunteers-over-restructure-project.html).

The SJA also displays another unpretty trait of modern charities; the expansion of highly paid posts. The proposed SJA  reform will involve  the creation of “ eight regional directors will be created on salaries of £80,000 a year plus benefits to represent London, the south east, south west, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, North-West and North East.”  (Ibid).  Salaries exceeding £100.000 for chief executives are common (http://society.guardian.co.uk/salarysurvey/table/0,12406,1042677,00.html).  Sometimes the percentage of donations taken by senior staff is astonishing. Take PACT, a charity run by the wife of Sir Anthony Meyer, with Cherie Blair – a close friend of Lady Meyer – as patron. Here is the Mandrake column in the Telegraph reporting on 25 May 2011 “… all but £9,500 of the money received in donations by Pact, which stands for Parents & Abducted Children Together, was paid to the Chanel-clad Catherine Meyer, who is the chief executive, and to one member of staff.

“Lady Meyer, who is also its president, and her employee were paid a total of £49,586. Lady Meyer received almost 70 per cent of that sum. Pact’s income from donations was £59,056 and it received a further £38,234 in grants…

“We are doing a huge amount of work for very little salary,” she said. “I used to work in the City and earned much more.”

Her husband, and six of Pact’s 11 trustees, added in a letter: “We consider it to be at the low end of the pay scale for chief
executives of charities with a demanding brief. “(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/8534133/Cherie-Blair-is-in-no-hurry-to-speak-up-for-charity-boss-Lady-Meyer.html).
The example beautifully demonstrates the inability of those running charities to understand the difference between a business and a charity.

The danger for charities which lose their popular base and become dangerously dependent on public  funding is that they  run the risk of being left stranded when the economic tide goes out.  When, as is happening today, public funding is cut many will find that they cannot fill the gap because they have put too many of their campaigning eggs in one basket.

There is a further serious  problem, namely what is a  legitimate charity? Charity is big business. According to the Charity Commission, as at June 2001 there were 161,978 registered charities in England and Wales with a combined income of £56 billion (http://www.charity-commission.gov.uk/About_us/About_charities/factfigures.aspx).   Is it
really possible that such a vast number of good causes exist which deserve the considerable privileges granted to them by the state?

Take our private schools (many of them bewilderingly for foreigners called public schools).  They are overwhelmingly charities. They also have in most cases a history of one hundred years or more. This means that the profit motive is absent and a quasi public-service (civil society) ethos has had time to evolve. Yet public schools – which get around £100 million tax relief – have always subsidised the education of the poorer middle-class children rather than the education of the truly poor. Why should they have status of a charity?

There are also many questionable cases where the charity exists to fund something which is essentially, even in principle,  a private or sectional interest, for example the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Why should the taxpayer subsidise such institutions?

The biggest charitable status bone of contention is political action.  The Charities Commission permits political campaigning  “Yes – any charity can become involved in campaigning and in political activity which further or support its charitable purposes, unless its governing document prohibits it” but bans charities having a political purpose “A charity cannot have a political purpose. Nor can a charity undertake political activity that is not relevant to, and does not have a reasonable likelihood of, supporting the charity’s charitable purposes”  (http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc9.aspx#11).  This is completely impractical. For example, how can  a charity whose purpose is to support immigrants in applications for asylum, fight deportation and so forth not  have a political purpose?  There can also be the complication of  public funding which is a political matter in itself. Take the Immigration Advisory Service (IAS) which is currently insolvent,viz: .

” The Immigration Advisory Service (IAS), the largest provider of publically funded immigration and asylum legal advice,  advised today that it had been placed into administration. The IAS, a registered charity, has been in existence for 35 years, and employs 300 staff at 14 locations across England and Scotland. It is renowned for a large number of important legal precedent cases which have been taken through the Courts, including to the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights.

“The Governments reforms include the removal of immigration from the scope of legal aid, and a 10% cut in legal aid fees for refugees seeking asylum within the UK. Immigration accounts for around 60% of IAS’s income. There are few organisations that could cope with the compound effect of removal of immigration from the scope of legal aid and a cut in fees for asylum clients.

“The IAS has been in discussion with the Legal Services Commission (LSC) in an attempt to gain support for a solvent restructure of its operations. IAS had also tried to reach an agreement with LSC for an extended period to repay monies which (in common with many other firms) had been claimed in error, partly, in IAS’s view, due to the complex funding rules in place. The legal aid cuts put IAS in the position of needing to fund any repayment of these monies, from a much reduced income base, and as a result it has not proved possible to reach agreement on a way forward.” (http://www.iasuk.org/home.aspx).  How can that not be an organisation with a political purpose?

Charities epitomise the difficulties of mixing private and public. It is true that as non-profit making bodies they share some of the ethos of public service and the profit motive is absent, but their entanglement with government has utterly undermined their charitable status and moral stature.   How do we return them to  their proper purpose? Charitable status should only be granted to those who raise their own money. Paid fundraisers should be banned.  Limits should be put on the amounts spent on administration and advertising.  Charities should only be registered which undertake their entire work in the UK. Those currently registered which are inherently political should have their charitable status removed.  Only  those with a purpose which could potentially benefit anyone should be registered.  Examples would be those dealing with medical research or care of the old.

Impractical? A recipe for chaos? No. Much of what charities now do is what government should be doing. Governments would have to do their duty and either employ what are now charities as simple  subcontractors without charitable status or make other arrangements. A great deal of the rest is simple political action under the guise of charity or the subsidy of of particular  interests without any wider social benefit.  Some charities such as the IAS are directly opposed to the UK’s interests.  A radical review is required of what should constitute  a charity.

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